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Introduction: Household Finances and
Labor Supply – The Role of Public
Policies
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to better understanding the role of various
public policies in shaping opportunities, incentives and ultimately economic decisions at
the individual and household level. The four independent research papers that consti-
tute the thesis employ microeconometric methods to explore causal relationships between
policy interventions, household consumption and labor supply, with a particular interest
in low-income households. Chapters one and two both focus on the effects of minimum
wages among groups exhibiting lower skills than those present in the average population:
teens and the non-employed, respectively. Chapter three investigates the work incentives
inherent in tax-benefit systems across 12 countries of the European Union and how these
incentives influence labor supply decisions on the extensive margin. Chapter four consid-
ers the effect of an in-kind benefit, namely the availability of public health insurance, on
household medical spending and consumption.
Chapter one presents joint work with David Neumark. In this paper, we explore
the drivers of the observed teen substitution away from working while in school and
toward exclusively being enrolled, which has substantially contributed to a decline in
teen employment in the United States since 2000, in particular among 16-17 year-olds.
We consider three main explanatory factors that are often discussed in the media and
academic debate: rising minimum wages that could reduce employment opportunities for
teens; increasing returns to schooling that could render an intensified focus on academic
pursuits more valuable; and competition from immigrants that, like minimum wages,
may reduce employment opportunities. We investigate this question using a cross-section
of data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and other sources and estimate a
multinomial logit model for the share of teens in each of four mutually exclusive and
exhaustive categories: not in school and not employed (NSNE or idle), employed and not
in school (ENS), in school and employed (SE), and in school and not employed (SNE).
Among the factors investigated, higher minimum wages prove to be the predomi-
nant explanation for changes in the schooling and workforce behavior of 16-17 year-olds
since 2000. Immigration from majority Spanish-speaking countries may have played a
minor role, while we do not find evidence of higher returns to schooling having made a
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significant contribution to this trend. The long-term human capital implications of our
findings remain somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, both factors– minimum wages
and competition from immigration – are associated with fewer opportunities to gain valu-
able labor market experience, which may have persistent, negative effects on potential
lifetime earnings and employment probabilities of teen cohorts exposed to these factors.
On the other hand, both factors could encourage teens to invest more in schooling in
order to qualify for jobs with higher productivity standards. The question of the long-run
returns to these competing types of labor market and academic experience, remains an
important area for future research.
Whereas chapter one uses variation in incremental increases in minimum wages
across states and time to identify induced changes in enrollment and employment de-
cisions, chapter two exploits a rather large quasi-natural experiment consisting in the
introduction of a highly binding statutory minimum wage in Germany in 2015 and takes
issue with changes to wage expectations of non-employed job seekers. This chapter is
joint work with Alexandra Fedorets.
While a large literature exists with respect to minimum wage impacts on employ-
ment and wages of the general population, chapter two presents the first causal study
using quasi-experimental methods to identify the effect on reservation wages of the non-
employed. We use exogenous variation in the reform exposure across regions and time
in a difference-in-difference framework to identify an 18 percent increase in reservation
wages among non-employed job seekers at the low end of the distribution of expected
wages following the introduction of the minimum wage. We also document a shift in the
observed wages of workers of a similar magnitude. Our findings suggest that minimum
wages do not necessarily result in higher labor force participation, as job seekers may
adjust their reservation wages accordingly.
Like chapters one and two, chapter three is dedicated to explaining labor supply
decisions at the individual level, but with a specific focus on the household context. In
collaboration with Charlotte Bartels, I investigate the role of tax-benefit systems across
12 European countries in contributing to the observed divergence in labor force partic-
ipation rates of low-skilled workers and secondary earners between 2008-2014. Using
EUROMOD harmonized data and the accompanying tax-benefit microsimulation model,
we compute participation tax rates (PTRs) as a measure of work disincentives for labor
market participation in each country.
By exploiting the institutional variation in tax-benefit policies modelled in EURO-
MOD and a group IV for the PTR, we go beyond comparing levels of work incentives to
assess the actual responsiveness of individuals to these extensive margin tax rates. We
compute heterogeneous participation elasticities by country, gender and the individual’s
2
potential earner role within the household (primary, secondary, sole earner) and find this
latter factor dominant in explaining the responsiveness of individuals in their decision
to work or not to work. Irrespective of gender, we find negligible responses for primary
earners and large responses for secondary earners. The paper contributes to the ongoing
debate in the EU regarding policies that incentivize work and moreover offers European
evidence corroborating the observed convergence in male and female labor supply elas-
ticities in the US, as traditional divisions of labor break down in some EU countries.
Because our findings demonstrate the importance of estimating participation elasticities
based on economic concepts like opportunity costs rather than gender, they should be of
relevance for researchers working on labor supply models and optimal taxation as well as
for policy-makers interested in the labor supply effects of tax-benefit systems.
Finally, chapter four turns to the monetary incentives of the in-kind benefit of
public health insurance and its subsequent impact on spending and consumption behavior
of low-income households in the United States. While this paper does not treat labor
supply directly, understanding the effect of public insurance on the budget constraint is
a prerequisite to investigating its potential labor supply effects, which I intend to explore
in future research.
Using data from the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS), I estimate the
short-run impact of Medicaid public insurance expansion under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA), which was implemented in 2014, on medical out-of-pocket
spending (OOP). I measure exposure to the reform at the household level according to
eligibility rules and apply a DD(D) identification strategy to exploit variation in eligibility
across regions, income groups and time. I find that a one standard deviation increase in
public insurance expansion significantly reduced household OOP among Medicaid-eligible
households by 8.8 percent for medical services and products and by 12.0 percent for
insurance premia. It moreover reduced risk exposure to high-cost payments. However, I
find no effect on access to urgent care or utilization of preventive care services. Results
demonstrate some crowd-out of private insurance in the order of 4.6 percent, but also a
reduction in inefficient charity care in favor of more formal public insurance schemes. On
net, Medicaid expansion increased the share of total medical costs paid by public sources
by 10.9 percent.
3
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2 Great Expectations: Reservation
Wages and Minimum Wage Reform
2.1 Introduction
Neoclassical, monopsonistic, and search theoretical models all predict negative labor de-
mand reactions to the introduction of a binding minimum wage that is set above marginal
productivity of labor. On the supply side, however, the same minimum wage could in-
crease the number of people whose reservation wage1 falls below the available market
wage, thus increasing the probability of filling vacancies in low-wage sectors. Yet, this
supply-side effect can only mitigate potential employment losses if reservation wages are
static. If reservation wages react to minimum wages by adjusting upward, non-employed
job seekers do not necessarily increase their search intensity and thus, this supply chan-
nel for possible positive employment effects would prove muted at best. The question of
how minimum wages affect the wage expectations of non-employed job-seekers is therefore
highly relevant for understanding the distributional and labor market effects of this policy
tool.
In this paper, we empirically investigate changes to the reservation wages of non-
employed job seekers induced by the 2015 statutory minimum wage introduction in Ger-
many. We employ a difference-in-difference strategy using variation in exposure to the
reform across regions and time. Defining a treatment intensity ’bite’ measure as the de-
gree of each non-worker’s exposure to the reform according to his/her county (ROR) of
residence, we compare reservation wages of individuals facing different levels of exposure
before and after the reform.
Theoretically, the relationship between reservation wages and minimum wages be-
longs to common model assumptions. Within the neoclassical framework of a competitive
market structure, binding minimum wages should increase reservation wages through in-
flation expectations. In labor markets with search and matching frictions, reservation
wages may adjust positively to increases in the observed wages of workers or negatively
to a decrease in the job offer arrival rate. In the present case of the introduction of
a high-impact statutory minimum wage in Germany, economic theory yields ambiguous
predictions about how reservation wages may adjust. First, the market structure is un-
1Defined by the threshold at which a potential worker is willing to accept a job offer.
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observable. Second, while early evidence suggests a rightward shift of the wage offer
distribution on account of the minimum wage introduction (Caliendo et al., 2017; Bossler
and Gerner, 2016), a consensus has yet to be reached on the employment impact and thus
changes to the job offer arrival rate for job seekers.
Targeting long-run effects, Blo¨mer et al. (2018) estimate an equilibrium search model
using a two percent representative sample of German low- and medium-skilled individuals
subject to social security contributions and find a large, total increase in unemployment in
the order of 13 percent compared to the steady state level. Bossler and Gerner (2016) use
the IAB Establishment Panel data with a difference-in-differences identification strategy
and find a smaller 1.9 percent decrease in employment among affected German establish-
ments compared to non-affected ones, driven predominantly by a reduction in new hires.
Using combined data from the Structure of Earnings Survey and the Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP), Caliendo et al. (2018) find even smaller employment reductions for a sam-
ple of prime-aged workers of approximately 0-0.3 percent of regular jobs and 2.4 percent
of mini-jobs. Likewise focusing on a sample of prime-aged workers with data from the
Federal Employment Agency, Garloff (2016) finds no significant impact of the minimum
wage on employment.2 We return to these early findings of small or insignificant dis-
employment effects in 2015-2016, which are driven by the reduction in new hires, in our
discussion of possible selection effects in our estimation.
Beyond the burgeoning research evaluating the employment effects of the German
minimum wage, a large literature has explored the effects of minimum wages on the hourly
wages and employment of workers in other countries. Belman and Wolfson (2014) and
Neumark and Wascher (2008) provide excellent surveys. With respect to the non-employed
job seekers, however, the empirical link between minimum wages and reservation wages
has largely been neglected in the literature due to lack of information about individual
acceptance thresholds. One prominent exception is Falk et al. (2006), who conduct a
lab-based experiment and find a positive and significant impact of minimum wages on
reservation wages. They demonstrate that minimum wages set a new standard for fair
pay and create entitlement effects that persist even after the removal of a wage floor.
While we are unaware of other papers employing reduced form strategies to directly
investigate the link between reservation wages and minimum wages, this paper contributes
to related structural work on the optimal search behavior and joblessness duration of job
seekers (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998; Flinn, 2006). It is well established that higher
2Differences in the estimated effects of these studies for Germany can be attributed to two main factors.
First, ex-post studies of treatment effects inevitably focus on the short-run impacts while equilibrium
search models target longer term trends. Second, effects tend to be smaller when sampling the entire
prime-aged population rather than groups likely to be more affected.
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reservation wages lead to longer unemployment spells and a higher probability of long-
term unemployment (Jones, 1988; Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998; Addison et al., 2009,
2010, 2013; Brown and Taylor, 2015). In the frictional setting of a sequential search
model, the reservation wage is defined implicitly as the optimal stopping rule in the job
search behavior of the unemployed and can be expressed as a function of the expected
future value of employment. This value depends centrally on the arrival rate of job offers
and the observed wage distribution of workers.3 A minimum wage may affect this optimal
reservation strategy in two ways: through a negative impact on the job offer arrival rate
or through the rightward (positive) shift of the wage offer distribution. According to this
model, a rightward shift of the wage distribution should increase the reservation wage,
while a decrease in the job offer rate should decrease the reservation wage.4
The current paper furthermore builds upon previous work by Brown and Taylor
(2013, 2015), who explore how reservation wages respond to business cycle downturns.
They trace out a ’reservation wage curve’, documenting that job seekers adjust their
acceptance thresholds inversely with the local unemployment rate. Previous papers have
also shown that reservation wages tend to decrease over the course of the unemployment
spell (Krueger and Mueller, 2016; Burdett and Vishwanath, 1988). Koenig et al. (2016)
however argue that reservation wages react little to changes in the job offer arrival rate due
to anchoring around previous wages. Against this background, the extent to which the
introduction of the minimum wage induced adjustments to the wage acceptance thresholds
of job seekers remains an empirical exercise to explore.
To our knowledge, the present paper is the first causal study using quasi-experimental
methods to identify the effect of minimum wage reform on reservation wages of non-
employed job seekers5 in a real-world setting. Detailed survey information from the Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), in combination with a quasi-experiment from the introduction
of a highly binding statutory minimum wage in Germany, provide a unique opportunity to
document this unexplored relationship. We show that reservation wages adjust upward in





[1−F (w)]dF (w) where b denotes transfers received when not working, ρ is a time discounting
factor, α captures the job arrival rate, and F (w) is the observed wage distribution. More complicated
models may include extensions, such as job destruction and job-to-job transitions, but these would
not change the relevant predictions for minimum wages that motivate this paper.
4These relationships are demonstrated by the sign the first order conditions of the reservation wage
equation with respect to α and [1− F (w)].
5Specifically, our population of interest includes individuals officially registered as unemployed as well as
all other non-working individuals who answer positively that they intend to take up work in the future
(date unspecified in the survey), as the SOEP records reservation wages for both of these groups. We
do not have reservation wage information for those simultaneously registered as unemployed and
working and thus do not include them in our population of interest. We use an additional survey
question on the timing of the job take-up intention in order to make the additional restriction that
individual plans to search within the next 12 months.
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reaction to minimum wage increases in the short run, suggesting that potential supply-side
positive employment effects are mitigated through higher wage expectations. In partic-
ular, the introduction of a high-impact minimum wage induces a substantial increase in
reservation wages among non-employed job seekers at the low end of the distribution in
2015 in the order of 18.1 percent at the 10th percentile and 12.5 percent at the 25th
percentile of the reservation wage distribution compared to the pre-reform distribution.
Growth in expectations at the 10th percentile of reservation wages moreover persists two
years after the reform, in 2016. Higher percentiles do not exhibit any change.
One limitation of this study is that we are unable to exhaustively exclude the pos-
sibility that our results may partially be driven by composition (selection) effects. If
dis-employment increases average productivity in the pool of job seekers, this influx of
new searchers could mechanically change the distribution of reservation wages. In order
to address this issue, we utilize the rich panel data structure of the SOEP to control
for observed human capital indicators. We find our results are robust to educational at-
tainment as well as controls for lifetime months of accumulated experience in full-time
employment, part-time employment and unemployment spells. Nevertheless, we cannot
exclude an impact from other composition changes not observable in our data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the insti-
tutional background of the reform. Section 2.3 discusses our data and sample restrictions.
Section 2.4 lays out our estimation strategy, presents the main results, and addresses the
question of possible selection and the suitability of our model. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background
On January 1, 2015, the German government implemented a nation-wide statutory min-
imum wage of e8.50 (gross) per hour. This first mandated wage floor in the country’s
history replaced a long-standing regime of decentralized, voluntary wage bargaining at the
sectoral level. The new minimum wage carried a large bite, with 16 percent of non-exempt
employees earning below e8.50/hour prior to the reform and thus directly impacted (Am-
linger et al., 2016). This measure corresponds to a Kaitz-index of 0.49 (OECD, 2015).
Exemptions exist for the self-employed, workers under the age of 18 without vocational
training, the long-term unemployed during their first 6 months of employment, trainees
and interns working for a period of less than three months in a compulsory internship or
in an entry-level internship for the purpose of gaining a qualification. In the transition
period that lasted through the end of 2016, additional exceptions encompassed workers
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already covered by a sector-specific minimum wage.6 For the calculation of the exposure
to the minimum wage reform, we omit from the analysis all individuals exempt from the
national minimum wage.
While the national minimum wage was not implemented until January 2015, it was
widely discussed in political debate and the media as early as the summer of 2013, albeit
without the specific threshold of e8.50. The minimum wage became a central topic of
the federal election held on September 22, 2013 and an important component of the
Social Democrat campaign platform. Therefore, anticipation of some form of a national
minimum wage became more concrete once coalition negotiations began in late September
2013 between that party and the Christian Democratic Union. On December 14, 2013,
both parties signed the coalition agreement confirming this intention. The new coalition
government then announced the planned minimum wage level at e8.50 on April 2, 2014.
In order to avoid distortions in our analysis stemming from possible anticipation effects,
we conduct the analysis using 2013 as the pre-reform basis year.
2.3 Data
We use the 2010 to 2016 waves of the Socio-Economic Panel, a representative longitudinal
survey that, as of 2016, surveys approximately 15,000 households (doi: 10.5684/soep.v33,
Goebel et al., 2018). The survey asks non-working individuals,7 ”What would your net
income (in euros per month) have to be for you to accept a position?” Subsequently, they
are asked, ”How many hours per week would you have to work for this income?”8 Using
this information, we calculate net hourly reservation wages.
For the period under investigation, between 2010-2016, we begin with a total of
roughly 22,000-26,000 unique individual observations of 17-64 year-olds in each year and
make several necessary restrictions to the working sample. Appendix Table 2.A1 docu-
ments each step of the sample restrictions and how they reduce the working sample. First,
we limit the (unbalanced) sample to all non-employed and unemployed, for whom valid
information on reservation wages exists and who are willing to take up work either im-
mediately or within one year. As such, our sample comprises the non-working population
truly searching for a job. We drop observations missing information about reservation
6Examples include the main construction sector, electrician trade, roofing sector, security services,
hairdressing, commercial cleaning and others. See Fitzenberger and Doerr (2016) for a thorough
overview.
7The sample includes respondents in voluntary military service, voluntary social year, or federal volun-
teer service, but excludes those in any type of employment, in training programs, in apprenticeships,
or in partial retirement.
8The wording for both questions remains exactly same over the observed time frame.
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wages or key socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, age, citizenship, highest
educational level, months of part-time, full-time and unemployment experience, marital
status, and presence of children below the age of 16 in the household. Further, we exclude
observations from four regions that have fewer than 30 observations. Finally, in order to
identify the region in which each individual resided (and thus their treatment intensity,
or ’bite’) prior to the minimum wage reform, we require the individual to be observed in
2012 and meet the working sample criteria listed above in any year between 2010-2016. In
total, the working sample contains 8,227 unique observations from 2010-2016, which enter
into our regression specification. Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for demographic
characteristics of the sample and demonstrates that the composition of non-employed job
seekers remains relatively stable throughout the period of analysis. In Section 2.4.2 we
present regression results that control for these characteristics and corroborate our main
findings.
Table 2.1: Sample Description, 2013-2016
2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Female share 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.65 0.64
Age, average 38.37 39.58 40.25 41.05 39.57
German share 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.92
Primary education share 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.37 0.40
Secondary education share 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.44
Tertiary education share 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.16
Married share 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.48
Living in HH with children below 16, share 0.60 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.57
Observations 1,277 956 805 660 3,698
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations.
Figure 2.1 shows the density of the distribution of hourly reservation wages and
demonstrates that, although the distribution remains almost unchanged in 2013 and 2014,
it exhibits a substantial shift to the right in 2015, when the statutory minimum wage was
introduced. However, in 2016, the distribution shifts again to the left, implying that the
reaction of wage expectations after the introduction of the minimum wage was perhaps
temporary for some sections of the wage distribution. Moreover, this back-and-forth
movement of the reservation wage distribution underlines the importance of analyzing
the extent to which this movement was caused by the minimum wage reform rather
than simply reflecting secular economic trends or a statistical peculiarity. Last but not
least, the reservation wage distribution exhibits clumping in the upper percentiles of the
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distribution, which may be of importance for the estimation. At the same time, lower
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Hourly Reservation Wages, 2013-2016
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations. Net hourly wages are CPI adjusted.
Because the net hourly reservation wage results from dividing net monthly reserva-
tion wages by the desired hours worked, it is important to ensure that the observed shifts
in the hourly reservation wage distribution over time stem from an increase in expected
monthly earnings rather than a decrease in working hours. Appendix Tables 2.A2 and
2.A3 display averages of monthly reservation wages and weekly hours in 20-percent bands
around the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the annual distribution of hourly
reservation wages. The comparison of these averages over time suggests that the shift in
the distribution of hourly reservation wages stems from an upward-shift of monthly reser-
vation wages whereas hours, if anything, increase. Therefore, while the positive effect of
the minimum wage reform on observed wages found in Caliendo et al. (2017) stems pre-
dominantly from reductions in contractual working hours, the main channel of adjustment
for hourly reservation wages can be attributed to upward adjustments of desired monthly
earnings rather than hours.
It is important to note that the e8.50 German minimum wage reform targeted gross
hourly wages while the reservation wage question in the SOEP survey asks about net take-
home wages. Appendix Table 2.A4 offers a descriptive comparison of the percentiles of
the distribution of gross hourly observed wages, net hourly observed wages and net hourly
reported reservation wages between 2013-2016. While the complexity of the German tax
system prevents a straightforward comparison between gross and net hourly wages, the
table reveals that net hourly observed wages surpass those of the net hourly reservation
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wages in all percentiles, reflecting, inter alia, a lower average skill set of the non-employed
compared to workers.
Successful job hunters with reservation wages in the lowest part of the distribution
are likely to transition into low-paid jobs directly affected by the minimum wage increase.
Table 2.2 shows these transitions in more detail. For example, non-employed job seekers
with reservation wages in the lowest quartile of the reservation wage distribution in 2013
obtained a mean gross wage of e8.37 if they took up a job the following year in 2014. In
the post-reform period, job seekers stated a reservation threshold of e5.58 and, among
those transitioning into employment, the mean realized gross hourly wage after the im-
plementation of the wage floor was e8.67. Although we do not observe in which wage
sector respondents look for job, these numbers suggest that low reservation wages tend to,
on average, transform into low observed wages. Therefore, minimum wages do not only
reshape the lower tail of the distribution of observed wages. They are also likely to affect
lower quantiles of the reservation wage distribution. Indeed, the causal analysis results
displayed in the following section show that the minimum wage brought about increases
in reservation wages only in these lower percentiles of the reservation wage distribution.








→ et=2014 → et=2016
wrt−1:
Average 8.56 0.23 12.96 9.15 0.23 13.65
1st quartile 5.13 0.17 8.37 5.58 0.14 8.67
2nd quartile 6.92 0.19 9.75 7.34 0.20 12.22
3rd quartile 8.52 0.24 12.77 8.97 0.25 11.18
4th quartile 13.67 0.30 17.40 14.71 0.33 18.91
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations.
To establish a causal link between reservation and minimum wages, we use the intro-
duction of a high-impact statutory minimum wage in Germany as a quasi-experimental
setting. Despite the nationally uniform introduction of the minimum wage, its impact
differs across regions. Figure 2.2 depicts the shares of eligible employees with actual gross
hourly wages below e8.50 in 2012 in 92 planning regions in Germany (Bite2012r ). The map
shows that the shares of eligible employees vary greatly from 4 to 46 percent. Eastern
German states exhibit a stronger exposure to the reform than Western Germany, but
the variation within these broad regions is also substantial. Due to data limitations, we
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exclude four regions with fewer than 30 observations. We chose 2013 as the reference
pre-reform year in which anticipatory adjustments are unlikely to occur in the SOEP
data: the field work of the SOEP survey was finished by September 2013, before the new
program of the Grand Coalition announcing the upcoming introduction of minimum wage
was published. Accordingly, in order to avoid simultaneity bias, we follow Caliendo et al.












Figure 2.2: Share of Employees with Actual Hourly Wages below the Minimum Wage in
2012
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations.
Appendix Table 2.A5 illustrates differences the sample composition between regions
with above- and below-median bite. The distribution of the main socio-demographic and
human capital characteristics is fairly similar between these two groups. Some differences
can be observed in the share of secondary versus tertiary education, with higher bite
regions having more secondary rather than tertiary educational attainment, consistent
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with education being positively correlated with wages. A large difference can also be found
in the share of married individuals, which is higher in low-bite regions. This difference
can likely be attributed to more traditional family norms in western Germany compared
to eastern Germany. We will discuss the inclusion of these controls in more detail when
describing different regression specifications.
2.4 Estimation Strategy
The continuous measure of the minimum wage bite enters a difference-in-differences esti-
mation as follows:
log(RWirt) = α +
2016∑
t=2010







[+µXirt] + irt. (2.1)
The dependent variable is the log of the net hourly reservation wage of individual i
at time t ∈ [2010, 2016] residing in region r. We use 2013 as the base year and exclude
it and its interaction with the bite from the estimation. Years 2010 to 2012 are pre-
reform and pre-announcement years, 2014 is the last pre-reform year in which anticipation
effects can be expected, whereas 2015 and 2016 are post-reform years. Bite2012r denotes
treatment intensity as captured by the region-specific shares of eligible employees with
actual hourly wages below e8.50 (divided by the average regional bite in 2012, such
that the average Bite2012r = 1). The coefficient δ
t on the interaction terms captures the
treatment effect of the reform in 2015 and 2016, potential anticipatory effect in 2014
and simultaneously verifies the common pre-trend assumption in the years 2010-2012. In
additional specifications, we expand this ‘bare bones’ specification by the vector Xirt,
which contains socio-demographic, human-capital related and regional controls. Section
2.4.2 contains these results as well as those for a model with additional regional fixed
effects.
Two potential threats exist to the validity of our identification of causal effects:
failure of the common trend assumption necessary for unbiasedness in the difference-in-
differences estimation and selection bias. The common trend assumption requires that,
absent the minimum wage introduction, reservation wages of job seekers in regions with
a small share of workers earning below e8.50 would have developed at a similar rate as
those in regions with a large share of such workers. Because we estimate an unconditional
quantile regression, this assumption must also hold within each quantile.
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We offer several forms of evidence that the common trend assumption holds. First,
Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of the 10th and 25th percentile of reservation wages since
2010 for high-bite, juxtaposed to low-bite regions and descriptively documents that the
high- and low-bite regions display a fairly parallel pre-reform course within the given
quantile. We highlight these lower quantiles rather than the mean, as they present the
regions of the distribution most impacted by the minimum wage reform and thus are the
focus of our descriptive and causal analysis. Appendix Figures 2.A1 and 2.A2 likewise
exhibit similar parallel trends for the relevant percentiles of observed hourly wages and
employment rates.
With respect to selection (composition) bias, a concern remains that disemployment
effects from the minimum wage may have improved the composition of the pool of job
seekers if those who lost their job are more productive than the average non-employed job
seeker. The increase in average productivity would then mechanically increase reservation
wages after the reform. While we cannot exhaustively control for such composition effects,
Section 2.4.2 discusses several strategies we employ to account for selection as much as
possible, including controlling for human capital indicators such as educational attainment
and work experience in full-time, part-time and unemployment. While results prove very
robust to the inclusion of these controls, we cannot rule out a possible impact from other
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Figure 2.3: 10th and 25th Percentiles of Reservation Wages, by Region Type
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations. Net hourly wages are CPI adjusted.
54
2 Great Expectations: Reservation Wages and Minimum Wage Reform
2.4.1 Baseline Specification
We expect the minimum wage to have a differential impact along the distribution of
reservation wages. Therefore, we estimate an unconditional quantile regression based on
the re-centered influence function (Firpo et al., 2009). Table 2.3 contains the results
of the estimation of equation 2.1 in its ‘bare bones’ specification. It presents estimates
of the coefficients δt from Equation 2.1 for quintiles of the distribution of log hourly
reservation wages. At the 10th percentile, the interaction term documents a growth of
18.1 percent (exp0.166−1) due to the reform in 2015. Given the reservation wage shown in
Appendix Table 2.A4 of e4.99 at the 10th percentile in 2013, this wage growth amounts
to e0.90/hour. In the 25th percentile, the growth is 12.5 percent (exp0.118 − 1), or e5.92
× 0.125 = e0.74/hour. In higher quantiles, the effect in 2015 is insignificant. In 2016, the
minimum wage-induced growth at the 10th percentile remains virtually unchanged, at 17.9
percent, while no effect can be detected at the 25th percentile. This result confirms that
the introduction of the minimum wage induced an increase in reservation wages exclusively
at the bottom of the distribution, where potential low-wage workers are disproportionately
located.
Table 2.3 not only depicts the causal impact of the minimum wage in the post-
reform years of 2015 and 2016. It also provides a test of the common trend assumption
by considering the coefficients on the interaction terms of the bite variable and pre-reform
years. As evidenced by the insignificant effects at the 10th, 25th and 50th percentiles, the
common trend cannot be rejected at the lower part of the distribution, where we detect an
impact from the minimum wage. In contrast, the significant coefficients at the 75th and
90th percentiles in 2011 warrant cautious interpretation in particular at higher quantiles
of the distribution.
To better understand the channel of adjustment observed in Table 2.3, we also
investigate the effect of the minimum wage introduction on observed hourly wages of
workers. Search theory predicts that job seekers should increase their acceptance threshold
if the wage offer distribution observed on the labor market shifts to the right. Table 2.4
provides estimates of Equation 2.1 with log gross hourly wages of eligible employees as
the dependent variable.
The impact on reservation wages can be compared to the overall shift in the observed
wages of workers. The results in Table 2.4 show that the effect on the 10th percentile
of the distribution of observed gross hourly wages is 24.0 percent (exp0.215 − 1) in 2015,
which corresponds to 7.55 × 0.240 = e1.81. This growth is even stronger (25.9 percent)
at the 10th percentile of gross hourly wages in 2016. The effect tapers off in higher
quantiles, with 6.7 percent growth at the 25th percentile in 2015 and 9.1 percent growth
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Table 2.3: Difference-in-Differences: Growth in Reservation Wages in 2010-2016
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
D2010 × Bite2012 0.097 -0.019 -0.020 0.095 0.119
(0.067) (0.047) (0.047) (0.060) (0.102)
D2011 × Bite2012 0.032 0.014 -0.016 0.123** 0.221**
(0.066) (0.043) (0.040) (0.054) (0.102)
D2012 × Bite2012 0.048 0.014 0.010 0.073 0.107
(0.059) (0.044) (0.042) (0.047) (0.100)
D2014 × Bite2012 0.013 -0.049 -0.050 0.004 -0.034
(0.059) (0.048) (0.047) (0.062) (0.121)
D2015 × Bite2012 0.166*** 0.118** -0.005 0.030 -0.120
(0.053) (0.047) (0.050) (0.064) (0.116)
D2016 × Bite2012 0.165*** 0.063 -0.051 0.020 -0.183
(0.055) (0.057) (0.053) (0.068) (0.136)
Observations 8,227 8,227 8,227 8,227 8,227
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
calculated using bootstrapping with 200 repetitions (built-in option bootstrap
in the rifreg command).
Reservation wages are in net terms and adjusted to inflation (CPI 2010).
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
in 2016, both compared to the baseline year of 2013. Individuals at the 75th and 90th
percentiles not only do not experience wage growth, but actually witness a decline in
their earned wages, of about 4.3 and 5.1 percent at the 75th percentile in 2015 and 2016,
respectively. In 2015, the decline at the 90th percentile of observed gross wages reached
roughly 6.5 percent, pointing to a compression of observed hourly wages. Compared to
the impact on hourly reservation wages, the effect on observed wages is slightly higher,
more concentrated at the lower tail of the distribution and also exhibits some indication of
wage compression. Table 2.4 moreover provides some evidence of anticipation effects, as
the 10th and 90th percentiles of observed wages show significant effects already in 2014.
2.4.2 Heterogeneity and Robustness of Results
Because previous studies have found that the German minimum wage most affected the
observed wages of women, low-skilled workers and East Germans, we run our estimation
separately for these groups in order to explore possible heterogeneous effects. We find the
effect only significant among East Germans (as opposed to West Germans) at a magnitude
similar to the main results at the 10th and 25th quantiles. The impact among men at the
10th quantile of the reservation wage distribution is stronger than in the main results: 20
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Table 2.4: Difference-in-Differences: Growth in Observed Gross Hourly Wages in 2010-
2016
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
D2010 × Bite2012 0.005 -0.005 0.037 0.024 0.068**
(0.045) (0.039) (0.027) (0.024) (0.027)
D2011 × Bite2012 -0.047 -0.024 0.007 0.003 0.030
(0.041) (0.034) (0.023) (0.022) (0.026)
D2012 × Bite2012 0.003 0.023 0.006 -0.008 0.019
(0.039) (0.033) (0.021) (0.024) (0.028)
D2014 × Bite2012 0.105** 0.050 -0.005 -0.037 -0.056*
(0.042) (0.035) (0.023) (0.026) (0.031)
D2015 × Bite2012 0.215*** 0.065* -0.003 -0.044* -0.067**
(0.041) (0.035) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032)
D2016 × Bite2012 0.230*** 0.087** -0.002 -0.052** -0.051
(0.039) (0.037) (0.026) (0.025) (0.034)
Observations 59,539 59,539 59,539 59,539 59,539
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
calculated using bootstrapping with 200 repetitions (built-in option bootstrap
in the rifreg command).
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
percent growth in 2015 and 25 percent in 2016 compared to the baseline year 2013. For
women, the effect is only significant at the 25th percentile in 2015 at a magnitude similar
to the main results. The additional sample partition, however, reduces the sample size
and prohibits a deeper consideration of these heterogeneous relationships.9
Another possible model specification that could control for time-persistent regional
trends would be to estimate a regional fixed effects model in line with Caliendo et al.
(2018). Appendix Table 2.A6 displays results from adding regional (ROR) fixed effects
to the baseline specification and shows that results are robust to any time-constant dif-
ferences across regions.
Next, we turn to the robustness of our results to selection (composition) bias, which
could arise if the quality of the pool of non-employed job seekers increased differentially
across regions after the minimum wage reform. In such a case, our results could simply
reflect a spurious effect from the positive correlation between higher reservation wages
and higher-skilled job seekers. A related paper by Caliendo et al. (2018) shows a small,
negative effect of the minimum wage bite on employment, suggesting that the average
productivity in the pool of the non-employed in regions with a high bite might in fact have
9For exposition purposes, we do not show these results here, but they are available upon request.
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increased. At the same time, duration dependence and scarring associated with longer
unemployment spells in these high bite regions may counteract the impact of the higher
quality pool of job seekers if they adjust their reservation wages downward accordingly.10
While it is not possible in our setting to control for unobserved heterogeneity of the non-
employed job seekers,11 we do use our rich panel data to control for observed heterogeneity
that is related to the quality of the pool of job seekers.
In a first step, we test the robustness of our results to socio-demographic covariates of
the pool of job seekers. Appendix Table 2.A7 presents estimation results from Equation 2.1
after the inclusion of control variables for gender, age, German citizenship, the presence of
children below the age of 16 in the household and marital status and shows that the impact
of the minimum wage on reservation wages at the bottom quantiles of the distribution
remain intact.
In a second step, we add further human capital controls that include indicators for
three possible levels of educational attainment (primary, secondary, tertiary) as well as
variables that capture experience in full-time employment, part-time employment and
unemployment in years. Appendix Table 2.A8 reports these results and shows they are
nearly identical to those from the main specification without these controls. As such, this
evidence would not comport with a story of selection on educational attainment and work
experience of the non-employed pool driving the effects.
Finally, Appendix Table 2.A9 additionally controls for a one year lag in the un-
employment rate and GDP per capita in the ROR. These additional regional controls
account for the regional potential to adapt to the reform (Dolton et al., 2015). Again,
the results prove very robust to this addition. In sum, all of these results with different
sets of controls confirm their general robustness to different selection channels. We, how-
ever, cannot rule out potential selection along other dimensions and characteristics not
measured here.
10A long literature exists with regard to the adverse effects of long unemployment spells on the proba-
bility of re-entering the labor market. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) offer a survey of early studies.
For recent evidence of scarring effects from a correspondence study, see Kroft et al. (2013), who doc-
ument that the probability of receiving a job interview decreases with the increasing length of an
unemployment spell that is independent of observed productivity.
11Ideally, one would use a selection model in line with Heckman (1979) in order to account for non-random
selection into unemployment. However, in contrast to a two stage equation in which the first stage
explains selection in to employment and the second stage explains observed hourly wages, the concern
of this paper lies in explaining reservation wages, which by definition define the lowest acceptable
wage offer threshold necessary to enter employment. As such, it is not possible to find valid exclusion
restrictions necessary for this model that explain the decision to work, but that are unrelated to the
reservation wage. Individual fixed effects likewise would not be suitable for our question of interest
because they would confine our sample to the long-term unemployed for whom we have observations
between 2013-2016 and who overlap very little with active job seekers.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the impact of minimum wages on the reservation wages of non-
employed job seekers. We exploited the unique opportunity to combine survey data on
reservation wages with the quasi-experiment given by the variation in regional exposure
to the 2015 introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany. Unlike many of the
previous minimum wage reforms around the world, the level of the German minimum
wage introduced in 2015 for the first time in German history on a national level was
highly binding, directly affecting 16 percent of workers (Amlinger et al., 2016). Using a
regional bite measure that captures the share of the workforce affected in each region, we
established causality through a difference-in-differences estimation in which we compared
the effects on individuals residing in highly affected local area regions with those living in
areas with a small share of affected workers.
We find that the introduction of the minimum wage in 2015 led to an increase in the
acceptable wage thresholds of non-workers at the bottom of the reservation wage distri-
bution. The induced growth in reservation wages measured 18.1 percent, or e0.90/hour
in 2015, among individuals at the 10 percentile of the reservation wage distribution and
12.5 percent, or e0.74/hour, at the 25th percentile in 2015. In 2016, 17.9 percent growth
persisted only at the 10th percentile compared to the pre-reform baseline year. Accep-
tance thresholds at the median and upper tail of the distribution remained unchanged.
These findings offer suggestive evidence of a labor market with search frictions, in which
job seekers adjust their reservation wage thresholds in reaction to a rightward shift in
the observed wage distribution of workers. The large positive impact of the minimum
wage on observed hourly wage growth of workers earning in the lowest 10 percentile of
the distribution in both 2015 and 2016 demonstrates the existence of this rightward shift.
Descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that, for respondents in the lower quartile of the
reservation wage distribution, the probability of finding a job fell after the introduction
of the minimum wage, whereas the resulting hourly wage grew. This evidence suggests
that the decrease in the job arrival rate could result in the re-adjustment of the wage
expectations of job seekers with low reservation wages in the medium run.
Finally, inflation expectations may additionally motivate the adjustment in reserva-
tion wages at the bottom of the distribution. Individuals from lower income households
have, on average, lower reservation wages and also spend a larger share of their income on
consumption. It is also plausible that lower-skilled individuals disproportionately utilize
services and goods affected by minimum wages and thus are more affected than individ-
uals with higher reservation wages, who reside on average in higher income households.
For instance, lower-income individuals would be more likely to receive a haircut from a
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hairdresser bound by the minimum wage whereas higher income individuals may utilize
services from higher end salons, where workers earn above the minimum.
In this paper, we attempted to outline what we consider the most plausible channels
of reservation wage adjustments that follow the introduction of a high-impact minimum
wage. Further exploration of these channels would shed more light on the supply-side
adjustments from the German minimum wage reform in particular and minimum wages
in general. At the same time, it remains a challenging empirical endeavor that requires
more detailed and larger data sources than those available to us.
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Figure 2.A1: 10th and 25th Percentiles of Observed Hourly Wages, by Region Type
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Figure 2.A2: Share of Employment in the Total Population (aged 17 to 64), by Region
Type

























Table 2.A1: Sample Size after Inclusion of Selection Criteria, by Year
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total SOEP v33.1 age 17-64 21,984 23,333 22,503 25,589 22,161 21,891 22,575
+ unemployed or non-employed 6,719 6,587 6,099 6,908 5,746 5,712 7,494
+ wants to take up work soon 4,833 4,827 4,584 5,056 4,292 4,084 5,523
+ valid info on res wage or ind characteristics 1,672 1,771 1,743 1,950 1,453 1,413 1,142
+ regions with at least 30 obs 1,671 1,768 1,742 1,947 1,450 1,407 1,141
+ res wage 2010-2016 and present in 2012 1,271 1,516 1,742 1,277 956 805 660
Notes: SOEP v33.1, own calculations.
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Table 2.A2: Average of Reservation Monthly Earnings at Percentiles of Hourly Reserva-
tion Wage Distribution, 2013-2016
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
2013 762.06 914.77 1096.32 1194.43 1627.65
2014 829.44 937.70 1114.80 1353.85 1744.96
2015 954.19 1085.01 1155.28 1243.44 1614.58
2016 891.01 1030.29 1059.15 1220.33 1710.02
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations. The table contains averages of monthly earnings in 20-percent
bands around the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the respective annual distribution of
hourly reservation wages.
Table 2.A3: Average Working Hours at Percentiles of Hourly Reservation Wage Distribu-
tion, 2013-2016
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
2013 33.65 35.24 34.83 32.96 32.75
2014 36.00 36.09 34.76 33.30 33.01
2015 37.15 37.95 34.77 29.00 29.23
2016 37.22 37.02 32.27 28.15 31.33
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations. The table contains averages of reservation weekly hours in 20-
percent bands around the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the respective annual distribution
of hourly reservation wages.
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Table 2.A4: Percentiles of Hourly Wage Distributions, 2013-2016
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Net hourly reservation wages
2013 4.99 5.92 7.40 8.87 12.04
2014 5.17 6.01 7.49 9.83 13.11
2015 5.42 6.50 8.12 10.26 13.54
2016 5.40 6.48 8.10 10.23 13.50
Net hourly observed wages
2013 5.79 7.69 10.26 13.74 18.46
2014 6.23 8.08 10.67 14.34 19.04
2015 6.46 8.24 10.93 14.57 19.53
2016 6.71 8.46 10.99 14.63 19.62
Gross hourly observed wages
2013 7.55 10.47 15.23 21.10 28.21
2014 7.92 11.08 15.79 21.60 28.96
2015 8.46 11.54 16.15 22.51 30.00
2016 8.65 11.54 16.48 22.69 29.71
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations.
The sample for the calculation of net hourly reservation wages contains respondents who were present in
the sample in 2012 and were in one of the other survey years 2010-2016 in the status of a non-employed job
seeker, i.e. were unemployed or non-employed aged between 17 and 64, who want to take up employment
immediately or within a year, with valid information on reservation wages and socio-demographics. The
sample excludes regional units with less than 30 observations.
The sample for the calculation of net and gross observed wages includes all employed who are eligible to
minimum wages, have valid information on socio-demographics. The sample excludes regional units with
less than 30 observations.
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Table 2.A5: Sample Description by Region Type, 2014-2016
Regions: High-Bite Low-Bite
Female share 0.63 0.65
Age, average 40.07 40.35
German share 0.95 0.90
Primary education share 0.41 0.37
Secondary education share 0.47 0.39
Tertiary education share 0.11 0.24
Married share 0.45 0.53
Living in HH with children below 16, share 0.54 0.56
Observations 1,292 1,129
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations. High-Bite: regions with the above-median regional bite in 2012.
Low-Bite: regions with the bite lower than the median in 2012.
Table 2.A6: Difference-in-Differences: Growth in Reservation Wages in 2010-2016, with
ROR-specific Fixed Effects
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
D2010 × Bite2012 0.107 -0.024 -0.020 0.103* 0.134
(0.066) (0.046) (0.044) (0.062) (0.100)
D2011 × Bite2012 0.026 0.006 -0.023 0.117** 0.210**
(0.071) (0.044) (0.043) (0.059) (0.098)
D2012 × Bite2012 0.049 0.015 0.015 0.080 0.110
(0.055) (0.041) (0.042) (0.057) (0.099)
D2014 × Bite2012 0.010 -0.051 -0.046 0.002 -0.037
(0.063) (0.051) (0.048) (0.063) (0.106)
D2015 × Bite2012 0.165*** 0.112** -0.008 0.031 -0.110
(0.053) (0.049) (0.047) (0.072) (0.113)
D2016 × Bite2012 0.175*** 0.061 -0.045 0.029 -0.151
(0.057) (0.050) (0.054) (0.079) (0.134)
Observations 8,227 8,227 8,227 8,227 8,227
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations. Robust standard errors in parentheses, calcu-
lated using bootstrapping with 200 repetitions (built-in option bootstrap in the rifreg
command).
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.A7: Difference-in-Differences: Growth in Reservation Wages in 2010-2016, with
Socio-Demographic Controls
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
D2010 × Bite2012 0.097 -0.023 -0.024 0.092* 0.118
(0.068) (0.053) (0.042) (0.054) (0.104)
D2011 × Bite2012 0.035 0.017 -0.017 0.119** 0.218**
(0.070) (0.046) (0.040) (0.052) (0.098)
D2012 × Bite2012 0.051 0.013 0.005 0.065 0.104
(0.054) (0.048) (0.040) (0.052) (0.101)
D2014 × Bite2012 0.014 -0.047 -0.046 0.011 -0.024
(0.061) (0.053) (0.047) (0.058) (0.119)
D2015 × Bite2012 0.159*** 0.107** -0.017 0.018 -0.134
(0.050) (0.052) (0.046) (0.066) (0.117)
D2016 × Bite2012 0.157*** 0.052 -0.060 0.014 -0.180
(0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.075) (0.139)
Observations 8,227 8,227 8,227 8,227 8,227
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations. Robust standard errors in parentheses, calcu-
lated using bootstrapping with 200 repetitions (built-in option bootstrap in the rifreg
command).
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
This specification additionally includes socio-demographic controls for gender, age, Ger-
man vs. foreign citizenship, marital status and presence of children aged below 16 in the
household.
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Table 2.A8: Difference-in-Differences: Growth in Reservation Wages in 2010-2016, with
Human Capital Controls
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
D2010 × Bite2012 0.092 -0.033 -0.039 0.071 0.098
(0.066) (0.048) (0.043) (0.053) (0.096)
D2011 × Bite2012 0.033 0.011 -0.027 0.104** 0.200**
(0.076) (0.047) (0.044) (0.045) (0.093)
D2012 × Bite2012 0.042 0.001 -0.010 0.039 0.072
(0.056) (0.048) (0.043) (0.049) (0.099)
D2014 × Bite2012 0.018 -0.046 -0.045 0.007 -0.039
(0.063) (0.051) (0.050) (0.057) (0.118)
D2015 × Bite2012 0.167*** 0.116** -0.003 0.042 -0.101
(0.056) (0.049) (0.053) (0.063) (0.107)
D2016 × Bite2012 0.176*** 0.075 -0.030 0.060 -0.128
(0.058) (0.051) (0.054) (0.058) (0.135)
Observations 8,227 8,227 8,227 8,227 8,227
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations. Robust standard errors in parentheses, calcu-
lated using bootstrapping with 200 repetitions (built-in option bootstrap in the rifreg
command).
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
This specification additionally includes socio-demographic controls for gender, age, Ger-
man vs. foreign citizenship, marital status and presence of children aged below 16 in the
household as well as human capital controls for three categories of the highest achieved
educational level (primary, secondary, tertiary) and years of experience in full-time em-
ployment, part-time employment and unemployment.
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Table 2.A9: Difference-in-Differences: Growth in Reservation Wages in 2010-2016, with
Regional Controls
P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
D2010 × Bite2012 0.095 -0.031 -0.037 0.071 0.102
(0.065) (0.049) (0.040) (0.055) (0.100)
D2011 × Bite2012 0.033 0.010 -0.030 0.097* 0.192*
(0.060) (0.045) (0.043) (0.058) (0.100)
D2012 × Bite2012 0.045 0.007 -0.002 0.053 0.092
(0.057) (0.044) (0.039) (0.051) (0.103)
D2014 × Bite2012 0.017 -0.047 -0.047 0.006 -0.041
(0.062) (0.047) (0.049) (0.062) (0.118)
D2015 × Bite2012 0.165*** 0.116** -0.003 0.044 -0.099
(0.053) (0.049) (0.044) (0.064) (0.116)
D2016 × Bite2012 0.175*** 0.077 -0.024 0.072 -0.115
(0.057) (0.052) (0.050) (0.071) (0.134)
Observations 8,227 8,227 8,227 8,227 8,227
Source: SOEP v33.1, own calculations. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
This specification additionally includes socio-demographic controls for gender, age, Ger-
man vs. foreign citizenship, and marital status, human capital controls for three categories
of the highest achieved educational level (primary, secondary, tertiary) and years of ex-
perience in full-time employment, part-time employment and unemployment, as well as
regional controls such as one-year lagged unemployment rate and GDP per capital in the
respective ROR.
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3 Drivers of Participation Elasticities
across Europe: Gender or Earner
Role within the Household?
3.1 Introduction
Labor market participation rates diverge greatly across countries of the European Union
(EU). The extent to which incentives inherent in the various tax-benefit systems drive
these differences remains a topic of contention throughout many member states.1 Of par-
ticular concern are low participation rates among low-skilled individuals and secondary
earners with weak labor market attachment. At the same time, these groups traditionally
exhibit high responsiveness to monetary employment incentives. Thus, tax-benefit distor-
tions at the extensive margin for these types of potential workers may contribute to low
participation rates and create high efficiency costs. The resulting, substantial fiscal costs
of inactivity include expenses for out-of-work benefits, foregone taxes and social security
contributions. These costs render understanding the responsiveness of these groups to
tax-benefit incentives highly relevant.
At the extensive margin, the participation tax rate (PTR) measures tax-benefit
distortions to work. Since the 1980s, a wide range of empirical studies estimate the
participation elasticity at the micro level, measuring the behavioral response to monetary
incentives for work at the extensive margin. These studies exploit exogenous shocks to a
particular group’s work incentives through a tax or benefit reform in a quasi-experimental
setting.2 A general result is that the behavioral response is higher at the extensive margin
than at the intensive margin, particularly for low-skilled, secondary earners (married
women) or single mothers. However, it is unclear whether results obtained in a very
particular quasi-experimental study of a specific reform yield externally valid results for
general application (Goolsbee, 1999; Meghir and Phillips, 2010). Bargain et al. (2013)
1For an early and a very recent contribution to this debate, see (Prescott, 2004; Bick and Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln, 2018).
2An early and often cited example is Eissa and Liebman (1996), who exploit the 1986 introduction of
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US in to estimate the labor market response of lone
mothers at the intensive and extensive margin. Chetty et al. (2013) and Meghir and Phillips (2010)
provide overviews on the estimated elasticities of these quasi-experimental studies. The participation
elasticities of the studies reviewed by Chetty et al. (2013) average 0.28 and range from 0.13 to 0.43.
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estimate a structural discrete choice model using numeric simulation to calculate labor
supply elasticities for several European countries and the United States and obtain results
in line with the magnitude found in quasi-experimental studies. Much smaller within-
period micro-elasticities are found in two reduced form studies that exploit incremental
changes in the tax-benefit system.
Ja¨ntti et al. (2015) and Kal´ıˇskova´ (2018) use two different instrumental variables
(IV) approaches to estimate participation elasticities across European countries. Build-
ing upon these studies, we establish exogeneity through a group IV that instruments the
individual-level net-of-PTR earnings with the group average such that common biasing
factors in the labor supply equation cancel out. We use the same instrument as Ja¨ntti
et al. (2015), but different from Kal´ıˇskova´ (2018), who employs a simulated IV approach
for a pooled EU-wide sample of women. In contrast to Ja¨ntti et al. (2015), who use
averages from similar household types to approximate PTRs on the basis of the Lux-
embourg Income Study data, we use the microsimulation model EUROMOD in order
to calculate taxes, social security contributions and benefits for every individual in both
potential working states, in work and out of work. This strategy enables us to investigate
participation elasticities across European countries and sociodemographic groups, such as
gender and earner roles within the household.
Our contribution is threefold. First, this paper is the first reduced form analysis
of European participation elasticities based on harmonized microsimulation of taxes and
benefits according to the earner position of the individual within the household rather
than simply according to gender. We exploit both the institutional variation across EU
countries and changes in the tax-benefit systems between 2008 and 2014 to identify the
causal impact of tax-benefit work incentives for employment across the EU, controlling
for country and skill-level heterogeneity, including cultural norms or tastes for work and
leisure. Second, we document the size and distribution of work disincentives, as measured
by Participation Tax Rates (PTRs), across EU countries between 2008-2014, using EU-
ROMOD data and the accompanying tax and benefit calculator.3 In doing so, we are able
to not only account for how a specific reform in isolation affects a certain target group, but
also how different changes in the tax-benefit system interact with each other to influence
work incentives throughout the entire distribution. Third, we provide a decomposition
3EU cross-country studies estimating PTRs based on the tax-benefit simulation model EUROMOD from
earlier time periods include Immervoll et al. (2007), Immervoll et al. (2011) and O’Donoghue (2011).
Kal´ıˇskova´ (2018) uses EUROMOD data covering 2005-2010 to estimate PTRs for women. Several
country studies evaluate PTRs over time: Dockery et al. (2011) for Australia, Collado (2018) for
Belgium, Adam et al. (2006) and Brewer et al. (2008) for UK, Pirttilla¨ and Selin (2011) and Bastani
et al. (2017) for Sweden, as well as Bartels and Pestel (2016) for Germany.
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of the driving components of labor supply disincentives at the extensive margin and how
individuals react differentially to taxes, benefits, and social security contributions.
Our main results are the following. First, disentangling the drivers of the PTRs,
we find that the relative importance of taxes, social insurance contributions and benefits
largely depends on household composition and the individual’s earner role within the
household. In line with optimal tax theory which shows negative PTRs can be optimal
at the bottom of the earnings distribution (Saez, 2002; Immervoll et al., 2011; Chone´
and Laroque, 2011; Jacquet et al., 2013; Hansen, 2017), we document negative PTRs
in several countries for low-income working families with children. Secondly, we find
an average elasticity of 0.08 for men and 0.15 for women, as well as a high degree of
heterogeneity across countries. Elasticities in half of the countries in our sample are not
statistically different from zero, while relatively high elasticities ranging from 0.1 to 0.3
can be found in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, and Sweden. Thirdly, however,
by comparing elasticities within the same earner type, i.e., primary or secondary earners,
this well-established difference between men and women dissipates. Both male and female
secondary earners are the most responsive earner groups with elasticities between 0.1
and 0.4. Our results demonstrate the importance of calculating labor supply responses
according to earner roles rather than gender, as differences between female and male labor
force participation continue to decrease over time (Blau and Kahn, 2006). The finding
that other earner types in most countries do not respond to work incentives limits the
case for policymakers to further reduce PTRs for these groups, if the motivation is to
increase labor force participation.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we derive our equation of interest
from a static household labor supply model. Section 3 provides a description of how we
compute PTRs, our estimation strategy, and the data employed. In Section 4, we take a
closer look at the variation of PTRs across countries by household and earner types. We
discuss in detail, how the varying degrees of work incentives are related to the specific
features of the tax-benefit system in a given country. Section 5 presents our regression
results and discusses our estimated participation elasticities. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Approach
3.2.1 Basic Model
Our analysis is embedded into the economic framework of a static labor supply model,
in which an individual i maximizes household utility u(yht − T (eit, e−it, zht), q), where
yht denotes household income defined as yht = eit + e−it + zht. zht expresses household
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non-labor income such as asset income in year t, while e−it + eit denote the labor supply
choices of each household member in the form of gross income. eit can also be expressed
as the product of wages and hours worked. We use the composite term, gross monthly
earnings. T (eit, e−it, zht) are taxes and social security contributions paid net of any public
transfers (benefits) received.
Following Immervoll et al. (2007), we assume that individual i enters employment
if the financial gain from working is positive considering all resulting changes in taxes
and transfers that the household faces as a whole. One should note that the changes in
household taxes and transfers when taking up a job not only depend on household income
as a whole, but on individual earnings, the earner role in the household (e.g., primary
vs. secondary earner) and individual as well as household characteristics (e.g., single vs.
couple), in particular. At the extensive margin, fix costs such as search costs, additional
transportation costs and commuting time, alternative child care, the opportunity cost of
home production, or general disutility from work can play a significant role in participation
decisions (cf. Piketty and Saez (2013); Cogan (1981)). We therefore denote fixed costs as
q and the condition for taking up a job becomes
qit ≤ eit − [T (eit, e−it, zht)− T (0, e−it, zht)]
From this inequality, we arrive at the definition of the net-of-PTR earnings, which
constitutes the measure of extensive margin work incentives in our analysis:
qit ≤
1− T (eit, e−it, zht)− T (0, e−it, zht)eit︸ ︷︷ ︸
PTRit
 · eit
Net-of-PTR earnings, (1 − PTRit) · eit, summarizes the decision of an individual
i facing the binary choice between the two labor market states of being employed w or
not working nw. Due to the static, one period nature of our model, we do not consider
second order effects, such as possible labor supply adjustments from the partner (i.e.
added worker effects) as a result of the individual changing her/his work status. Our
equation of interest can be formulated as follows:
P (wit) = α + β(1− PTRit) · eit + ηit (3.1)
where P (wit) represents the participation decision and takes the value of 1 when the
individual works and 0 otherwise. We expect a negative effect of the PTR on employment
probability, as distortions to work incentives should make work less probable. Accordingly,
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we expect the effect of (1-PTR) to be positive. We are interested in the parameter
β, which, if estimated consistently, permits us to quantify the participation elasticity.
We then add a interaction terms to the parameter of interest, expanding this term to
β(1 − PTRit) · eit · λcse in order to allow for heterogeneous effects in the reaction to tax
and benefit incentives across countries. As a result, it is possible to calculate the gender-
or earner-type-specific elasticity in each country c based on the definition of Saez (2002)
and adjusted to the PTR context:
PEcse = (βˆse + λcse) · (1− PTRcse)
P (w)cse
(3.2)
where PTRcse is the average PTR by gender s or earner type e in each country c and
P (w)cse is the respective sample employment rate in each country. In the above equation
of interest, the error term ηit is likely correlated with the PTR, thus causing an endogeneity
problem which we address in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.2 Measuring Participation Tax Rates
The PTR measures the net difference in household taxes and benefits when an individual
works, w, versus when (s)he does not work, nw, as a proportion of individual earnings in
labor market state w and can be formulated as follows, suppressing the time index t
PTRi ≡ T (y
w
h )− T (ynwh )
ei
(3.3)
where ywh is gross household income, T (y
w
h ) is household net taxes, and ei is individual
gross monthly labor earnings if the given individual is in the labor market state w. Gross
household income can be calculated as the sum of labor earnings, asset income, private
transfers, private pensions, and social security pensions of all household members. ynwh is
gross household income and T (ynwh ) is household net taxes, if the given individual is in
labor market state nw, i.e. when (s)he has no individual labor earnings. We refer to net
taxes T paid by the household h as income taxes th including social security contributions
reduced by benefits bh.
If household net taxes are equal for both labor market states, then the PTR amounts to
zero, indicating that incentives to take up work are not distorted. However, in reality, a
welfare state providing income support in the state nw usually leads to tnwh < b
nw
h resulting
in T (ynwh ) < 0 as social benefits will surpass taxes paid for the reduced household income
ynwh . As such, the change in net taxes when switching from w to nw will be positive in the
presence of a welfare state with means-tested social assistance and the PTR will be higher
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than zero for most individuals. The higher the PTR, the more generous income support
programs in the state of nw and/or high income taxes and social insurance contributions
in the state of w reduce the financial gain from working. The PTR will equal one if
the change in net taxes T (ywh ) − T (ynwh ) (numerator) is equal to individual earnings ei
(denominator). In this case, no financial gain arises from working. Ceteris paribus, lower
spousal or other household earnings generally lead to higher PTRs due to higher means-
tested transfers, and additionally, in countries where spousal tax splitting exists, a higher
spousal tax reduction in the labor status nw. Therefore, in many countries the PTR will
depend on household type and each potential worker’s earner role within the household.
Finally, if out-of-work income support exceeds earnings, then the PTR can be even greater
than one; if benefits depend on in-work status such as the case with earned income tax
credits (EITCs) or negative income taxes, the PTR could be negative for the affected
workers.
In order to obtain a PTR for all individuals in the prime working-aged population,
independent of their observed labor market status w or nw, we simulate the non-observed
state. For this simulation, we abstract from possible secondary effects of labor status
changes and concentrate our analysis on the decision of the individual potential worker,
holding all other aspects of household composition fixed. As such, we assume that a
change in one partner’s labor supply behavior, i.e., giving up or taking up a job, does not
simultaneously trigger a compensating labor supply reaction by other household members
or changes in household income from other non-labor sources. This assumption reflects
standard procedure in the PTR literature (see, e.g., Immervoll et al., 2007; Ja¨ntti et al.,
2015).
We start by predicting potential individual monthly earnings êi using a standard
two-step Heckman regression (Heckman, 1979) by country, year and gender separately.
Exclusion restrictions used to identify the selection term vary according to these groups.
Variables include dummies for the presence of children in certain age groups, marital
status, household non-labor income, household size, and the presence of an elderly person
(older than 65 years) in the household. On average, predicted earnings closely match
observed earnings, as can be taken from Table 3.1. We mostly predict slightly lower
average incomes than observed for men and slightly higher average incomes than observed
for women. 4
4Appendix Figure 3.A15 demonstrates that the difference in the estimated PTR calculated on the basis
of predicted rather than observed earnings is negligible. Small deviations remain for Greece.
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Table 3.1: Predicted and Observed Mean Monthly Earnings
2008 2010 2012 2014
pred. obs. gap pred. obs. gap pred. obs. gap pred. obs. gap
AT
Women 2281.2 1966.2 0.1 2297.6 2201.9 0.0 2243.3 1597.2 0.3 2490.1 2431.0 0.0
Men 3174.5 4360.7 -0.4 3467.3 3371.8 0.0 3646.5 4241.1 -0.2 3814.2 3668.0 0.0
BE
Women 2431.2 2109.8 0.1 2662.0 2391.1 0.1 2828.3 2385.2 0.2
Men 3193.5 3466.5 -0.1 3291.0 3558.9 -0.1 3463.7 3722.7 -0.1
BG
Women 512.7 409.9 0.2 625.5 522.1 0.2 603.6 530.4 0.1 710.7 625.4 0.1
Men 671.6 681.2 -0.0 761.9 818.8 -0.1 754.2 786.4 -0.0 904.0 886.4 0.0
CZ
Women 17663.9 18514.4 -0.0 19512.3 16601.2 0.1 19181.2 17748.4 0.1
Men 25714.3 25325.4 0.0 27328.3 23395.0 0.1 28093.0 21259.9 0.2
DE
Women 2300.0 2035.0 0.1 2408.1 2147.3 0.1 2402.0 2268.3 0.1
Men 3645.8 4208.4 -0.2 3537.3 4229.8 -0.2 3641.4 4563.9 -0.3
DK
Women 24576.7 23616.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30381.3 29347.8 0.0
Men 32581.9 22403.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 38521.3 44705.3 -0.2
EL
Women 1393.1 1110.2 0.2 1416.0 1162.6 0.2 1297.0 940.5 0.3 1129.4 741.2 0.3
Men 1926.2 2109.6 -0.1 1933.0 1988.3 -0.0 1725.9 1474.7 0.1 1480.6 1260.3 0.1
ES
Women 1493.1 1122.0 0.2 1592.1 1163.1 0.3 1592.5 1124.2 0.3 1619.0 1304.7 0.2
Men 1895.9 2047.0 -0.1 1951.3 1795.4 0.1 1900.9 1672.2 0.1 2000.1 1911.3 0.0
FR
Women 1827.0 1680.4 0.1 2070.7 1986.6 0.0 2219.6 2110.6 0.0
Men 2442.5 2350.2 0.0 2793.9 2739.8 0.0 2935.5 2827.8 0.0
IT
Women 1926.8 1427.8 0.3 1905.0 1338.1 0.3 1910.1 1347.5 0.3 1939.2 1373.6 0.3
Men 2567.7 2866.6 -0.1 2423.9 2447.7 -0.0 2431.5 2249.0 0.1 2503.8 2187.4 0.1
SE
Women 21250.4 20663.0 0.0 24572.0 24490.7 0.0 26323.5 30910.8 -0.2
Men 28515.8 24710.3 0.1 32010.4 33479.4 -0.0 34649.7 31339.6 0.1
UK
Women 1798.3 1612.1 0.1 1793.3 1600.5 0.1 1905.1 1654.8 0.1 1914.8 1624.3 0.2
Men 2648.4 2425.8 0.1 2709.5 2497.2 0.1 2721.8 2671.6 0.0 2658.6 2422.3 0.1
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations. The sample includes individuals aged 25-54 working at least 20 hours per
week, excluding the self-employed, students, pensioners, the permanently disabled, those in compulsory military service,
and those on parental leave. Rates describe weighted means per country using the EUROMOD sample weights. The sample
only includes years for which EUROMOD input data exist. UK 2008 is based on input from 2007, UK 2010 is based on
input from 2009 and UK 2014 is based on input from 2013.
We assign individuals observed in w zero labor earnings in the counterfactual situa-
tion nw. We then obtain gross household income in both potential labor market states as
yh = êi +
∑N
j 6=i ej + zh, whereby êi = 0 when the individual is in labor market state nw.
5
Following the calculation of household gross income described above, we then use
EUROMOD to apply the tax-benefit rules of the respective year and country to obtain
household taxes th and public transfers bh for both w and nw in a way that ensures
consistent assumptions regarding deductions as well as other special tax and transfer rules
5Replacing observed earnings with predicted earnings for those observed in w allows us to isolate the
identifying variation of interest discussed in further detail in Section 3.2.4.
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across countries. For example, household taxes paid in state nw are the sum of income tax
assessed on the basis of ynwh and social security contributions from the partner’s earnings
ej if the partner j is working. Household public transfers are the sum of social assistance,
housing allowances, and child benefits. A potential increase in benefits when changing
from w to nw will mostly occur for social assistance and housing allowances. In contrast,
benefits may also increase when changing from nw to w in the case of in-work benefits.
3.2.3 Data
We draw on EUROMOD data from 2008-2014,6 which is based on EU-SILC cross-sectional
data that have been specifically prepared for use in the EUROMOD microsimulation
model.7 EU-SILC provides ex-post harmonized and internationally comparable household-
level statistics on labor and income variables. To date, the EUROMOD microsimulation
model functions exclusively using this cross-sectional input dataset. We refer to this data
in the following as EUROMOD data. All simulations are based on EUROMOD version
G4.0+.
The EUROMOD data cover a representative sample of private households in all
investigated countries.8 Our sample includes individuals in their prime working age, be-
tween 25 and 54 years of age. We restrict the sample to these ages because large groups
of individuals younger than 25 likely face a decision between education and work rather
than between employment and inactivity, which is the focus of this paper. Likewise, be-
ginning approximately around age 55, individuals in many countries may choose between
(early) retirement and employment rather than employment and inactivity. Furthermore,
we exclude the self-employed, students, pensioners, permanently disabled persons, those
in compulsory military service, and those on parental leave. We trim the earnings distri-
bution by dropping the bottom 1% in order to exclude unreasonably low earnings. Our
final sample consists of approximately 350,000 individuals and four years of observations,
namely 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014.9
6The income reference period for all countries in our sample, except the UK, refers to the previous
calendar year. For the UK, income refers to the previous twelve months. Furthermore, yearly income
variables and the number of months employed are used to calculate monthly earnings.
7The EUROMOD microsimulation model is developed, maintained, and managed by the Institute for
Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of Essex, in collaboration with national teams
from the EU member states (See Sutherland and Figari (2013) for details).
8Countries include: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE),
Denmark (DK), Greece (EL), Spain (ES), France (FR), Italy (IT), Sweden (SE) and United Kingdom
(UK). In the following, we use the included abbreviations.
9We only include years for which EUROMOD provides input data in order to ensure that the determi-
nation of the PTR precedes the observed employment choice of the individual. For country-specific
input years, refer to Table 3.2.
76
3 Drivers of Participation Elasticities across Europe
The EUROMOD micro-simulator currently offers an option to account for non-take-
up of benefits as well as tax evasion for some countries. In order to ensure comparability,
however, we do not model these for any country. Moreover, due to data limitations,
neither contribution-based transitory benefits, such as unemployment insurance, nor in-
kind benefits are accounted for. Not accounting for the former will underestimate the
PTR level for countries with contribution-based SIC systems such as Austria, Belgium,
and Germany. Lack of the latter could attenuate the participation elasticity, for example,
in the case of publicly-provided childcare for individuals with small children, as such
complementary goods reduce the fix costs of working.
We define the labor market status of employment, w, as having positive earnings
and working at least 20 hours per week. We restrict our definition of w for two reasons.
Firstly, working at least 20 hours allows workers to be employed either half- or full-time.
Because part-time work is prevalent in many EU countries, this definition avoids the
restrictive assumption that if non-workers transition into employment, they will always
begin with a full-time job. Secondly, in order to avoid distortions in the PTR due to very
low monthly earnings driven by workers in a transitional status between labor market
attachment and occasional work, we exclude workers with less than 20 hours from our
sample. Consequently, transition into employment is defined as taking up a job for at
least 20 hours per week.
3.2.4 Estimation Strategy
In our regression analysis, we investigate the responsiveness of individuals to work incen-
tives that are inherent in tax and benefit systems across the EU. We begin with a simple
pooled OLS estimation of the structural labor supply equation, Equation 3.1, in the EU-
ROMOD cross-sectional data and add demographic controls as well as country and year
fixed effects. The binary outcome variable is one if individual i is employed in period t
(wit).
P (wit) = α + β(1− PTRit) · eit +X ′itγ + λc + µt + it (3.4)
If uncorrelated with it, the coefficient β would capture the effect of the net-of-
PTR earnings on the likelihood of labor market participation. A vector of controls for
each individual is denoted by Xit and includes household non-labor income, education,
experience, marital status, and the presence of a child in different age groups. Year fixed
effects, µt, capture business cycle fluctuations affecting labor demand, while country fixed
effects, λc, control for possible omitted policy variables and cultural preferences for work
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and leisure. The idiosyncratic error term is denoted by it. Table 3.5 shows these results
with and without controls for the EU sample as a whole.
We expect OLS to yield biased results due to an endogenous regressors problem
in which the error term it is likely correlated with the PTR. Endogeneity may arise
through omitted variables, simultaneity or measurement error. The main concern in our
setting stems from the omitted variable, which plausibly influences both an individual’s
probability to work P (wit) and his or her net-of-PTR earnings (1 − PTRit) · eit. For
instance, highly motivated individuals might invest more in their human capital or choose
more ambitious career paths, both of which are associated with higher earnings. At
the same time, one would expect these same individuals to have a higher willingness to
work compared to someone who is not motivated. Social norms present another omitted
factor influencing both willingness to work and labor market income that individuals of
particular social groups might expect. The correlation of these omitted variables with
earnings eit would bias the estimate of β in an upward direction. At the same time,
for most individuals in the EU, higher labor market earnings will yield higher PTRs, as
the PTR is a function of labor income. This mechanical correlation holds due to the
progressive character of most taxation systems10 and the means-tested nature of benefit
receipt. The positive correlation between the omitted variable and the PTR creates a
positive bias. Therefore, 1 − PTRit yields a negative bias. In sum, the direction of the
overall bias for the composite term of net-of-PTR earnings (1 − PTRit) · eit depends on
which component dominates.
Due to these endogeneity concerns, we apply an instrumental grouping estimator
(group IV), where group averages serve as instruments for the individual level net-of-PTR
earnings. This instrument must be correlated with the individual level PTR (relevance
condition) and exogenous to the observed labor supply choice (exclusion restriction). As
discussed at length in Angrist (1991), Blundell et al. (1998), Blau and Kahn (2006) and
Heckman and Robb (1985), instrumenting the individual-level endogenous explanatory
variable in the labor supply equation with a group average drives the bias from omitted
variables and measurement error toward zero as the cell size used to calculate group aver-
ages grows large. Specifically, identifying variation comes from cross-sectional differences
across groups while common biasing factors are canceled out. Applications in the labor
supply literature include Ja¨ntti et al. (2015), Burns and Ziliak (2015) and Blau and Kahn
(2006).
Optimal group partition will minimize heterogeneity within a group while allowing
for enough variation beyond the group averages for identification. Minimizing hetero-
10Bulgaria and the Czech Republic serve as exceptions, with proportional taxation systems.
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geneity involves a trade-off in which the group cells must remain sufficiently large for
estimation. Since tax-benefit changes differentially affected individuals in different birth
cohorts and income groups, we split the sample into 5-year age groups and three educa-
tional attainment levels as a proxy for permanent income, resulting in 18 groups. This
group definition follows Burns and Ziliak (2015).11 Adapting the Wald estimator for-
mulated in Blundell et al. (1998) to the extensive labor supply margin, we estimate the
following equation by 2SLS:
1ststage : (1− PTRit) · eit = θ(1− PTRgt) · egt +X ′itγ + αg + λc + µt + uit (3.5)
2ndstage : P (wit) = β(1− PTRit) · eit
∧
+X ′itγ + αg + λc + µt + it (3.6)
Having replaced the individual net-of-PTR earnings with the predicted value from
the first stage, the correlation between the group mean and the idiosyncratic error term
it is assumed negligibly near zero. The necessary exclusion restriction for this instrument
is that unobservable differences in net-of-PTR earnings across groups can be captured by
permanent group αg and country effects λc and an additive time effect µt. The second
necessary condition corresponds to the rank condition and requires that, after subtracting
the effect of the group, country, and time averages, some identifying variation in the
PTR still remains, i.e. net-of-PTR earnings grow differentially across groups. Figure
3.1 displays our grouping estimator, i.e., PTRs by age group and education level over
time, for Italy and shows that PTRs decreased at a higher rate for low-skilled than for
high-skilled from 2008 to 2014. Further, the reduction is more pronounced for younger
age groups. PTRs by age group and education level for the entire set of countries can be
found in the Appendix Figures 3.A1 to 3.A12.
3.3 Participation Tax Rates across Europe
In this section, we take a closer look at variation across countries with respect to the
dependent variable, employment, and the main explanatory variable of interest, net-of-
PTR earnings. Table 3.2 depicts the observed employment rates in our sample across
the EU when we define employment as having positive earnings and working at least 20
11For our preferred group definition, group sizes range from 29 to 2,046 individual observations. We also
provide results according to an alternative group definition according to 10-year age cohorts, three
educational attainment groups, and gender for comparison with Ja¨ntti et al. (2015). Our estimates
are robust to this alternative definition. These results are presented in Table 3.A1.
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hours. Employment rates vary substantially between countries from 54 to 94 percent of
the prime working-age population of women and between 81 and 97 percent of men.
Juxtaposed to these employment rates, Table 3.3 shows median PTRs for each
country by year and gender. It is not only employment rates, but also PTRs that vary
greatly across countries, with the highest extensive margin work incentives (lowest PTR)
for women in Greece and Bulgaria; and for men in Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria. Several
countries share relatively high PTRs and, thus, low work incentives for both women and
men; in particular Belgium, Germany, and Denmark. Across all countries in the pooled
sample, the average PTR is approximately 32% for women and 36% for men. Men tend to
have a higher PTR than women due to higher earnings and, subsequently, higher tax and
social security contributions, especially in countries with progressive taxation. As such,
the income tax wedge between employment and unemployment is lower for women than
for men, yielding a lower PTR. We return to these gender differences in more detail in
Figure 3.3 where we decompose the drivers of the median PTR by earner type. Between
2008 and 2014, mean PTR decreased for both women and men in Denmark, Germany,
and Italy, while they increased in Belgium, France, and Spain.
Figures 3.2 to 3.4 show the PTR distribution across countries by individual earnings
quintile, earner type and household type. The boxplots show the median, interquartile
range as well as minimum and maximum PTRs excluding outliers.
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Table 3.2: Employment Rates in % and Observations by Country, 2008-2014
Employment Rates Observations
Female Male All
2008 2010 2012 2014 2008 2010 2012 2014 2008 2010 2012 2014
AT 81 84 84 85 97 97 95 97 4990 5232 4997 4511
BE 75 79 79 92 91 90 5415 5052 4723 0
BG 84 86 85 85 92 93 90 89 4222 5683 5032 4254
CZ 81 80 83 97 97 97 9903 7778 7225 0
DE 79 78 82 93 93 94 9608 9424 9180 0
DK 96 97 97 97 5481 0 4520 0
EL 65 65 57 54 94 91 83 78 6253 6354 4835 7550
ES 70 69 64 71 93 84 81 85 13786 14034 12519 11586
FR 85 89 90 94 96 96 9421 9045 9985 0
IT 67 64 64 65 92 89 87 86 20316 18631 18296 17751
SE 95 95 95 97 97 95 6417 5963 5346 0
UK 80 78b 79 80c 91 89b 90 91c 19319 19167b 15402 15498c
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations. The sample includes individuals aged 25-54 working at
least part-time, according to the country-specific part-time norm, excluding the self-employed, students,
pensioners, the permanently disabled, those in compulsory military service, and those on parental leave.
Rates describe weighted means per country using the EUROMOD sample weights. The sample only
includes years for which EUROMOD input data exist. a. based on input 2007 b. based on input 2009 c.
based on input 2013.
Figure 3.2 shows varying degrees of dispersion in PTRs across countries by individ-
ual earnings quintile. On average, we expect PTRs to increase with earnings in progressive
taxation systems as the tax wedge between working and not working increases with po-
tential income. For most of the countries in our sample, we observe increasing median
PTRs as we move from the lowest to highest individual potential earnings quintile. This
observation lends credence to our concern about an endogenous regressors problem in
our structural equation of interest. This effect becomes less pronounced in joint taxa-
tion countries like Belgium, France, and Germany because joint assessment of household
income lessens the tax burden more on the upper end of the earnings distribution than
on the lower end. While Bulgaria has very little variation in median PTRs across the
earnings distribution due to a proportional tax rate and relatively insignificant out-of-
work benefits, most other country systems show a great deal of dispersion in incentives
throughout the earnings distribution.
PTRs are more dispersed in the bottom quintile, reflecting the fact that they consist
primarily of single, sole, and secondary earners. While the former may be eligible for
means-tested benefits when out of work, the latter most often do not pass the means test
for benefit receipt. The highest quintile mostly consists of single and primary earners with
high individual labor income, which leads to less dispersed PTRs. Given the significant
influence that household structure appears to exert on the size of the individual PTR, in
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2008 2010 2012 2014
UK
1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations. Participation tax rates shown on the y-axis.
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Table 3.3: Mean Participation Tax Rates by Country and Gender in %, 2008-2014
Male Female
2008 2010 2012 2014 2008 2010 2012 2014
AT 48 47 52 53 37 39 37 40
BE 51 50 52 50 50 53
BG 24 23 23 24 25 24 25 25
CZ 33 32 33 33 32 33
DE 54 47 47 53 47 46
DK 59 53 54 52
EL 24 22 21 23 19 15 14 15
ES 25 28 30 30 25 29 31 30
FR 38 38 40 35 36 38
IT 33 30 28 24 26 25 24 20
SE 33 33 33 30 28 30
UK 43 43b 41 39c 34 35b 32 30c
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations. Median values weighted using EUROMOD
sample weights. a. based on input 2007 b. based on input 2009 c. based on input 2013.
The sample includes individuals aged 25-54 working at least 20 hours per week, excluding
the self-employed, students, pensioners, the permanently disabled, those in compulsory
military service, and those on parental leave.
the following we decompose the driving components of the PTR according to household
and earner types.
Negative PTRs arise from substantial in-work benefits or earned income tax credits
(EITCs) and are especially found at the bottom of the earnings distribution. In most
countries, these in-work benefits are either non-existent or small for individuals without
children, but generous for working families with children.12 In Sweden, eligibility for the
EITC is independent of the number of children in the household. Belgium, Bulgaria, and
Denmark do not have substantial in-work benefits. This finding is of particular interest
as some results from optimal tax theory call for a negative PTR at the bottom of the
earnings distribution if the extensive elasticity is large (Saez, 2002; Chone´ and Laroque,
2011; Jacquet et al., 2013; Hansen, 2017).
Figure 3.3 displays the dispersion in PTRs by earner type. We define four stylized
earner roles within the household: 1) single earners in a one-person household (”single”);
12This applies to Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. In Greece, the social dividend was paid in 2014 as a one-time lump-sum payment. In all
other years, no substantial in-work credits existed.
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2008 2010 2012 2014
UK
Single Sole earner First earner Secondary earner
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations. Participation tax rates shown on the y-axis.
2) sole earners in a multiple-person household (”sole earner”); 3) primary earners in
households in which more than one person is employed (”first earner”); and 4) secondary
earners in households in which more than one person is employed. The primary earner is
the highest earning member of the household. Individual PTRs depend on other household
member’s earnings through two channels. First, singles or single earners are more likely
to be eligible for means-tested benefits in nw than secondary earners. Secondly, single
and primary earners face a higher tax wedge between w and nw than secondary earners.
As a result, PTRs are lowest for secondary earners in all countries. We find larger PTRs
for primary earners than for secondary earners in all countries, thus corroborating the
results of Immervoll et al. (2011). Tax-benefit systems create the highest disincentives for
singles in Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Spain; for single earners in Belgium,
Germany, Denmark, France and Sweden; and for first earners in Greece and Italy.
Figure 3.4 shows that the presence of children in the household has a large effect on
the PTR. We distinguish between five stylized household types: 1) single; 2) single parent;
3) couple without children; 4) couple with children; and 5) extended families. Greater
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2008 2010 2012 2014
UK
Single Single parent Couple w/o kids Couple w kids Extended family
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations. Participation tax rates shown on the y-axis.
variation can be seen in the PTRs among parents and particularly for single parents in
Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
This is the effect of two opposing factors. On the one hand, means-tested benefits in
nw increase with the number of children in the household, which in turn increases the
PTR. On the other hand, many countries offer in-work family benefits that increase work
incentives and reduce the PTR. The PTR becomes negative for some single parents in
the Czech Republic and Italy, as well as for some couples with children in Austria and
the United Kingdom. We comment further on these in-work family benefits below.
The composition of the PTR by household and earner type for the latest observed
year is displayed in Figure 3.3. PTR compositions across all observed country-years are
provided in Appendix Figures 3.A13 and 3.A14. The upper part of the figure displays
the PTR composition by the five household types and the bottom part displays the PTR
composition by the five earner types. The rationale for showing both distinctions lies
in the fact that benefits most often depend on household composition and taxes for the
household can vary greatly for different earner types across countries. Income taxes as
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well as social security contributions and benefits are displayed as a share of individual
earnings, such that adding up the components results in the individual PTR. Household
income taxes and social security contributions when the individual is not working, nw, as
well as benefits when employed, w, negatively enter the PTR. Accordingly, this share is
denoted below the horizontal axis.
With respect to the household type, three findings are worth discussing. First,
out-of-work benefits are high for families, most noticeably for single parents. Second, in-
work-benefits are also high for families. Work-related child benefits are granted in Austria
(Kinderbetreuungsgeld), Belgium (Basiskinderbijslag), Italy (assegni familiari), Greece
(koinoniko´ me´risma), Germany (Kinderzuschlag) and Spain (mı´nimo por descendientes),
which can create negative PTRs for low-income earners. Similarly, working tax credits and
child tax credits that include a partial childcare cost compensation for working parents
exist in the United Kingdom and comprise a substantial incentive to work. In France,
low-income workers receive in-work payments in addition to the social assistance received
by non-workers (Revenue de solidarite´ active, RSA). This benefit is more generous for
families than for households without children, as the lump-sum depends on the number of
dependent children.13 EITCs for single earners, on the other hand, while prevalent in some
countries, are often negligible compared to the in-work benefits for families. Third, the
tax wedge between working and not working is lower for couples than for singles regardless
of the presence of children. This tax wedge, however, varies according to the individual’s
earner role within the household, as demonstrated in the bottom half of Figure 3.3.
In the context of earner types within the household, three findings with regard to
individual incentives merit discussion. First, household income taxes and social security
contributions as a share of individual earnings are particularly high for secondary earners
in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Italy. If the labor income of secondary earn-
ers represents only a small portion of overall household income, the household’s income
tax changes only marginally between working and not working for secondary earner. In
contrast, household’s income tax changes substantially between working and not working
for single earners. Second, only single, sole-earner and no-earner households receive sub-
stantial out-of-work transfers, while individuals in two-earner households are mostly not
eligible. Third, large differences result from the variation of tax-benefit systems across
countries. While countries like Denmark, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom
provide generous income support to the unemployed, countries like Bulgaria and Greece
only offer small or no benefits.
13Additionally in France, the means test for receipt of the family complement benefit (Comple´ment
familial) is measured against a higher eligibility threshold for households in which two earners, rather
than one, are working. In 2016, a separate in-work benefit, Prime d’activite´, was introduced to replace
this system for low income earners.
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Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations.
Note: Latest observed year per country, i.e. 2012, 2013 or 2014.
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Beyond the household context, tax-benefit systems differentially affect individual
incentives depending on the level of their earnings. Because individuals with a weak
attachment to the labor force on average exhibit low potential earnings and high extensive
margin responses to incentives, Table 3.4 displays indicators of tax and benefit receipt
for individuals in the bottom quintile of the earnings distribution in both possible labor
states: 1) the share of benefit receipt and tax payment (% receiving/paying in w/nw);
and 2) the level of taxes paid and benefits received, proportional to the bottom quintile’s
earnings threshold (Ratio in w/nw).
The share of benefit receipt in w and nw varies greatly across countries. In contrast,
the ratio of benefits received in w, conditional on receipt, does not exceed one-fifth of the
bottom quintile’s earnings threshold in most countries. When these individuals do not
work, the ratio of benefits to the bottom quintile’s earnings threshold increases to 40-50%
in Austria, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom; to almost 30% in France, Belgium
and Denmark; and 20% or less in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, and Sweden.
The difference in generosity of benefits in w and nw is highest in Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Denmark, Spain, and France, indicating lower work incentives for low-income
workers in comparison to countries with a small differential.
In most of the countries in our sample, almost all workers in the bottom quintile
of the earnings distribution pay taxes. Only in Greece, Spain and the Czech Republic,
do high tax allowances lead to roughly 12-22% of low income workers being exempt from
paying taxes on their earnings. The ratio of the tax (including SIC) burden to the bottom
quintile’s earnings threshold, conditional on being positive, is lower than 10% in Spain,
the Czech Republic and Italy, slightly higher than 10% in Austria, Belgium and Greece
and between ca. 15-30% in Germany, Denmark, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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Table 3.4: Tax and Benefit Incentives for Bottom Quintile
Benefits Taxes
% receiving Ratio % receiving Ratio % paying Ratio
in w in w in nw in nw in w in w
AT 18.5 23.0 17.0 47.8 98.8 11.6
BE 16.6 10.0 41.1 26.0 98.3 17.4
BG 23.1 19.5 16.0 20.9 100.0 14.9
CZ 23.8 11.6 31.3 20.3 84.5 10.3
DE 17.1 19.5 19.3 41.2 98.8 28.1
DK 63.9 1.9 89.0 41.6 99.5 28.8
EL 8.9 21.9 7.1 20.4 63.4 11.0
ES 20.1 10.9 15.3 44.8 68.1 5.4
FR 68.3 9.2 62.4 28.0 100.0 18.7
IT 13.8 13.4 0.5 19.5 89.5 9.2
SE 28.7 13.9 50.1 28.0 98.6 17.0
UK 31.5 45.6 36.4 62.8 97.7 13.7
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations. Median values weighted using EU–SILC sample weights.
Ratio refers to median benefits or taxes (including social security contributions), respectively, as a
share of bottom quintile’s earnings. a. based on input 2007 b. based on input 2009 c. based on input.
The sample includes individuals aged 25-54 working at least 20 hours per week, excluding students,
pensioners, the permanently disabled, those in compulsory military service, and those on parental leave.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Estimates
Results include data for 12 European countries that represent a variety of welfare state
systems. Regression results for Equation 4 are presented in Table 3.5. This table juxta-
poses results from the OLS estimation of Equation 3.4 that treats the PTR as exogenous
to the probability of employment (columns (1)-(2)) to those of the 2SLS estimation using
the group IV of Equation 3.6 (columns (3)-(5)). For the group IV, groups are defined
as 5-year age cohorts and three categories of educational attainment. Adding control
variables for demographic factors that potentially influence labor supply decisions has a
stronger effect in the OLS estimation than in the group IV, as the latter implicitly controls
for education and age groups already in the baseline specification. Column (5) displays
results including an additional interaction term of net-of-PTR earnings with the female
dummy and confirms previous findings in the literature that, on average, women respond
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more than men to monetary incentives. Further results exhibit the expected signs: higher
education and being male are associated with a higher employment probability whereas
the presence of children and marital status negatively impact employment probabilities
when averaging over men and women. Despite similar results, the group IV with full
controls (column (4)) presents our preferred specification, as it carefully controls for the
endogeneity of earnings to the labor supply decision as well as the PTR being a function
of earnings.
In accordance with economic theory that suggests an increase in work incentives
yields an increased probability of gainful employment, we find a strong, positive effect
of net-of-PTR earnings on employment probability. The estimates of the group IV yield
higher participation responses to changes in the net-of-PTR earnings than the OLS re-
gressions, thus indicating a downward OLS bias. The high first stage Anderson-Rubin
statistic, which tests the null-hypothesis of weak instruments, lends credence to the use
of the group IV as a strong instrument for individual net-of-PTR earnings.14
Results for group IV prove rather robust to the definition of the group both in
magnitude and direction of the effect. Appendix Table 3.A1 displays these results from the
alternative definition, which includes 10-year age cohorts, three educational attainment
levels, and gender.15 Our preferred specification from Table 3.5 column (3) and (5) (with
controls) is robust to alternative clustering strategies, as shown in Appendix Table 3.A2.
Further, results prove robust to specifications that allow for country-specific, gender-
specific and age-specific time trends, as shown in Appendix Table 3.A3.
14We calculate this statistic from Finlay et al. (2016), which allows for cluster robust inference.
15Our two alternative group definitions follow the two studies of Burns and Ziliak (2015) and Ja¨ntti et al.
(2015), which both applied a group IV in order to estimate hours and participation elasticities.
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Table 3.5: Regression Results for Pooled OLS and Group IV
OLS Group IV
baseline controls baseline controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1-PTR)*e 0.160*** 0.039*** 0.114*** 0.091*** 0.053***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
(1-PTR)*e*female 0.090∗∗∗
(0.004)






Married -0.051∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Hh. non-labor income 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Child 1-3 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Child 4-6 -0.013∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Child 7-17 -0.037∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Experience 0.036∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience squared -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.836∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Adj. R-squared 0.081 0.239
First-stage AR-statistic 220.14*** 181.13*** 480.75***
N 355,793 355,793 355,793 355,793 355,793
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations. The sample includes prime working-aged individuals aged
25-54, excluding students, pensioners, the permanently disabled, and those in compulsory military service.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and are corrected for generated variables bias. All equations
include both year and country fixed effects. The omitted education category is lower secondary education.
Groups are defined as 5-year age cohorts and three educational attainment groups, following Burns and
Ziliak (2015). We define groups within each European country. All regressions are estimated with
2SLS, instrumenting the individual-specific net-of-PTR earnings with the group average in each year and
country.
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3.4.2 Participation Elasticities
Given the different institutional settings, social norms and tastes for work and leisure
across European countries, it is reasonable to expect participation elasticities to vary
across countries, gender and earner types. From the marginal effects of the regression in
Equation 3.6, we calculate the static, within-period participation elasticity according to
Equation 3.2.
Figure 3.6 captures these country-specific elasticities estimated in Equation 3.6 by
country for men and women separately. An overall country-specific pattern is observable
across gender, in which higher elasticities for men in one country compared to another
generally translate into higher relative female elasticities as well. Participation elasticities
are high in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, and Sweden, while they are low
and not statistically different from zero in Bulgaria, France, and the United Kingdom.
In these countries, especially Bulgaria and France, labor market participation is already
high (see Table 3.2), leaving few individuals on the margin between participating and not
participating in the labor force. Perhaps even more striking than the difference in the
size of the estimates for men and women is the large dispersion in the elasticities among
women, indicating substantial heterogeneity that is not captured by gender alone.16 Our
findings indicate an EU-average elasticity of 0.08 for men and of 0.15 for women.17
Beyond identifying average male and female responses to work incentives, in the
second step of our analysis, we further disaggregate the impact of these disperse PTRs
by earner roles within the household. Figures 3.7 to 3.10 display elasticities for men and
women, respectively, according to their potential earner role within the household when
in labor state w. These figures reveal that men and women respond similarly if compared
within the same household earner role. This result corroborates Blau and Kahn (2006)
who find that women’s labor supply elasticities approached men’s in the US from 1980 to
2000 as the traditional division of labor broke down. Our results offer first reduced-form
evidence that this closing gap also can be observed in the European context in many but
not all countries.
Single and primary earners’ elasticities are indistinguishable from zero irrespective
of gender. Only primary male earners in Greece and Spain have small, but statistically
significant elasticities. Male sole earners in Austria, Greece, Spain and Italy show statis-
tically significant responses to monetary incentives to work in the order of ca. 0.1. In
contrast, both male and female secondary earners were the most responsive in terms of
16This finding corroborates work by Bastani et al. (2017), who estimate PTRs by skill level and emphasize
the importance of providing heterogeneous estimates to be used in the calibration of structural models.
17These averages are weighted using the individual EUROMOD sample weights.
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Source: EUROMOD cross-sectional data and microsimulation, own calculations.
Note: Vertical lines show cluster robust confidence intervals at the 95%-level.
size and significance of their respective elasticities, although more variance exists among
male secondary earners than for female secondary earners. These results demonstrate that
difference between female and male elasticities are much greater on average, than within
earner types. A closer consideration of what drives this behavior uncovers the importance
of the specific earner role that the individual plays within the household.
In a final disaggregated analysis, we tie our results into work by Aghion et al. (2017)
and Abeler and Ja¨ger (2015) on the importance of salience in determining responses to
changes in tax-benefit systems. In the following, we consider the extent to which individ-
uals react differentially to the three main components of the PTR: taxes, social insurance
contributions, and benefits. Just as we defined the PTR as the household’s tax wedge be-
tween w and nw, it is possible to break this term down into the wedge for taxes, SIC, and
benefits before formulating the net-of-tax earnings from each of these wedges: (1− tax
e
)∗e
for taxes, (1 − SIC
e
) ∗ e for SIC, and (1 − ben
e
) ∗ e for benefits. The expected direction
of the effect is the same as for the entire net-of-PTR earnings term, but the reaction of
individuals to each of these components could vary according to differences in the salience
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of taxes, SICs or benefits.18



























Source: EUROMOD cross-sectional data and microsimulation, own calculations.
Note: Vertical lines show cluster robust confidence intervals at the 95%-level.
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Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations.
Note: Vertical lines show cluster robust confidence intervals at the 95%-level.



























Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations.
Note: Vertical lines show cluster robust confidence intervals at the 95%-level.
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Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations.
Note: Vertical lines show cluster robust confidence intervals at the 95%-level.
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Following results from the previous section, which demonstrate significant elastic-
ities almost exclusively for secondary earners, Table 3.6 displays average elasticities for
this earner type in each country with respect to these separate components. Social in-
surance contributions systematically generate the highest response for this group, while
benefits comparably exert the smallest effect across countries, despite the common focus
on benefits in the public debate.
Table 3.6: Participation elasticity by PTR component
Income tax Soc. ins. contributions Benefits
Elasticity SE Elasticity SE Elasticity SE
AT 0.135 0.038 0.170 0.044 0.107 0.030
BE 0.193 0.081 0.215 0.087 0.197 0.076
BG 0.131 0.065 0.138 0.073 0.122 0.071
CZ 0.177 0.061 0.191 0.070 0.164 0.057
DE 0.260 0.077 0.319 0.082 0.278 0.067
DK 0.123 0.081 0.134 0.088 0.104 0.083
EL 0.211 0.059 0.229 0.068 0.206 0.052
ES 0.216 0.065 0.233 0.075 0.204 0.054
FR 0.108 0.064 0.120 0.072 0.100 0.060
IT 0.336 0.067 0.399 0.075 0.363 0.055
SE 0.182 0.104 0.216 0.105 0.195 0.097
UK 0.153 0.073 0.165 0.077 0.136 0.069
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations. The sample includes prime working-aged individuals
aged 25-54, excluding the self-employed, students, pensioners, the permanently disabled, and those in
compulsory military service. Standard errors are clustered at the group level.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we compute Participation Tax Rates (PTRs) across the EU as a compre-
hensive measure of work disincentives inherent in tax-benefit systems. We find varying
degrees of disincentives that were larger on average for men and that increase with gross
individual earnings, which is related to the progressivity of most European tax-benefit
systems. Throughout the period under investigation, large disparities between countries
persisted, but remained relatively constant across time despite several individual reforms.
Disentangling the drivers of the PTRs, we find that the relative importance of taxes,
social insurance contributions and benefits largely depends on household composition and
the individual’s earner role within the household. Tax-benefit systems create the highest
disincentives for singles in Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Spain; for sole
earners in Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France and Sweden; as well as for first earners
in Greece and Italy. Across European countries, PTRs are lowest for secondary earners.
High PTRs for singles, sole earners, and those observed not working are the result of
substantial out-of-work benefits in Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,
while out-of-work benefits are very small or even non-existent in Bulgaria, Greece, and
Italy. Comparably higher PTRs for secondary earners in Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, and Italy are the result of a high tax and social insurance contribution wedge
between participation and non-participation.
Negative PTRs arise in several countries for working families with children at the
bottom of the earnings distribution from substantial in-work benefits or earned income
tax credits (EITCs). More precisely, work incentives are upwardly distorted for single
parents and single earners in the Czech Republic and Italy as well as for couples with
children (single earner or first earner) in Austria and the United Kingdom. This finding
is of particular interest as optimal tax theory shows negative PTRs can be optimal at
the bottom of the earnings distribution for one-earner households as well as for families
if the social weight placed on this group is sufficiently high (Saez, 2002; Immervoll et al.,
2011; Chone´ and Laroque, 2011; Jacquet et al., 2013; Hansen, 2017). While two-earner
households benefit from economies of scale, childcare costs for parents of small children
create higher fixed costs associated with working, which may suggest a lower optimal
PTR in comparison to childless households. The present paper empirically documents
the widespread existence of negative PTRs as a result of means-tested in-work benefits
for some countries and earner types. In contrast, in-work benefits for individuals without
children are either non-existent or small in most European countries. Only in Sweden is
eligibility for the EITC independent of the number of children in the household, which
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could be rendered unnecessary due to the general availability of publicly provided child-
care. Belgium, Bulgaria, and Denmark do not have substantial in-work benefits.
A reform reducing the PTR of a particular group only increases efficiency if partici-
pation elasticities of this group are sufficiently high. In the second step of our analysis, we
identify the impact of the disperse PTRs on labor supply and estimated marginal effects
on an aggregate level as well as by country, gender and earner roles within the household.
We find an average participation elasticity of 0.08 for men and of 0.15 for women, as well
as a high degree of heterogeneity across countries. Countries with high extensive margin
responses include: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Sweden.
Gender turns out not to be the characteristic that best predicts individual responses
to monetary incentives for work. A further analysis reveals that men and women respond
similarly if compared within the same household earner role. Typically, both male and
female primary earners, sole earners, and singles show elasticities indistinguishable from
zero. In contrast, both male and female secondary earners were the most responsive in
terms of size and significance of their respective elasticities. Participation elasticities of
male and female secondary earners are mostly between 0.1 and 0.4. In a final step, we
show that among the three components of the PTR – taxes, social security contributions,
and benefits – social security contributions elicit the strongest response among secondary
earners.
Our average estimates corroborate the smaller participation elasticities found by
other studies that likewise compute reduced-form participation elasticities across coun-
tries based on incremental changes to tax-benefit incentives, namely Ja¨ntti et al. (2015)
and Kal´ıˇskova´ (2018). Ja¨ntti et al. (2015) find a range of elasticities, mostly between 0-0.2,
with statistically insignificant results in many countries. Kal´ıˇskova´ (2018) estimates an
average female participation elasticity of 0.08 between 2005-2010 for an EU-wide sample
of women from 26 countries. Our results – estimated on the basis of cross-country data,
the full prime working-aged population and the tax-benefit system as a whole – demon-
strate smaller participation elasticities when compared to existing studies using quasi-
experimental settings, mainly using US and UK data. On average, quasi-experimental
studies reviewed by Chetty et al. (2013) find a participation elasticity of 0.28 and es-
timates range from 0.13 to 0.43, which corresponds to the magnitude of our estimates
found only for the most responsive group of secondary earners. This discrepancy could be
explained by the use of large and intensively discussed reforms such as the introduction
of the EITC in the US, which cause disproportionately high reactions in the target group.
Smaller behavioral responses imply that government policies may have a less distortionary
effect on labor supply in the short run than existing studies suggest.
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Taken together, our findings demonstrate the importance of using more heteroge-
neous participation elasticities when calibrating structural labor supply models and/or
predicting welfare effects from simulating tax-benefit reforms. Elasticities calculated on
the basis of country-specific case studies may not broadly apply across socioeconomic
groups and the entire working-aged population. In particular, our analysis shows the
central role of the individual’s earner position within the household context. Secondly,
larger estimates of quasi-experimental studies are likely more relevant for large, salient
reforms, while smaller estimates, such as those found in this study, prove more accurate
for incremental changes to the tax-benefit system in the short run.
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Table 3.A1: Regression Results for Group IV with Alternative Group Definition
Blundell et al. 1998 Ja¨ntti et al. 2015
baseline controls baseline controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1-PTR)*earnings 0.112*** 0.090*** 0.147*** 0.092***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)





Hh. non-labor income 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Child aged 1-3 -0.059*** -0.057***
(0.003) (0.002)
Child agend 4-6 -0.032*** -0.030***
(0.002) (0.002)




Experience squared -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.849*** 0.533*** 0.775*** 0.487***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
First stage AR-statistic 163.26*** 520.22*** 838.59*** 372.70***
N 355,793 355,793 355,793 355,793
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations. The sample includes prime working-aged individuals
aged 25-54, excluding students, pensioners, the permanently disabled, and those in compulsory
military service. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and are corrected for generated
variables bias. All equations include both year and country fixed effects. The omitted education
category is lower secondary education. Groups are defined as 10-year age cohorts, three educational
attainment groups and gender, following Ja¨ntti et al. (2015). We define groups within each European
country. All regressions are estimated with 2SLS, instrumenting the individual-specific net-of-PTR
earnings with the group average in each year and country. Standard errors are clustered at the group level.
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Table 3.A2: Regression Results for Group IV and Alternative Clustering Strategies
Cluster group group year country group group year country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1-PTR)*earnings 0.114∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.091∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.050) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Male 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023)
Married -0.012∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Hh. non-labor income 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Child 1-3 -0.064∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
Child 4-6 -0.035∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Child 7-17 -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Experience 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Experience squared -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.850∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.064) (0.056) (0.056) (0.060)
N 355,793 355,793 355,793 355,793 355,793 355,793
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations. This table corresponds to Table 3.5 with alternative clus-
tering strategies including clustering by group, clustering by group and year, and clustering by country.
Columns (1)-(3) show baseline results, columns (4)-(6) add demographic controls.
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Table 3.A3: Robustness of Group IV to Time Trends
Group IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1-PTR)*earnings 0.071*** 0.085*** 0.091*** 0.063***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Country × Year X X
Age × Year X X
Gender × Year X X
Demographic controls X X X X
N 355,793 355,793 355,793 355,793
Source: EUROMOD data, own calculations.
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4 Affordability of the Affordable Care
Act’s Medicaid Expansion:
Implications for Household and
Public Finances
4.1 Introduction
Health economists and policy-makers around the world continue to debate the merits of
public health insurance as an in-kind benefit to low-income households. Beyond the con-
text of the United States, where public insurance (Medicaid) expansion under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) remains highly contentious, the World Health
Organization is leading a campaign to achieve universal health insurance coverage (World
Health Organization, 2011, 2013). Across many OECD countries, which have provided
state-sponsored health care for decades, moral hazard and adverse selection prevent a
thorough understanding of the causal link between public insurance, the household bud-
get constraint and medical consumption behavior. The ACA Medicaid expansion presents
a unique quasi-experiment through which it becomes possible to causally examine the im-
pact of this policy tool on household medical consumption and spending.
Previous work has established that the ACA Medicaid expansion led to an increase
in public insurance coverage ((Sommers et al., 2014; Courtemanche et al., 2016; Duggan
et al., 2017; Frean et al., 2017)). However, still very little empirical evidence exists
regarding how this increased insurance coverage actually altered affordability of health
care goods and services for targeted households and changed the burden of out-of-pocket
(OOP) medical expenditures for taxpayers. This paper seeks to fill that gap.
A priori, economic theory yields ambiguous predictions regarding the relationship
between subsidized public insurance and OOP. Holding health care consumption (uti-
lization) fixed, subsidizing costs through Medicaid should unambiguously reduce average
OOP by 75%, the mean share of health care expenditures covered by Medicaid in the
United States. Because health care represents a normal good, however, subsidies likely
lead to increased utilization, as the relative price decreases by 75% (substitution effect).
Furthermore, income effects may increase the OOP of households with pre-reform pos-
itive health expenditures; stark reductions in OOP may free up income for non-health
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consumption or savings, and some of this increased income could be spent on additional
medical services or products.
Differentiation in the health care services market further complicates predictions
about the effect on OOP. Common avenues of pre-reform health care access for low-
income households such as public hospitals and emergency rooms offer an arguably inferior
good compared to regular physician treatment. Post-reform substitution across health
care providers may actually increase OOP if households previously received pro-bono
treatment through charity care.1 Determining which of these channels dominates remains
the empirical exercise at issue in this paper.
Beyond effects to mean expenditures, insurance should decrease the risk especially
of high-cost medical events and thus reduce the mean-preserving risk spread (Feldstein
and Gruber, 1995; Finkelstein and McKnight, 2008; Shigeoka, 2014). The potential shock
to the budgets of low income households in the form of free or subsidized insurance proves
particularly large because OOP medical expenditures comprise a substantial portion of the
household budget. In extreme cases, an unlucky medical event could lead to bankruptcy,
accompanied by additional negative effects on the long-term financial health of the house-
hold.2 The analysis provides estimates of changes to OOP across the distribution of
expenditures and quantifies the reduction in risk exposure.
As a comprehensive reform, the ACA combined several additional policy measures
beyond Medicaid public insurance expansion, including the introduction of private in-
surance exchanges and subsidies, an individual insurance mandate and wide-reaching
regulations of the health insurance market. This paper will assess the separate effects of
Medicaid, private insurance subsidies and individual mandate penalties on affordability of
health care, measured in household out-of-pocket medical expenditures (OOP) including
insurance premia. The primary concern lies in identifying the impact of Medicaid expan-
sion while controlling for exposure to these other two policy provisions. At the same time,
any causal impacts must be interpreted as being in combination with underlying changes
to regulations, which, as a simple time-series change are not separately identifiable.
In order to establish a causal relationship between OOP medical expenditures and
exposure to Medicaid, exchange subsidies and mandate penalties, I exploit variation in
eligibility rules for each of these policies across regions, income groups and time in an
1Charity care refers to an informal network of emergency rooms, public hospitals, community centers
and private physicians that offer low-income individuals pro-bono care in exchange for reimbursements
from state and federal government programs. For a detailed discussion of charity care, refer to section
4.5.3.
2Himmelstein et al. (2009) attribute as much as 62.1% of consumer bankruptcies prior to the onset of
the Great Recession in 2007 to medical bills. Gross and Notowidigdo (2011) estimate this share to be
much lower, around 26%. Even based on the lower bound, however, this figure remains economically
relevant.
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enriched difference-in-differences (DD) strategy. I also provide results for a full difference-
in-difference-in-differences (DDD) analysis across these dimensions. Furthermore, I in-
strument observed eligibility with a simulated eligibility measure in the spirit of Cutler
and Gruber (1996) and Currie and Gruber (1996) that isolates the exogenous variation
in policy generosity from individual-level endogeneity. Rich information in the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) allow me to explore how changes to OOP of recipient
households shift the burden of payment between recipient households, private insurance
and public insurance (including charity care). It moreover permits a detailed analysis of
the possible channels of OOP adjustment, including changes to health care utilization.
The main contribution of this paper is that it causally identifies and quantifies the
cost savings to Medicaid-eligible households as well as the cost-shifting from beneficia-
ries to other taxpayers. To my knowledge, it presents the first analysis of the impact
of the ACA public insurance expansion on medical spending and consumption that uses
individual-level data to define eligibility status for Medicaid, private insurance subsidies
and individual mandate penalties for each household. This focus allows for the interpre-
tation of effects as an intention to treat (ITT), which is the parameter of interest for the
policy-maker, who can offer eligibility, but not receipt of health insurance. In addition to
the effect on mean reductions in OOP, the paper provides the first analysis of the impact
on risk exposure to high out-of-pocket medical payments. Finally, it contributes to the
debate on the value of in-kind benefits, which has been growing in fiscal importance in
recent decades (Besley and Coate, 1991; Bearse et al., 2000; Currie and Gahvari, 2008;
Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009; Cunha et al., 2018; Lieber and Lockwood, 2019).
I find that the ACA Medicaid expansion reduced household out-of-pocket expen-
ditures for medical services and products by 8.8% (among households with positive ex-
penditures) and for insurance premia by 12.0%, for each standard deviation increase in
Medicaid eligibility. Quantile regressions reveal that mean improvements in affordability
for low-income households are driven by reductions in large OOP payments in the up-
per percentiles of the OOP distribution and by households with at least one pre-existing
condition. Medicaid expansion moreover reduces the variance of medical spending. The
value of this risk protection to eligible households amounts to $126 annually at the mean,
with the utility of insurance increasing with risk aversion, total expected expenditures
and the number of newly insured individuals in the household. Despite reductions in
OOP expenditures among households that would become eligible for the ACA Medicaid
expansion, total expenditures paid on their behalf increased. Reductions in the share
of total medical expenditures paid by private insurance (4.6%) and OOP (7.2%) were
compensated by a 10.9% increase in the share paid by the taxpayer through public in-
surance. Despite improvements in affordability for low-income families, the analysis does
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not detect substantial improvements with respect to access to urgent care or utilization
of preventive care services.
The short-run cost-benefit-analysis (CBA) quantifies the net fiscal cost of expanding
Medicaid public insurance to low-income households. Total costs include a mechanical
cost (or mere transfer component) of the reform and efficiency costs from the increased
spending associated with the moral hazard of obtaining health insurance. Benefits of the
reform include decreased costs for charity care, the transfer value of reduced OOP to
households and the insurance value of risk protection, defined as the willingness to pay
of the average household to insure itself against all OOP risk. Considering all of these
contributions to the costs and benefits of the reform, the CBA yields an estimate of net
costs amounting to approx. $2,432 for each additionally eligible person annually, with
almost half of this cost attributed to (an upper bound on) moral hazard. At the same
time, this estimate falls well below the Congressional Budget Office estimate of per capita
costs because it measures the effect of offering insurance rather than holding it.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses relevant findings from
related research. Section 4.3 outlines the identification strategy. Section 4.4 describes
trends in OOP as well as observed and simulated eligibility rates for the three ACA
provisions investigated. Section 4.5 presents results from the analysis and Section 4.6
explores heterogeneous effects of the reform. Section 4.7 offers a short-run cost-benefit-
analysis of Medicaid expansion from the perspective of recipients and other taxpayers and
Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Evidence on the Impact of Public Insurance
Early studies of the effects of the ACA Medicaid expansion on related outcomes have
motivated the questions this paper seeks to answer. Frean et al. (2017) use data from
the American Community Survey (ACS) to explore how eligibility for Medicaid expan-
sion, private insurance subsidies and individual mandate penalties influenced increases
in insurance coverage in 2014 and 2015. Among these three policy provisions, they find
the largest coverage from increases in Medicaid eligibility.3 The current paper follows a
similar identification strategy by applying the same measures of exposure to the Medicaid
expansion, private insurance exchange subsidies and individual mandate penalties using
3Additional studies using different identification strategies confirm that increased eligibility for Medicaid
substantially increased take-up (Courtemanche et al., 2016; Sommers et al., 2015, 2014).
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the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data, which allow me to investigate the
financial impact of increased coverage.4
Further research has investigated the impact of Medicaid expansion – either through
the ACA or previous expansions – on household finances and medical debt. Brevoort et al.
(2017), Gross and Notowidigdo (2011), Hu et al. (2016) and Dillender (2017) all find im-
proved measures of financial health as a result of becoming eligible for Medicaid. Of
these studies, the present paper builds most closely on Dillender (2017), who focuses on
the potential crowd-out of Medicaid expansion and uses data from the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey (CEX) to show that families switching from private health insurance to
Medicaid reduce their probability of having any health insurance spending, while average
OOP medical spending remains unchanged for households at the low end of the income
distribution. However, his period of investigation spans 2000-2014, including several years
of relatively small incremental legislative changes at the state level and the immediate
year following ACA Medicaid expansion. In this analysis, in contrast, I focus exclusively
on the large changes beginning in 2014, which primarily affected households with adults.
This difference likely explains the larger reduction I find for the most recent expansion. I
further contribute to this line of research by using the MEPS data to investigate detailed
OOP medical expenditures and types of utilization as well as sources of payment in order
to explore channels of household adjustment to Medicaid.
One recent paper by Blavin et al. (2018) uses ACS and CPS data to compare dif-
ferences in changes in coverage and OOP medical expenditures between expansion and
non-expansion states and finds that OOP decreased on average by $344 more in expan-
sion states. By restricting their sample to households between 100-138% of FPL5, their
measure of interest is how much more Medicaid expansion states reduce household OOP
compared to states that only have access to exchange subsidies in non-expansion states.
A further paper from Buchmueller et al. (2018) likewise employs a DD strategy between
expansion and non-expansion states on the basis of CEX data to examine the impact of
the ACA Medicaid expansion on the medical and non-medical consumption patterns of
low-income households. They find small reductions in health spending and little effect on
non-health consumption in expansion states, which they attribute to low health spend-
ing in general. While my results confirm low overall OOP spending among low-income
households, the evidence points to intensive margin growth in health care utilization and
a stark reduction in OOP payments in particular among households with at least one
4A minor difference is that I use summary measures for the post-reform years of 2014-2016 rather than
treat each year separately.
5It should be noted that the authors use gross income rather than MAGI for this cut-off, which may
bias the results.
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pre-existing condition as well as among single households. By defining eligibility at the
household level, I am not only able to explore heterogeneous effects and the possible chan-
nels of adjustment, but can more precisely identify the level of treatment exposure to this
reform.6
Very little information exists to date on the effect of private insurance exchange
subsidies and penalties on OOP expenditures. Long (2008) and Long and Masi (2009)
provide some evidence from the Massachusetts health reform from 2006, which, to some
extent inspired the design of some of the ACA provisions discussed in this paper. The
authors show that the combination of public insurance expansion and private insurance
exchange subsidies to households below 300% of FPL increased the affordability of and
access to care. However, this study did not attempt to disentangle the impact from both
policies, but rather presented a pre-post comparison of these outcomes in Massachusetts.
Beyond these papers focusing on the ACA Medicaid expansion, some important
insights emerge from evaluations of the dependent coverage mandate. The dependent
coverage mandate was one of the first provisions of the ACA to be implemented, on
September 23, 2010. It required insurance companies to include children of policy holders
on their parents’ plan until the age of 26 without extra cost. Depew and Bailey (2015)
use the MEPS data to show that this provision caused an increase in prices (insurance
premiums) for eligible households. Chen et al. (2017) and Chua and Sommers (2014)
likewise draw upon the MEPS data to examine the effect of the dependent mandate on
OOP medical expenditures excluding premium costs of young adults under the age of
26 and find an overall reduction. Because they suspect higher OOP and utilization for
smaller amounts of expenditures, but a reduction in large expenditures, for instance for
emergency room (ER) visits, Chen et al. (2017) conduct a quantile regression analysis
and find a decrease in OOP only in the 90th and 95th percentile of expenditures. For
Chua and Sommers (2014), the negative effect also persists at the mean. However, the
dependent mandate affected a very specific section of the population: they were younger,
healthier and from lower-than-average-income households.7 Therefore, it is unclear from
the onset whether to expect similar effects from the provisions implemented in 2014 that
targeted the entire population. My quantile estimates along the distribution of OOP
6Medicaid expansion states differ fundamentally from non-expansion states on several dimensions that
are correlated with OOP medical expenditure as well as unobserved tastes for insurance or health
care, which might cause concern with endogeneity bias from difference-in-differences (DD) results.
For example, expansion states tended to have more generous pre-reform Medicaid eligibility criteria,
wealthier populations, more public poverty intervention programs and more widely available access
to charity care than did non-expansion states prior to the reform.
7Prior to the dependent mandate, students were already covered on their parents’ plan. Therefore, the
young dependents who newly became eligible through the ACA were neither students nor employed
in a job offering health care.
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medical expenditures confirm a similar reaction of the ACA expansion population, in
that large reductions at and above the 95th percentile drive the positive and significant
effect at the mean.
4.3 Empirical Approach
4.3.1 Data and Sample
A pooled cross-section of the Household Component of the Medical Expenditures Panel
Survey (MEPS-HC) forms the main dataset used in the analysis. It is the most detailed
source of nationally representative data for the United States regarding medical condi-
tions, health care utilization, insurance coverage, and expenditures by source of payment.
Furthermore, it contains demographic and income information for each household, which
enables me to identify Medicaid eligibility status at the individual level. Commensu-
rate with eligibility rules, the unit of analysis is defined at the household insurance unit
(HIU). A HIU may consist in single households, couples or families with children and some
dwelling units may contain two or more HIUs. While all outcome variables of interest
stem from this dataset, additional sources are necessary to measure household eligibility
for each respective policy provision of the ACA. Section 4.3.2 describes these datasets in
detail.
The analysis focuses on non-elderly households with individuals below the age of
65. I restrict the sample to households earning below 400% of the poverty line (FPL),
in accordance with the income cut-off for the target population for ACA subsidies.8 The
final sample encompasses approximately 73,000 households from 2010-2016. While most
information in the MEPS is available before 2010, I restrict the sample to these years in
order to maintain comparability of the main results with those from the heterogeneous
effects according to the presence of a pre-existing condition, as some chronic conditions
appear in the dataset in 2010. Appendix Table 4.A2 does however demonstrate that
results of the main analysis in Table 4.4 are very robust to including years 2007-2016,
with the longer time period yielding marginal effects of similar magnitude and higher
significance due to the increased power with roughly 101,000 household observations.
Table 4.1 displays sample characteristics of sample households in the treatment and control
groups.
8Appendix Table 4.A1 shows that the main results (Table 4.4) are robust to including all income groups.
Results are somewhat stronger given the larger sample size.
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4.3.2 Measuring Policy Provisions of the Affordable Care Act
In order to isolate the effect of Medicaid expansion from that of other policy instruments
that comprise the ACA, it is important to control for exposure of households to possi-
ble alternative treatments. Some substantial aspects of the reform, such as changes to
regulation requiring community rating and guaranteed issue cannot be disentangled from
Medicaid expansion, as the former present a time series change without exogenous varia-
tion in exposure among the population.9 For this reason, results must be interpreted as
being in addition to any impact from underlying changes to the regulatory environment.
In addition to Medicaid eligibility, I measure exposure to two possible alternative
treatments for which exogenous variation and data are available: the individual mandate
penalties and insurance exchange subsidies. Using this variation, I construct treatment
and control groups according to treatment intensity, defined by the share of the HIU
eligible for each policy provision. While the main concern lies in the impact specifically
of the Medicaid expansion provision, controlling for exposure of households to subsidies
and penalties allows for the interpretation of policy interest, namely the effect of Med-
icaid eligibility versus non-eligibility rather than Medicaid eligibility versus exposure to
these other policies. For example, an individual eligible for Medicaid does not qualify for
private insurance exchange subsidies, but a household with the same income level resid-
ing in a state that did not expand Medicaid, will not qualify for Medicaid and instead
would be eligible for a private exchange subsidy. This section provides some institutional
background for the three provisions and describes the measurement of eligibility for each.
All relevant income thresholds for ACA eligibility refer to the concept of modified
gross adjusted income (MAGI). Using income information available in the MEPS-HC,
MAGI amounts to the sum of the following family unit income components: gross wages
and salaries from employment, business and farm income, taxable interest income, rent
income, trust fund income, alimony received less alimony paid, annuities, dividends10,
taxable pensions, and unemployment benefits.11 This gross amount is then adjusted by
subtracting deductions, including large medical expenses, to arrive at adjusted gross in-
come (AGI). I apply NBER's TAXSIM program, version 9, to account for deductions
based on household gross income, expenses and composition. Commensurate with con-
9Guaranteed issue refers to the prohibition of insurance companies from denying coverage to eligible
individuals, regardless of pre-existing conditions. Community rating obliges insurance companies to
offer one price for individuals of the same age and location, regardless of sex or pre-existing conditions.
The ACA further mandates that insurers offer coverage for 10 health benefits deemed essential and
required all policies sold in the US to provide an annual maximum cap for out of pocket payments.
10Dividends are treated as other property income in the TAXSIM model because the MEPS does not
contain information about whether dividends are qualified.
11Capital gains are set to zero due to lack of information in MEPS.
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vention in the United States, I treat married couples as filing jointly for the purpose of
calculating AGI. Finally, MAGI results from adding untaxed foreign income, non-taxable
Social Security benefits and tax-exempt interest to the AGI. Due to lack on information on
these last components, I use AGI rather MAGI. The importance of this restriction, how-
ever, is limited because AGI and MAGI are equivalent in the vast majority of households
and in particular for the low-income groups targeted by the reform.
4.3.2.1 Medicaid Expansion
Medicaid public insurance coverage was introduced in the United States in 1965. How-
ever, coverage was restricted to protected groups such as pregnant women, the disabled,
children and parents of eligible children with very low incomes. The ACA expanded el-
igibility to childless adults with MAGI below 138% of the federal poverty line (FPL).12
Simultaneously, some states also increased means-tested thresholds for parents and chil-
dren. However, before its planned implementation on January 1, 2014, a 2012 landmark
Supreme Court ruling in the case National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebe-
lius declared the Medicaid provision of the ACA coercive and permitted states to decide
whether or not to expand it. As a result, only 26 states, roughly half, implemented the ex-
pansion in 2014 and 5 more by 2016.13 I will use this expansion decision as quasi-exogenous
variation from the perspective of the individual household. At the same time, expansion
and non-expansion states differ in important dimensions such as income distributions,
family types, pre-reform insurance levels and anti-poverty government interventions. I
detail how I account for these differences in section 4.3.3.
Eligibility for ACA Medicaid expansion depends on residing in an expansion state
and having household income below a category-specific (pregnant women, children of
certain age ranges, disabled individuals, parents or other adults) means-tested threshold.
I use the state expansion status from 2014-2016 and apply the Medicaid/CHIP eligibility
thresholds by state, year, age and status from the Kaiser Family Foundation.14 I apply
these thresholds to the MEPS households and determine individual eligibility according
to the demographic and income information in the main public-use files of the MEPS-HC
as well as the restricted geographic information available at the Agency for Healthcare
12In 2016, the last year included in this analysis, the federal poverty line is $11,880 in annual taxable
income for a single household or $24,300 for a family of four.
13These states include: AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DC, DE, HI, IA, IL, KY, MA, MD, MI, MN, NH, NJ,
NM, ND, NV, NY, OH, OR, RI, WA and WV. By 2015, PA, IN and AK also expanded Medicaid and
MT and LA followed suit in 2016. For the period under investigation, which extends through 2016,
non-expansion states in the sample include: AL, FL, GA, ID, KS, IN, ME, LA, MS, MO, NC, NE,
OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WI and WY.
14These can be found on the website of the Kaiser Family Foundation, under https://www.kff.org/
state-category/medicaid-chip/medicaidchip-eligibility-limits/ (accessed June 10, 2018).
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Quality and Research in Rockville, Maryland. Because means-tested thresholds depend
on status category, one household may have some eligible and some ineligible members
such the eligibility measure applied in the regression analysis consists in the share of the
HIU eligible.
4.3.2.2 Minimum Essential Coverage Requirement (“Individual Mandate”)
The “individual mandate” refers to the requirement of every non-exempted individual
to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty. Effective January 1, 201415, it sought to
prevent a possible downward spiral in the private insurance market, induced by adverse
selection.16 Penalty amounts rise with household income and were gradually increased
from 2014 to 2016. For the 2014 tax year, the penalty amounts to the higher of a flat rate
of $95 per uninsured adult and half of that per uninsured child or 1% of modified adjusted
gross income (MAGI). In 2015, penalties increased to the greater of $325 per uninsured
adult and half of that per uninsured child or 2% of MAGI. In 2016 and all subsequent
years, the penalty reaches $695 per adult and half of that per uninsured child or 2.5%
of MAGI. These penalties are capped at the national average price of a bronze level
insurance plan. Between 2014-2016, roughly 33-31% of households are exempted from
penalties irrespective of insurance status. Exempted groups include: households earning
below the tax filing threshold, those earning below 138% of FPL in non-expansion states,
and those without access to affordable health care, defined as access to an insurance plan
that costs no more than 8% of MAGI. For all of these groups, the potential penalty is equal
to $0. While about 67-69% of households are eligible for a penalty for foregoing insurance
coverage, penalties should in practice only affect those previously uninsured, increasing
transitions into private, non-group insurance. For these groups, a higher penalty amount
should increase average OOP.
The calculation of penalty amounts for non-exempted households is straightforward.
Determining exemption status, however, requires calculating the price of the lowest-cost
bronze plan for the given household size and rating area, which serves as the govern-
ment benchmark for the affordability of accessible insurance.17 For this calculation, I
incorporate price information from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation for the lowest
15The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 eliminated the enforcement mechanism for the individual mandate
beginning in 2019.
16Such a situation could occur if young and healthy individuals chose not to purchase insurance and
exited the pool of the insured, leaving relatively unhealthy and older individuals in the market. The
subsequent increase in the risk pool would likely raise prices, further pushing the marginally healthier
individuals out of the market until it finally collapses.
17Rating areas are equivalent to counties with the exception of AK, CA, ID, MA and NE, which use
3-digit ZIP codes. For these 5 states, I use the average price in the rating area.
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cost bronze plan on the federal insurance exchange in each county. I supplement federal
exchange prices with those from state exchanges with the help of the Kaiser Family Foun-
dation’s Marketplace Calculator.18 Next, I apply the age adjustment curves documented
by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services in order to account for age-based price
setting. Finally, the price of the benchmark plan equates to the sum of costs for the
individual plans in the HIU, including up to 3 children.19 For HIUs with the lowest-cost
bronze insurance premium above 8% of MAGI, the potential penalty is zero.
4.3.2.3 Health Insurance Exchange Subsidies
Health insurance exchanges and exchange subsidies offer Americans without Medicaid or
employer-sponsored-insurance (ESI) an online marketplace for purchasing private health
insurance. The creation of the insurance exchanges on the federal and state level increased
the transparency and comparability of private plans. Additionally, plans are categorized
into three metal tiers according to their actuarial value, reflecting the percentage of total
costs the insurance covers for the average policy holder. However, in addition to these
regulations that sought to lower costs and increase transparency for the consumer, the
ACA simultaneously increased the risk pool for non-group private insurance.
Households with income between 100–400% of the FPL are eligible for exchange
subsidies that decrease with income up to this threshold. The subsidy amount is equal
to zero for households eligible for Medicaid as well as those earning at least 400% of
FPL or with access to affordable ESI. The value of this subsidy depends on household
income (MAGI) as well as the cost of the second-lowest premium for single coverage
in the household’s rating area.20 For eligible households, the amount results from the
difference between a progressive affordability cap and the second-lowest cost silver plan in
the household’s rating area.21 Both the sliding scale of affordability caps and the market
prices of the benchmark silver plans changed in 2015 and 2016. Therefore, similar to the
18Beginning in 2015, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation provides price data for all states. For 2014,
however, information is missing for the 14 states that relied on their own state exchanges rather than
the federal exchange. I fill in this missing information manually using the Marketplace Calculator.
19Federal regulations stipulate that insurance coverage of the fourth and subsequent children must be
offered without extra cost.
20In 2014 in Medicaid non-expansion states, childless adults below the FPL do not qualify for Medicaid
or exchange subsidies. This unforeseen gap emerged because the drafters of the ACA assumed these
individuals would qualify for Medicaid. RAND estimates that 5.3 million Americans fell into this
category and did not have insurance directly after the implementation of the ACA in 2014. This gap
has since been closed.
21In 2014, the affordability caps as a percentage of MAGI were: 2% for households earning below 138%
of FPL, 4% for those in the range of 138-150, 6.3% for 150-200% of FPL, 8.05% for 200-250% of FPL,
9% for 250-300% of FPL and 9.5% for 300-400% of FPL.
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treatment of the mandate penalties, the treatment variable for subsidy eligibility is an
average of the potential subsidy for which the household qualified between 2014-2016.
As in the case of individual mandate penalties discussed above, the calculation of
eligible subsidy amounts requires price information for benchmark insurance plan costs in
the HIU rating area. I compile this information likewise from the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation and Kaiser Family Foundation, but rather than using the lowest price bronze
plan, the benchmark for subsidies relates to the second-lowest cost silver plan. I apply
these thresholds to the households in the MEPS dataset and calculate the eligible dollar
amount of subsidy using the HIU composition, income and geographic information in the
MEPS.
4.3.3 Estimation Strategy
In order to establish a causal relationship between the ACA Medicaid expansion and
household medical spending, the present paper implements an enriched difference-in-
difference (DD) estimation strategy in combination with a simulated instrument for eligi-
bility status. Building on this specification described in detail in section 4.3.3.1, section
4.3.3.2 incorporates additional interaction terms that control for time trends in income-
group and state-specific trends in OOP. Finally, section 4.3.3.3 describes the construction
and implementation of the simulated instrument.
4.3.3.1 Main Specification: Enriched Difference-in-Differences
In this treatment effects analysis, I define treatment group status, MCAIDACAhst , in both
pre- and post-reform years as being Medicaid eligible according to the ACA rules from
2014-201622, but applied to household income, state and demographic composition in
each year. Because the level of analysis is the health insurance unit (HIU), I aggregate
MCAIDACAhst to the share of the household newly becoming eligible for Medicaid through
the ACA. Eligibility is determined by residency in an ACA expansion state as well as
falling below the means-tested household FPL threshold, which depends on each individ-
ual’s status as a child (in different age ranges), single adult, parent, pregnant or disabled
person.
After controlling for the direct, time-invariant influence of income, region and year on
the outcome variable of interest, identifying variation stems from differences in these rules
across income groups, states and time. Rather than considering all households residing
22The measure uses the average eligibility status. For example, if an individual only becomes eligible in
2016, average eligibility of the individual in the post-reform period would be 0.3. In a next step, the
average eligibility is calculated over all individuals in the household.
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in an expansion state as treated, this strategy allows me to use additional variation at
the individual level and reflects the different Medicaid eligibility thresholds for children,
pregnant women, parents, the disabled and childless adults. The enriched DD equation
can be stated as follows:









In the main analysis, the dependent variable, Yh, represents the amount of out-of-
pocket medical expenditures including premium costs paid by the household in time t.
It does not include any subsidies received or payments made by third parties, insurance
or otherwise. Results for this su mmary measure of total medical spending are displayed
in Table 4.4. I also estimate the equation for the two components separately, namely for
OOP excluding premium costs and for premium costs, results of which can be found in
Tables 4.5 and 4.6. In the secondary analysis, which serves to explain the channels of
OOP reductions and fiscal consequences, Yh denotes the following outcome variables: the
probability of any visit or the number of visits to different types of medical facilities, the
share of total household medical expenditures by source of payment and the share of the
household delaying necessary treatment for financial reasons.
INCGRhst encompasses the following 8 income bands: below 50% FPL, [50-100%
FPL), [100-150% FPL), [150-200% FPL), [200-250% FPL), [250-300% FPL), [300-350%
FPL), [350-400% FPL). Breaking points correspond to relevant ACA thresholds for the
three provisions investigated, whereby Medicaid eligibility for childless adults requires the
household to earn below 138% of the FPL.23 Income band controls absorb the positive
correlation between levels of OOP and income that stem from the nature of health care as
a normal good. The matrix Xhst contains characteristics of the household such as family
type (singles, single parents, couples without children and families with children) as well as
the age, sex, race and a dummy for Hispanic origin of the head of the household. STATEs
denotes the household state of residence, which nets out time invariant differences between
expansion and non-expansion states. URATEct, the annual county unemployment rate
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, controls for the local labor demand shocks
at the county level that could influence income and thus OOP.24 Tt are year fixed effects.
23The means-tested threshold for children and parents varies by state and is at least 138% of FPL or
higher, with most expansion states having raised the threshold above 138%.
24Local unemployment rates also control for possible early adjustments from the employer mandate that
was implemented beginning in 2015, but not enforced until 2018.
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The coefficient θ on the interaction term of treatment and the post-reform years 2014-2016
(Postt), captures the reform effect on household OOP, denoted as Yh.
4.3.3.2 Robustness Strategy: Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
As a further robustness check to the enriched DD, I estimate the full DDD model formu-
lated below.25 Because Medicaid eligibility involves an interaction between state expan-
sion status and household income, the coefficient θ in Equation 4.1 can be interpreted as
a triple interaction by adding the missing double interactions to line 2 of Equation 4.2.










TG1×TT, TG2×TT︷ ︸︸ ︷
(δ1INCGRhst + δ2STATEs)× POSTt




Finally, to finish the full specification for the ACA Medicaid expansion provision, I control
for eligibility according to the old Medicaid rules, captured by MCAIDPreACA. This
group control proves necessary in order to interpret the effect of MCAIDACA as that
attributed only to the ACA expansion. With this final inclusion, the same identification
strategy is then applied analogously to each of the other two policy measures of private
insurance exchange subsidies and individual mandate penalties.
Incorporating all three provisions into 4.2 and consolidating terms yields the com-
plete regression equation used in the main specification:
















+ (δ1INCGRhst + δ2STATEs)× POSTt
+ µINCGRhst + λ1STATEs + λ2URATEct + γTt + ξXhst + εh
(4.3)
where θ2 on the interaction term for ACA Medicaid expansion and post-reform years
denotes the main coefficient of interest. The coefficients θ3 and θ4 summarize the effect of
insurance exchange subsidies, SUBSIDY ACAhst and mandate penalties, PENALTY
ACA
hst .
It is important to include all three provisions in the same equation in order to be able to
25Given the number of observations to regressors, the DD strategy is preferred.
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interpret these coefficients as the absolute effect of the respective policy provision rather
than the relative effect of, for example, becoming eligible for Medicaid rather than for a
subsidy.26
The corresponding β coefficients capture the effect of different levels of OOP spend-
ing among households in each of these treatment groups and in each pre- and post-reform
year, according to the rules of the provision between 2014-2016. The coefficient β2 absorbs
the differential spending patterns of families that would later newly qualify for Medicaid in
2014 according their income as a percent of FPL, their household composition and state
of residence. INCGRhst additionally controls for the fact that OOP tends to increase
with income. STATEs and Tt are state and year fixed effects that respectively account
for local policies such as the availability of charity care and trends in spending over time.
Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics for medical spending of households in the treatment
and control groups.
4.3.3.3 Simulated Instrument
Despite the DD(D) strategy, some endogeneity concerns may remain with respect to
the relationship between OOP and program eligibility. First, households may adjust
their income in response to the ACA Medicaid expansion in order to qualify for benefits.
Second, different income distributions across regions may qualify a larger share of the
population in poorer states for ACA provisions or otherwise affect demand for and thus
prices of health care. In order to address these concerns, I instrument observed household
eligibility with simulated eligibility. Simulated instruments are well-established in the
health economics literature as a method of isolating variation generated by the generosity
of policy rules alone (see for example Cutler and Gruber (1996), Currie and Gruber (1996),
Lo Sasso and Buchmueller (2004), Schmidt et al. (2016), Frean et al. (2017), and Dillender
(2017)).
To construct the instrument, I take the entire national sample of observations from
the MEPS-HC in each year, income group and family type and simulate eligibility of these
individuals as if they resided in each county. I then assign each observed household the
average eligibility share from its corresponding household type and income group from
the national sample according to the eligibility rules in its county of residence. In total,
there are 4 household types and 8 income groups for a total of 32 averages in each county.
I then use the simulated eligibility measures as instruments for actual eligibility and esti-
26The control group for the Medicaid eligible do not receive Medicaid eligibility treatment, but may
receive the alternative treatment of subsidy eligibility. While Medicaid and subsidy eligibility are
mutually exclusive treatments, all households that choose not to gain either public or private insurance
and are not otherwise exempt are subject to an individual mandate penalty.
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mate regression equation 4.3 using 2SLS. This procedure isolates the exogenous variation
stemming from ACA changes to the policy rules for the three provisions, rather than
differential income distributions, family structures or other demographic characteristics
in each state. Moreover, even if the household income is endogenous at the individual
level, exogeneity should hold at the group level. Because the simulated instrument varies
only in policy rules, it offers a plausibly exogenous instrument.
Table 4.4 juxtaposes the DD and DDD marginal effects using OLS with those using
the simulated instrument and shows that results are very similar using either estimation
strategy. Consistently high first stage F-statistics well above the critical value of 10 for all
regression models are displayed in the table and lend credence to the relevance of these
instruments. Due to the presence of multiple endogenous variables (4 simulated policy
measures27 and 4 interaction terms containing these measures), I calculate F-statistics
as Anderson-Rubin (AR) statistics from Finlay et al. (2016), which allows for cluster
robust inference from multiple endogenous variables. Appendix Table 4.3 displays the
observed and simulated eligibility values for the years 2010-2016. Nevertheless, because
I cannot reject equality of the OLS and simulated IV results, I proceed using the OLS
specification, as it renders interpretation of the marginal effects and cost-benefit analysis
straightforward.28
27These measures include: pre-ACA Medicaid eligibility, ACA-Medicaid eligibility, subsidy eligibility and
exposure to mandate penalties.
28Results tables of all main outcome variables have also been produced using the simulated IV DD
specification and show comparable effects. With the exception of the IV counterpart to Table 4.A6,
the instrument has a strong first stage. These results are available upon request.
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Table 4.1: Sample Characteristics of Treatment and Control Households, 2010-2016
According to the ACA Medicaid Rules from 2014-2016:
Medicaid Eligible Medicaid Eligible Not Eligible Not Eligible
2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2013 2014-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household Head:
- Age 18-25 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.14
- Age 26-39 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.35
- Age 40-49 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.21
- Age 50-64 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.29
- White 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.77
- Black 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18
- Hispanic 0.18 0.14 0.20 0.20
Household Context:
- Singles 0.68 0.70 0.51 0.47
- Single parents 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.11
- Couples w/o children 0.11 0.05 0.22 0.13
- Couples w/ children 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.22
- Larger families 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07
- Total HH income ($) 21,248.84 20,943.53 40,511.13 43,306.71
(16,167.54) (17,751.41) (24,684.14) (28,126.70)
- Any private insurance 0.40 0.40 0.56 0.60
- Public only 0.31 0.46 0.21 0.25
- Uninsured 0.29 0.14 0.23 0.15
- Share with chronic 0.53 0.57 0.46 0.46
disease
Observations 6,778 3,941 36,096 25,882
Source: MEPS cross-sectional data 2010-2016, calculations based on the working sample residing in
households below 400% FPL. Weighted means using MEPS household sample weights. Households
with at least one member becoming eligible through the ACA Medicaid expansion in any year between
2014-2016 are categorized as eligible. Column (1) presents the average value for households that would
have been eligible according to the ACA rules, had the reform been implemented between 2010-2013.
Column (2) presents the average value for the treatment×post group that actually became eligible for
Medicaid through the ACA expansion. Columns (3) and (4) show weighted means for households that
would not have met eligibility criteria for the ACA Medicaid expansion in any year. Standard deviations
in parentheses.
4.4 Trends in Household OOP Medical Spending
Out-of-pocket medical expenditures comprise a significant share of the household budget.
Figure 4.1 displays this share in percent according to the household gross income before
the implementation of the central reform provisions. Income groups are divided accord-
ing to their AGI in relation to the federal poverty line (FPL), as the FPL determines
eligibility for each of the three reform provisions. The left panel shows the average over
all households and the right panel only those households with positive OOP values, as
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premium cost OOP medical expenditures
Source: MEPS 2007-2013. Weighted shares for all ages using MEPS household weights.
many households have zero OOP medical expenditures in most years. Zero expenditures
may ensue because households do not have any medical events or because public insur-
ance covers both the premium and any medical costs. For the lowest income (per capita)
households, total OOP including any insurance premiums comprises over 18 percent of
total household gross income in the event that the household has any OOP medical ex-
penses at all. Both the share of gross household income spent on premium costs and that
spent on OOP medical expenses (excluding premiums) decreases as income increases.
This fact simply reflects that the difference in gross income surpasses the difference in
health care expenditures.29 In absolute terms, however, both OOP medical expenditures
and premiums tend to increase with income, as seen in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. As mentioned
above, this observation likely reflects higher utilization of health care for higher income
households, as health care is a normal good.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the evolution of OOP medical expenditures (excluding
premiums) and OOP insurance premium costs, respectively, by household treatment in-
tensity. The left panel includes all households with positive OOP medical expenditures
and the right panel plots the share of households with positive payments. Analogously
to the causal analysis, the share of the HIU eligible for Medicaid refers to the share eli-
29The graph excludes households reporting zero income, but positive expenditures. Imposing an income
floor of $1,000 does not change the general message of the composition chart.
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Share with Positive OOP
All Non-Elderly Households, by Treatment Intensity
No One Medicaid Eligible Some Medicaid Eligible Everyone Medicaid Eligible
Source: MEPS 2007-2016. Weighted shares for all ages using MEPS household weights. Dollar amounts
have been adjusted to constant 2017 dollars using the CPI-med.























































































Share with Positive Premium Costs
All Non-Elderly Households, by Treatment Intensity
No One Medicaid Eligible Some Medicaid Eligible Everyone Medicaid Eligible
Notes: See Notes from Figure 4.2.
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gible according to the ACA 2014-2016 Medicaid rules in each state and does not include
individuals already eligible for Medicaid under rules preceding the ACA reform. These
shares are then separated into treatment intensity categories of households in which no one
became eligible, households where some but not all members gained eligibility and those
where every member of the household became eligible. Despite their volatility, mean OOP
medical expenditures remained similar for households in all treatment intensity groups
until 2014 when ACA Medicaid expansion took effect, after which these trends began to
separate in the expected direction. The right panel of Figure 4.2 shows that the group
with the highest treatment intensity had the lowest share of households paying for any
medical expenditures out of pocket, both before and after the reform. The most striking
observation in Figure 4.3 is that the share of households paying insurance premiums in-
creased for the groups of households with no or low treatment intensity and decreased for
households with the highest treatment intensity.
In order to take a closer look at household medical spending patters before and after
the reform in treatment and control groups, Table 4.2 displays weighted means for four
groups: column (1) presents the average value for households that would have been eligible
according to the ACA rules, had the reform been implemented between 2010-2013; column
(2) presents the average value for the treatment×post group that actually became eligible
for Medicaid through the ACA expansion; columns (3) and (4) show weighted means for
households that would not have met eligibility criteria for the ACA Medicaid expansion
in any year. As such, column (2) shows the average expenditures and shares with any
expenditures for the treatment group.30
The first two rows of Table 4.2 show the summary measure of total OOP, including
OOP medical expenditures for medical services, care and products as well as costs of any
insurance premiums. Rows 3-5 and 6-8 separate the two components of total OOP into
OOP expenditures for services, care or products and OOP expenditures for insurance
costs, respectively. Households with at least one member meeting the ACA eligibility
requirements are slightly less likely to spend any money out of pocket on medical services,
care or products, albeit with only a 3-4 percentage point difference compared to households
in which no one meets eligibility criteria. ’Would be’ Medicaid eligible households (column
(1)) with positive OOP medical spending (excluding premiums) spent slightly less than
their non-eligible counterparts before expansion. However, while mean spending remained
remarkably constant for non-eligible households, eligible households experienced a stark
30Note that the table shows an average for all treated households, defined as having at least one mem-
ber become eligible for Medicaid expansion, while the causal analysis additionally uses variation in
treatment intensity, as some households experienced a larger portion of their HIU becoming eligible.
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reduction in OOP spending after 2014, in line with public insurance covering a large
portion of their medical expenses.
In the pre-reform baseline period from 2010-2013, a much lower share of Medicaid-
eligible households spent any amount on insurance premiums compared to non-eligible
households and this share does not change significantly after the reform for this group.
This observation can likely be explained by the fact that previously uninsured individ-
uals transitioned into public insurance in 2014, as depicted in Appendix Figure 4.A1,
and neither category would exhibit positive premium spending. In contrast, the share
of non-eligible households with positive insurance payments substantially increased by 7
percentage points, as many of these households qualify subsidies on the private insurance
exchange market and are subject to the individual mandate penalty in the case of re-
maining uninsured. These descriptive trends are reflected in the causal analysis, which
finds the largest reductions for Medicaid-eligible households on the intensive margin of
OOP medical spending on care, services and products as well as the extensive margin of
insurance premium costs.
Table 4.3 displays the means of the main policy variables of interest that measure
exposure to Medicaid, private insurance exchange subsidies and mandate penalties from
2010-2016. The first two columns show means of the variables calculated on the basis
of household composition, income and state as observed in the MEPS data for each
household while the third and fourth columns reflect simulated eligibility as described
in detail in section 4.3.3.3. The table shows that, on average, 17-18% of the household
is eligible for Medicaid according to pre-ACA rules.31 The causal analysis controls for
the share of the household eligible under previous Medicaid rules, but is not primarily
concerned with possible impacts on this group.32 The average share of the household
becoming newly eligible for ACA Medicaid expansion is 13-17%. Average unsubsidized
insurance premiums are included in the table for reference and are simply average observed
benchmark premiums for the lowest cost silver plan. The ratio of the subsidy to the
unsubsidized benchmark plan yields the average share of the premium that would be
reimbursed by the government according to the rules of 2014-2016. The share of the
unsubsidized premium covered is rather substantial, ranging from 30-42% in 2014 and
2015 for the 6-12% of the population eligible to receive a subsidy.
31Note that this share is different from the share of households in the population eligible for Medicaid.
The average share of the household eligible is preferred to the share of households because it is the
variable used in the causal analysis and captures treatment intensity rather than using a binary
variable for treatment.
32While this group did not experience any change in eligibility, they plausibly received other types of
treatments, such as increased information regarding application procedures due to the salience of the
reform or a decrease in stigmatization due to the larger share of the population enrolling in Medicaid.
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Table 4.2: OOP Medical Expenditures of Treatment and Control Households, 2010-2016
According to the ACA Medicaid Rules from 2014-2016:
Medicaid Eligible Medicaid Eligible Not Eligible Not Eligible
2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2013 2014-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
- Household total OOP ($) 1,561.32 1,347.76 2,187.78 2,521.78
(3,255.66) (2,710.79) (3,530.69) (3,877.09)
- Household total OOP if > $0 2,008.42 1,705.68 2,635.87 3,014.85
(3,568.91) (2,947.86) (3,719.94) (4,060.11)
- Share with pos. OOP 0.75 0.76 0.79 0.79
(excluding premiums)
- Household OOP ($) 790.10 553.65 896.59 896.98
(excluding premiums) (2,168.24) (1,232.58) (2,076.29) (2,078.18)
- Household OOP if > $0 1,052.75 728.78 1,139.33 1,140.31
(excluding premiums) (2,447.02) (1,368.33) (2,280.71) (2,283.21)
- Share with pos. 0.24 0.25 0.39 0.46
ins. premium cost
- Household OOP premium 3,189.36 3,199.60 3,271.87 3,498.69
costs if > $0 (3276.48) (3188.94) (3226.52) (3349.30)
- Household OOP ($) 771.21 794.11 1,291.20 1,624.81
premium costs (2,111.79) (2,105.37) (2,581.78) (2,872.99)
Observations 6,778 3,941 36,096 25,882
Notes: See notes from Table 4.1. OOP = out-of-pocket medical expenditures. Values have been
adjusted to the CPI-med and are presented in constant 2017 dollars.
Finally, the individual mandate penalty represents the provision that theoretically
applies to the largest portion of the population, with 51-60% of the sample subject to
a penalty. Nevertheless, as discussed in section 4.3.1, the penalty is only binding for
individuals without ESI. Appendix Figure 4.A1 demonstrates, however, that roughly 55%
of the population obtains insurance coverage through their employer, their partner’s or
parent’s employer and this share did not change after 2014. De facto, the penalty likely
proves binding only for uninsured individuals and those with non-group private insurance.
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Table 4.3: Observed and Simulated Eligibility for Policy Variables
Observed Simulated
2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2013 2014-2016
Medicaid Eligibility:
- Pre-ACA eligible 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18
- ACA newly eligible 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.15
Exchange Subsidies:
- Unsub. premium ($) 3,659.99 3,624.99 3,659.99 3,624.99
(38.92) (22.22) (38.92) (22.22)
- Share subsidy (if >0) 0.40 0.42 0.30 0.32
- Share of households 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.11
eligible
Mandate Penalties
- Share subject to penalty 0.51 0.52 0.60 0.60
-Avg. penalty (if >0) ($) 736.08 848.17 624.61 735.09
(329.72) (408.07) (349.26) (416.98)
Source: MEPS-HC and MEPS-IC 2010-2016. Standard deviations in parentheses. The average unsubsi-
dized premium does not represent the amount actually paid, but rather the second lowest cost premium
plan among the Silver tier category for the household, given the age and composition of household mem-
bers, as this benchmark plan determines the eligible subsidy amount.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Out-of-Pocket Expenditures
Table 4.4 displays the regression results of all policy interaction terms of interest (θ2− θ4)
from the DD and DDD equations for the composite measure of total OOP medical expen-
ditures, which includes both expenditures for medical care and for insurance policy pre-
mium costs. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide results, respectively, for household OOP medical
expenditures (excluding premium costs) and OOP insurance premium costs. In addition
to presenting results for the log-transformed dependent variable that captures intensive
margin effects on OOP, results tables include the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of OOP
in order to retain valuable information contained in zero expenditure observations, as the
descriptive statistics showed the largest changes on the intensive margin of OOP medical
expenditures for care, services and products, but on the extensive margin for insurance
premium costs. The IHS is defined as IHS(OOP ) = log(OOP + (OOP 2 + 1)1/2) and has
the advantage that it, like the logarithmic function can be used to approximate percent
changes while not excluding values of zero (Burbidge et al., 1988; Pence, 2006; Ravallion,
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2017; Barcellos and Jacobson, 2015). It therefore captures a combined response at the
intensive and extensive margins.
The impact of the main explanatory variable of interest, the share of the household
eligible for ACA Medicaid expansion, can be found in row 1 for all results tables, fol-
lowed by the impact of subsidy eligibility and exposure to individual mandate penalties.
Columns (1)-(2) present results from the DD OLS regression and columns (3)-(4) the same
for the DD simulated instrumental regression. Columns (5)-(6) show robustness to a full
DDD OLS regression and columns (7) - (8) the DDD simulated instrument specification.
All results contain state and year fixed effects, local county unemployment rate controls,
fixed effects for the 8 income groups and 4 household types as well as a full set of demo-
graphic controls including age, sex, race and ethnic background of the head of household.
Columns (5)-(8) add interaction terms for INCGR×POST and STATE×POST fixed
effects.
For the group targeted by the ACA expansion, denoted MCAIDACA × POST ,
induces a large reduction in total OOP, which is greatest on the intensive margin. Col-
umn (2) shows that one standard deviation increase in the share of the household be-
coming eligible for Medicaid (roughly 0.32, from Table 4.3), or roughly the equivalent
of one additional person in a family of three, amounts to a 11.2% decrease in OOP
(0.32×(exp−0.429−1)). With an average total OOP expenditure of $2,008.42 in the pre-
reform period, this savings amounts to roughly $224 annually for a Medicaid-eligible
household with positive medical expenditures. Results for OLS and simulated instrument
regressions are similar and we cannot reject the equality of coefficients across these speci-
fications. I therefore interpret the OLS results as the preferred specification and focus on




























Table 4.4: Results for Total OOP: Pooled OLS vs Simulated IV
Difference-in-Difference (DD) Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD)
OLS Simulated IV OLS Simulated IV
(IHS) (log) (IHS) (log) (IHS) (log) (IHS) (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Medicaid×post -0.242∗∗∗ -0.429∗∗∗ -0.178∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.064 -0.264∗∗∗ -0.174 -0.304∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.070) (0.092) (0.074) (0.135) (0.091) (0.148) (0.106)
Subsidy×post 0.050∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.025) (0.018)
Penalty×post 0.037∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.022 0.016 0.115∗∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017) (0.016) (0.051) (0.036)
State×post controls X X X X
Income group×post controls X X X X
R¯2 0.260 0.257 0.260 0.256
AR-Statistic (H0=weak IVs) 21.86** 27.22*** 22.82** 28.05***
Observations 72,697 56,261 72,697 56,261 72,697 56,261 72,697 56,261
Source: MEPS cross-sectional data 2010-2016. Post = years 2014-2016. Weighted regression results using household sample weights. All regressions contain
controls for year and state fixed effects, local county unemployment rate, household income group, household type (single, couple without children, family with
children) and the race/ethnic origin (non-exclusive dummies for black, white, Hispanic) and age of the head of household. Columns (1)-(2) present results from the
difference-in-difference (DD) OLS specification and columns (3)-(4) show results from the DD simulated IV. Results for the difference-in-difference-in-differences
specifications can be found in columns (5)-(8): the OLS version in columns (5) and (6) and the simulated IV in columns (7) and (8). The dependent variable
for results in columns (1),(3),(5) and (7) is transformed by inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) to capture intensive and extensive margin changes including zeros while
remaining columns show results from a log-transformed dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. AR-Statistic = Anderson-Rubin first
stage statistic testing for weak instruments.
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Table 4.5: Results for OOP Excluding Premium Costs
Difference-in-Difference Difference-in-Difference-
(DD) in-Difference (DDD)
(IHS) (log) (log) (IHS) (log) (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid×post -0.151 -0.320*** -0.340*** -0.198 -0.278*** -0.269***
(0.095) (0.066) (0.065) (0.129) (0.089) (0.093)
Subsidy×post 0.017 0.012 0.016** 0.011 0.011 0.012
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008)
Penalty×post 0.022* 0.022** 0.023*** 0.031 0.014 0.011
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012)
Conditional on utilization X X
State×post controls X X X
Income group×post controls X X X
R¯2 0.230 0.183 0.234 0.230 0.183 0.233
Observations 72,697 53,122 53,122 72,697 53,122 53,122
Source: MEPS cross-sectional data 2010-2016. Post = years 2014-2016. Weighted regression results
using household sample weights. All regressions contain controls for year and state fixed effects, local
county unemployment rate, household income group, household type (single, couple without children,
family with children) and the race/ethnic origin (non-exclusive dummies for black, white, Hispanic) and
age of the head of household. All columns refer to OLS estimations. Columns (1)-(3) present results from
the difference-in-difference (DD) specification, columns (3)-(6) show results from the DDD specification.
The dependent variable for results in columns (1) and (4) is transformed by inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS)
to capture intensive and extensive margin changes including zeros while remaining columns show results
from a log-transformed dependent variable. Columns (3) and (6) add controls for the number of household
visits to hospitals and doctors’ offices. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
A comparison of this composite measure of total OOP with Tables 4.5 and 4.6
demonstrates that the effect is driven by OOP for medical care and services as well as for
insurance premium costs. Reductions in OOP spending on medical goods and services, as
displayed in Table 4.5, stem from decreases in OOP among households with any positive
spending, which can be seen comparing the log transformed dependent variable in columns
(2)-(3) and (5)-(6) to the IHS results in columns (1) and (4). One standard deviation
increase in the share of the household becoming eligible for Medicaid yields a mean reduc-
tion of 8.8% of OOP expenditures for medical goods and services (0.32×(exp−0.320−1)).
Among households with positive expenditures, Table 4.2 displays the pre-reform mean for
positive OOP excluding premiums as $1,052.75. As such, average OOP savings amount
to approximately $92 annually for Medicaid-eligible households. Results are robust to
adding state×post and income group×post controls as well as to conditioning on health
care utilization.
With respect to affordability of premium costs, results from the main DD specifica-
tion in Table 4.6, columns (1)-(3) show that Medicaid eligible households experienced a
reduction in OOP for insurance premia in the order of 12.0% for each additional standard
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deviation increase in the share eligible. Because the intensive margin results in columns
(2) and (3) are small and insignificant while the IHS formulation yields a large negative
and statistically highly significant effect, results suggest that the reduction in premia for
Medicaid eligible households is driven by extensive margin adjustments, namely by house-
holds switching from non-zero private insurance premia to Medicaid coverage that does
not charge a premium.
While Medicaid targets the poorest households and subsidies a broader range of
low-middle income households, the penalty is the most binding for households at higher
positions in the taxable income distribution. In contrast to Medicaid eligibility, exposure
to exchange subsidies and mandate penalties actually increased household total OOP,
which is driven by extensive margin changes in insurance premium costs. Table 4.6
demonstrates that a 10 percent increase in the potential subsidy amount increases OOP
premium costs by 1.4% (0.10×(exp0.127−1)), or roughly $43 annually, for the mean house-
hold OOP premium for Medicaid-eligible households shown in column (1) of Table 4.2.
Likewise, a 10% increase in the potential penalty amount increases premium costs by
0.4%. The small effect of the penalty could be attributed to the fact that the lowest
income households tend to be exempt from the penalty or privy to Medicaid coverage.
The progressive nature of the mandate penalty makes it most binding for higher-income
households, which are not part of this analysis.
Table 4.6: Results for Premium Costs
Difference-in-Difference Difference-in-Difference-
(DD) in-Difference (DDD)
(IHS) (log) (log) (IHS) (log) (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid×post -0.471∗∗∗ -0.073 -0.077 0.154 -0.040 -0.042
(0.126) (0.068) (0.069) (0.167) (0.069) (0.070)
Subsidy×post 0.127∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.108∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.024) (0.006) (0.007) (0.027) (0.007) (0.007)
Penalty×post 0.042∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗ -0.016 0.014 0.014
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.014) (0.013)
Conditional on utilization X X
State×post controls X X X
Income group×post controls X X X
R¯2 0.246 0.164 0.165 0.247 0.166 0.167
Observations 72,697 23,537 23,537 72,697 23,537 23,537
See notes for Table 4.5.
Figure 4.4 shows results from quantile regressions of out-of-pocket expenditures. For
exposition purposes, these regressions use the level of OOP in dollars rather than the IHS
or log specification on the left-hand side in order to ease interpretation of the magnitude of
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Source: MEPS 2010-2016. Regression results from OLS DD quantile regressions of total OOP
(including care and policy payments) on the full set of regressors listed in equation 4.3 and conditional
on the number of visits to doctors and hospitals. Point estimates display the effect of Medicaid
expansion, θ1. Confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors.
effects. The quantile point estimates show the effect of ACA Medicaid eligibility on total
household OOP at each ventile of the total OOP distribution. The figure demonstrates
that the mean OOP reduction is driven by high-cost medical expenditures in the 95th and
99th percentiles of the distribution. For the median household, no effect on OOP can be
detected. Results of the quantile regressions thus demonstrate the relevance of high-cost
medical events for the Medicaid eligible households.
4.5.2 Risk Protection
Given the large impact of medical costs in the upper quantiles of the distribution, this
section evaluates the contribution of Medicaid expansion on risk protection from large
medical payments and attempts to quantify willingness to pay for this additional risk
protection as a measure of welfare gain. I employ a similar approach to that used in
previous work evaluating the welfare gains from Medicare and other pension insurance
reforms (Feldstein and Gruber (1995); Finkelstein and McKnight (2008); Engelhardt and
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Gruber (2011);Shigeoka (2014); Barcellos and Jacobson (2015)). The basic model involves
a one-period utility maximization problem subject to the household budget constraint:
c = y −moop (4.4)
where non-health consumption, c, is defined as household income, y, less OOP medical
expenditures, moop. moop is a random variable with a probability density function f(moop)




The value a household places on risk protection from Medicaid insurance is captured
by the risk premium, pi, which places an amount on the household’s willingness to pay
in order to completely insure itself against the random variable moop. In other words,
it is the difference between the certainty equivalence (CE) of non-health consumption
and expected consumption and can be defined for two possible states of the world: one
in which the household is eligible for Medicaid, s = 1 and one in which no one if the
household is eligible s = 0. The risk premium for each household pih is then implicitly
defined by the following equation:
u(CEs) = u(y − E[moops ]− pis) =
∫ m¯oops
0
u(y −moops )f(moops )dmoops ; s = 0, 1 (4.6)
By incorporating the causal treatment effects from the quantile regressions, it be-
comes possible to measure the value of risk protection under Medicaid insurance as the
difference in the CE under Medicaid eligibility, CE1, and under a counterfactual situation
without it, CE0:
∆CE = (pi0 − pi1) + (E[moop0 ]− E[moop1 ]) (4.7)
In order to approximate ∆CE, I first predict the out-of-pocket distribution of expendi-
tures with Medicaid eligibility, mˆoop1,h , and without, mˆ
oop
0,h for each household and percentile
j in the sample, conditional on observable characteristics. For exposition purposes, I
consolidate the notation for the control variables from equation 4.3 and make a linear
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prediction of mˆoop0,h using the coefficients from the quantile regressions in each j = 1/99
quantiles:33
mˆoop,j0,h = αˆ
j + βˆjMCAIDACAh + rcλˆ
j + γˆjT +Xhξˆ
j (4.8)
where, as in equation 4.3, MCAIDACAh defines the average share of the household that
would be eligible for Medicaid according to rules from 2014-2016, Xh is a matrix con-
taining the observable household characteristics, rc are regional controls, including the
local county unemployment rate and state fixed effects, and T are year fixed effects from
2010-2016.34 Predicted out-of-pocket expenditures with Medicaid, mˆoop,j1,h then equate to:
mˆoop,j1,h = αˆ
j + βˆjMCAIDACAh + θˆ
jMCAIDACAh × POST + rcλˆj + γˆjT +Xhξˆj, (4.9)
in which θˆj captures the quantile treatment effects of the policy interaction term for the
ACA Medicaid expansion.
Using the predicted distributions in the treated and counterfactual situations, we
can now formulate equation 4.6 for pi0 and pi1.




u(y − mˆjs); s = 0, 1 (4.10)
where ¯ˆms,h is the expected value of OOP based on 99 predictions (one from each quantile)
for each household and each state s. Assuming a CRRA utility function with risk aversion
parameters of 1,3,5 allows us to solve this equation for pis,h. Equipped with this last
parameter, the willingness to pay of each household for risk protection of Medicaid can be
calculated as the sum of ∆pih and ∆ ¯ˆmh. Averaging over the entire sample of households
yields the parameter of interest, the average welfare gain from Medicaid risk protection.
I calculate the change in CE at the mean of the sample of all households as well as
at higher quantiles and present results in Table 4.7. Table 4.7 demonstrates that, much
like the case of the mean benefits of Medicaid on reducing expected OOP expenditures,
the value of risk protection is highly right-skewed, indicating that very large expenditures
in the upper tail of the distribution drive the positive value of risk protection, which ACA
Medicaid eligible families value at $420.26 in the 95th percentile and $695.11 in the 99th
percentile of OOP expenditures per additionally eligible family member. The value of risk
33In order to make the benefit calculation comparable to the cost, measured per person, the quantile
regressions for the benefit analysis define Medicaid treatment as the number of people in the household
eligible rather the share of people in the household. This adjustment enables the interpretation of the
treatment effect coefficient as the OOP expenditure effect of one additional person in the household
becoming eligible for Medicaid.
34While all estimations at the mean contain county fixed effects, computational constraints only allow
me to include state fixed effects for the quantile regressions.
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protection in this calculation, however, is likely understated because the OOP medical
expenditures include the behavioral response of increased utilization.















Source: MEPS cross-sectional data 2010-2016. Values listed in 2017 CPI-med-adjusted dollars.
Calculations are based on quantile regressions at each percentile of the conditional OOP medical
expenditure distribution (excluding premiums). Control variables include household income band and
type, the number of people in the household with a chronic disease as well as the age, race (dummy for
black) and Hispanic background of the household head. Regressions also include year and state fixed
effects.
4.5.3 Charity Care and Other Sources of Payment
Prior to the reform, its proponents argued that insuring low-income households would re-
duce the formidably expensive and inefficient costs of charity care to the taxpayer through
several channels. First, different state and federal programs either mandate care to pa-
tients without the ability to pay for treatment or offer strong monetary incentives to do so
by reimbursing facilities for uncompensated care or offering them tax benefits or subsides,
which government finances through taxes. Second, hospitals often charge paying cus-
tomers a surcharge to recover part of their losses from uncompensated care (Qin and Liu,
2013). Many uninsured Americans have relied on this unofficial safety net for decades,
beginning with the Hill-Burton Act in 1946, when non-profit hospitals became legally
required to provide a certain amount of uncompensated care to those unable to pay in ex-
change for government funding. In 1986, the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and
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Active Labor Act (EMTALA) further strengthened the role of charity care by mandating
all ERs to treat patients regardless of their ability to pay. Herring (2005) and Gruber and
Rodr´ıguez (2007) estimate national pre-reform charity care costs at somewhere between
$3.2 and $27 billion annually. Against this background, I investigate whether the reform
reduced charity care expenditures.
I define charity care in the MEPS data as the sum of total medical expenditures not
covered by the patient or the patient’s family (OOP expenditures), any type of insurance,
Medicaid or Medicare. Furthermore, I consider changes to the share of total household
expenditures for medical care and services (excluding premiums) paid by one of three
mutually exclusive categories: household OOP, private insurance and any public source,
including charity care, Medicaid, and Medicare. Table 4.8 shows conditional means of
these variables in the pre- and post-reform periods. Total medical expenditures paid
on behalf of households from any source have increased in both treatment and control
groups and average expenditures are higher among Medicaid-eligible (according to ACA
rules from 2014-2016) compared to non-eligible households both before and after the
reform. Eligible households moreover cover a larger fraction of their total medical expenses
through public sources and a smaller fraction through private insurance compared to non-
eligible households.
Table 4.9 displays the marginal effects of exposure to Medicaid expansion on the
proportion of total expenditures paid by or on behalf of households covered by each source
of payment discussed above. The left panel focuses on the amount paid by charity sources
and shows a stark reduction in charity care expenditures on behalf of households eligible
for the ACA Medicaid expansion. One standard deviation increase in Medicaid eligibility
decreases the amount of charity care coverage by 9.3% (0.32×(exp−0.343−1)) in the IHS
specification and by 10.4% in the log specification. While the ACA Medicare expansion
decreased the amount of charity care paid on behalf of Medicaid-eligible households, it
also increased the share of total expenditures paid by public sources overall, including
charity care. Column (5) documents a 10.9% increase for one standard deviation increase
in eligibility (0.32×(exp0.294−1)). It likewise reduced the share paid OOP by 7.2% and the
share covered through private insurance by 4.6%, indicating some crowd-out of private
insurance by public sources. As such, the reform did reduce the tax-payer burden for
charity care, but increased the total tax-payer burden on net, due to increases in the
shares formally covered by Medicaid. In section 4.7, I calculate the magnitude of the
costs to taxpayers of expanding Medicaid public insurance, highlighting many of the cost
components discussed above.
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Table 4.8: Conditional Means of Sources of Payment Variables
According to the ACA Medicaid Rules from 2014-2016:
Medicaid Eligible Medicaid Eligible Not Eligible Not Eligible
2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2013 2014-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
- Total household med. 5,721.76 6,323.11 3,827.64 4,292.11
expenditures ($) (17,690.26) (17,724.79) (11,705.94) (15,647.64)
- Amt. paid by charity care ($) 331.67 375.48 199.47 152.39
(2,688.35) (5,570.74) (2,957.45) (1,668.90)
- Share paid by charity care 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.20) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14)
- Share paid by public source 0.39 0.49 0.28 0.30
(0.43) (0.44) (0.39) (0.40)
- Share paid by private ins. 0.32 0.31 0.42 0.45
(0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38)
- Share paid out of pocket 0.29 0.20 0.30 0.25
(0.34) (0.28) (0.32) (0.28)
Observations 6,778 3,941 36,096 25,882
Source: MEPS cross-sectional data 2010-2016. See notes from Table 4.A3.
Table 4.9: Sources of Payment for Household Medical Expenditures: Difference-in-
Difference OLS Results
Total amount paid Share of total expenditures paid by:
by charity care charity care OOP public sources private ins.
(IHS) (log) (log) (log) (log) (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid×post -0.343*** -0.391* -0.339 -0.253*** 0.294*** -0.157**
(0.100) (0.207) (0.211) (0.081) (0.080) (0.071)
Subsidy×post -0.008 -0.019 -0.008 0.021*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Penalty×post 0.021** 0.004 0.005 0.028*** -0.007 -0.004
(0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
R¯2 0.055 0.032 0.098 0.136 0.214 0.123
Observations 72,697 13,817 13,817 53,122 36,448 36,306
Source: MEPS cross-sectional data 2010-2016.
145
4 Affordability of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion
4.5.4 Health Care Utilization
Due to the possible substitution effects discussed in section 4.1, which could increase
utilization of health care goods and services, this section examines to what extent the
reform in fact altered patterns of utilization, which in turn affect OOP. Rich information
regarding health care utilization and the number of visits to different types of service
providers allows me to distinguish between types of care such as emergency room visits,
inpatient hospital stays, outpatient facility visits and visits to regular doctors’ offices.
Table 4.10 provides conditional means for medical service utilization variables according
to treatment and control groups and Table 4.11 shows causal effects from the OLS DD
analysis of Medicaid eligibility on the probability of any family member having at least
one visit to any of these types of providers as well as the total number of annual visits. In
Table 4.10: Medical Service Utilization: Conditional Means
According to the ACA Medicaid Rules from 2014-2016:
Medicaid Eligible Medicaid Eligible Not Eligible Not Eligible
2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2013 2014-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
- Share with any ER visit 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.24
(0.43) (0.45) (0.42) (0.43)
- Number of ER visits 1.68 1.79 1.64 1.68
(if> 0) (1.31) (1.62) (1.25) (1.28)
- Share with any inpatient 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10
visit
- Number of hospital 1.51 1.54 1.31 1.38
inpatient visits (1.09) (1.06) (0.73) (0.84)
- Share with any outpatient 0.20 0.26 0.17 0.21
visit
- Number of outpatient 3.39 4.34 2.74 3.35
hospital visits (6.27) (9.57) (4.92) (6.87)
- Share with any office 0.72 0.75 0.76 0.78
visit
- Number of physician 10.10 13.20 9.30 11.13
office visits (16.39) (25.15) (14.08) (17.03)
Observations 6,778 3,941 36,096 25,882
Notes: See notes from Table 4.1. ER = emergency room.
general, both treatment and control groups increased their utilization of medical services
in the post-reform years. The Medicaid-eligible population tends to utilize medical services
slightly more than non-eligible households, both before and after the reform took effect.
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In the causal analysis, I do not detect any change in utilization of hospitals, including
emergency rooms, inpatient and outpatient facilities. Lawmakers intended for Medicaid
expansion to decrease inefficiently costly utilization of emergency rooms for non-urgent
care and I do not find evidence that this reduction took place at a statistically significant
level. However, Siddiqui et al. (2015) investigate the response from Medicaid recipients
to a previous reform that introduced co-payments for non-urgent ER visits and find that
a lack of available physicians in poor neighborhoods prevented Medicaid recipients from
switching from the ER to regular physicians, which may also explain why I did not find
a stronger reduction in ER visits for the ACA Medicaid expansion: insurance provi-
sion grants recipients access, but access does not materialize without adequate supply of
providers.35
Despite finding no effect on hospital utilization, column (7) of Table 4.11 documents
a statistically significant but economically negligible increase in the probability of having
any doctor’s visit among individuals newly eligible for the ACA Medicaid expansion. A
standard deviation (0.32) increase in the share of the household newly eligible for Medicaid
results in a 0.011 increase in the probability of a visit. Given the 0.72 baseline share of
households with any visit to a doctor’s office in the past 12 months, shown in column
(1) of Table 4.10, this increase on account of Medicaid expansion is very small. These
findings suggest that individuals did not respond to public insurance eligibility by utilizing
more health care goods and services (increasing consumption), but rather simply shifted
the burden of payment for these goods and services when they did utilize them. They
moreover offer further evidence to support the results for OOP medical expenditures in
Section 4.5.1, which found a reduction for goods and services only on the intensive margin.
While Medicaid-eligible households did not appear to increase visits to health care
providers, it is possible that the nature of utilization changed in the intended direction
of more preventive care. In order to investigate this question, I consider changes to two
different types of utilization: 1) access to care for acute medical needs and 2) preventive
care services. Beginning with access to health care for acute needs, Appendix Table
4.A3 summarizes the share of households delaying or forgoing necessary medical care for
financial reasons.36 All items in the table stem from direct questions in the MEPS. The
bottom panel of Appendix Table 4.A3 further shows the share of households reporting
35In the long-run, giving low-income households purchasing power in the form of health insurance may
encourage more doctors to move into low-income neighborhoods. To what extent this occurs in the
future remains to be seen.
36MEPS asks each respondent two questions: 1) whether they delayed or forwent care (for each type of
care listed in the table) and 2) the reason for delaying or forgoing such care. The dummy variable at
the individual level is coded as 1 if the respondent answered yes to both of these questions and zero
otherwise. The table shows the share of households with at least one person answering positively to
these two questions.
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that they must travel more than 30 minutes in order to reach their usual care provider
and the share reporting they lack access to a usual care provider. Access for acute care
seems to have improved for both treatment and control groups during the post-reform
period. Notably, only 18% of Medicaid-eligible households in the baseline period report
forgoing or delaying acute treatment of any kind or not purchasing necessary drugs due
to financial constraints.
Despite an upward trend in access to care for acute medical needs, the causal analy-
sis indicates that these improvements cannot be attributed to Medicaid eligibility. Results
displayed in Appendix Table 4.A4 fail to find any significant impact on these measures
of access to care, with exception of a statistically significant but economically very mi-
nor decrease in the probability of reporting access to a usual care provider; a standard
deviation increase in Medicaid eligibility (0.32) only decreases this share by 0.005.
Next, I investigate whether it is possible to detect an increase specifically in pre-
ventive care, which could yield long-run reductions in costs for the tax-payer through
improved health outcomes. Appendix Table 4.A5 reports conditional means of the share
of treatment and control households that utilized central preventive care services dur-
ing the previous 12 months. While a general upward trend is visible for both treatment
and control households, no notable difference exists between the Medicaid-eligible and
non-eligible groups with respect to preventive care behavior, with the exception of den-
tal checkups and blood pressure checks. Perhaps not surprising given the descriptive
statistics, the causal analysis provided in Appendix Table 4.A6 does not find that ACA
Medicaid eligibility elicited more preventive care behavior.
In sum, the results of the medical utilization analysis indicate neither increased
access to urgent care nor increased utilization of preventive care services for the Medicaid-
eligible population, both of which were central goals of the ACA expansion. With respect
to urgent care, the absence of an effect can be explained in one of two ways: either
Medicaid-eligible households lacked access to urgent care prior to the ACA and public
insurance provision did not succeed in granting it to them or; low-income households
previously had access to this type of care already prior to the reform. The relatively low
share of the sample population reporting lacking access to care (Appendix Table 4.A3)
may simply render finding significant average marginal effects difficult. The analysis in





























Table 4.11: Difference-in-Difference OLS Results: Medical Service Utilization
Emergency Inpatient Outpatient Physician
Room Stay Facility Office Share with
Log Log Log Log usual care
Any visit Nr. of visits Any visit Nr. of visits Any visit Nr. of visits Any visit Nr. of visits provider
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Medicaid×post 0.010 0.020 -0.008 -0.050 0.025 -0.026 0.035** 0.061 0.024
(0.011) (0.037) (0.009) (0.063) (0.020) (0.084) (0.016) (0.065) (0.015)
Subsidy×post 0.001 -0.006 -0.004*** -0.012** 0.001 -0.013 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Penalty×post -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
R¯2 0.068 0.044 0.040 0.026 0.089 0.039 0.168 0.147 0.124
Observations 72,697 18,011 72,697 7,438 72,697 12,594 72,697 53,222 72,697
Source: MEPS cross-sectional data 2010-2016. Post = years 2014-2016. Weighted regression results using household sample weights. All regressions contain
controls for year and state fixed effects, local county unemployment rate, household income group, household type (single, couple without children, family with
children) and the race/ethnic origin (non-exclusive dummies for black, white, Hispanic) and age of the head of household. All columns refer to OLS estimations.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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4.6 Heterogeneous Effects
Beyond the average treatment effects discussed in the preceding sections of this paper, this
section highlights heterogeneous effects of the ACA Medicaid expansion for households
with and without a pre-existing condition for the main outcomes of interest. These
households not only had less access to insurance prior to the reform, but that they also
paid more for insurance premiums when they were covered and have particularly high out
of pocket payments for medical needs. Therefore, one would expect the average reductions
shown in section 4.5.1 to be even larger for these households.
The MEPS data allows me to identify many of the most common chronic condi-
tions used by insurance companies prior to the ACA in order to price discriminate among
costumers or to deny coverage altogether.37 These conditions include: heart attack, coro-
nary heart disease, angina, other heart disease condition, stroke, emphysema, diabetes,
arthritis, high blood pressure, asthma, high cholesterol, pregnancy, and extreme obesity
(BMI≥40). Table 4.12 displays mean OOP expenditures for medical goods and services
as well as for insurance premium costs of households with at least one pre-existing con-
dition (Panel A) juxtaposed to those without any pre-existing condition (Panel B). In
line with moral hazard expectations, households in both treatment and control groups
are more likely to purchase private insurance if they have a chronic condition. Likewise,
premium costs and OOP expenditures for medical goods and services are higher for these
households.
Figure 4.5 confirms that in fact households without chronic conditions are driving
the mean OOP reductions observed in the population average among all Medicaid-eligible
households. The top panel of the figure corresponds to Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and shows that
the marginal effects for households without a pre-existing condition are insignificant while
those for households with such a condition are slightly larger and more significant than
in the population average. The most substantial difference between all Medicaid-eligible
households and those with a pre-existing conditions can be seen on the extensive margin
of OOP insurance premium costs. Whereas the average reduction amounted to 12.0%,
the savings for households with a chronic condition reach 15.1% (0.32×(exp−0.636−1)),
or, given the much higher average premium cost shown in Table 4.12, the equivalent of
roughly $522 annually. While this effect can be interpreted as the additional impact from
Medicaid expansion, above and beyond the underlying regulation changes of the ACA,
37For a more complete discussion and list of conditions see, for example, Fehr et al. (2018).
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it should be noted that without changes to guaranteed access and community rating
regulations, there may not have been any reduction for this subpopulation.38
The bottom panel of Figure 4.5 documents heterogeneous effects for the sources
of payment outcomes by the presence of a chronic condition, which can be compared to
those for the entire sample in Table 4.9. The reduction in the amount paid by charity care
on behalf of Medicaid-eligible households is larger and more significant for those with a
pre-existing condition. The increase in the share of total expenditures covered by public
sources is also slightly larger for households with chronic conditions while the reduction
in the fraction paid by private insurance becomes insignificant for this subgroup.
Table 4.12: Out of Pocket Expenditures by Pre-Existing Condition Status: Conditional
Means
According to the ACA Medicaid Rules from 2014-2016:
Medicaid Eligible Medicaid Eligible Not Eligible Not Eligible
2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2013 2014-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Households with at least one pre-existing condition:
- Share with pos. OOP 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.87
(excluding premiums)
- Household OOP 1,213.58 809.38 1,317.92 1,290.82
excluding premiums if > $0 (2,745.32) (1,456.17) (2,489.73) (2,455.21)
- Share with pos. 0.27 0.27 0.43 0.50
premium cost
- Household OOP premium 3,470.96 3,461.08 3,501.59 3,747.10
costs (if > 0$) (3,404.07) (3,452.39) (3,366.65) (3,421.73)
Observations 4,219 2,652 21,841 16,671
Panel B: Households without any pre-existing condition:
- Share with pos. OOP 0.57 0.57 0.64 0.62
(excluding premiums)
- Household OOP 654.47 482.25 752.61 746.56
excluding premiums if > $0 (1,389.99) (1,017.22) (1,680.56) (1,693.30)
- Share with pos. 0.20 0.20 0.34 0.39
premium cost
- Household OOP premium 2,559.99 2,492.86 2,812.67 2,902.06
costs (if > 0$) (2,877.00) (2,186.84) (2,872.21) (3,088.56)
Observations 2,559 1,289 14,255 9,211
Notes: See notes from Table 4.1.
38Although this statement applies to the average marginal effects for the entire Medicaid-eligible popu-
lation, it is particularly relevant to households with chronic conditions.
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Households w/ at least one pre-existing condition
Households without any pre-existing condition
Source: MEPS 2010-2016. Regression results from DD OLS regressions for households with and
without at least one pre-existing condition. Pre-existing conditions include: heart attack, coronary
heart disease, angina, other heart disease condition, stroke, emphysema, diabetes, arthritis, high blood
pressure, asthma, high cholesterol, pregnancy, and extreme obesity (BMI≥40). Confidence intervals
based on 95% significance with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regressions are run
separately for households with and without a pre-existing condition.
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Source: MEPS 2010-2016. The left panel shows the log specification of household OOP expenditures
excluding insurance premium costs by household type. Notes from Table 4.5, column (2) apply. The
right panel displays marginal effects from the IHS specification of insurance premium costs by
household type. Notes from Table 4.6, column (1) apply.
A subanalysis by household type (singles, couples without children, single parents
and couples with children) reveals that reductions in OOP medical spending on goods
and services are concentrated among single households and couples without children,
corresponding to the groups most impacted by the ACA Medicaid expansion. Reductions
are roughly equivalent to those found in the causal analysis in Table 4.5, column (2). With
respect to insurance premium costs, single households are driving the overall reduction
in OOP for coverage, albeit likewise at a similar level as that found for the entire sample
and displayed in Table 4.6, column (1).39
4.7 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Policy-makers did not intend the ACA Medicaid expansion to be a budget-neutral reform:
providing free and heavily subsidized health insurance is expensive and many of the in-
tended benefits non-monetary in nature, such as improved physical, mental and financial
39Results are shown for the two specifications for which the main analysis found the largest effects: log
OOP medical expenditures for goods and services and the IHS of insurance premium costs.
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health. The goal of this short-run cost-benefit analysis of the ACA Medicaid expansion is
to highlight the different components of overall costs and benefits of the ACA Medicaid
expansion to eligible households and non-eligible taxpayers and to quantify a ballpark
figure of net social costs and benefits in the three years after the reform. It should not
be seen as exhaustive, but rather a summary measure of the aspects that are measurable
during the first three years following implementation with the data available. Further-
more, the short-run impact may well differ from the medium-term or a long-run analysis,
in which individuals have more time to adjust their behavior and potential health effects
may become apparent. For the short run, net costs of the Medicaid expansion can be
formulated as follows:
Net Costs = (Total Cost)− (Total Benefit)
= (1 +MCF )× (mechanical cost+moral hazard)
− (mechanical gain+ risk protection+ health improvement)
= MCF ×mechanical cost+ (1 +MCF )×moral hazard
− risk protection− health improvement
(4.11)
where MCF stands for the marginal costs of (raising public) funds to finance the reform
and can be considered deadweight loss. I apply the consensus value in the literature of
0.3 (Poterba (1996); Finkelstein and McKnight (2008); Shigeoka (2014); Hendren (2017);
Finkelstein (2018)). Note that the mechanical gain and mechanical cost of the reform
cancel out, as this portion represents a mere transfer value. The following sections discuss
each of these cost and benefit components and provide an overall estimate of the net social
costs of the benefits provided by the ACA expansion of Medicaid eligibility.
4.7.1 Fiscal Costs of Medicaid
I follow Shigeoka (2014) and Hendren (2016) in distinguishing between two types of pro-
gram costs for Medicaid: a ’mechanical cost’ and a ’fiscal externality’, or ’efficiency cost’.
Mechanical costs encompass increases in government spending necessary to extend the
benefit of Medicaid to new recipients, holding the spending behavior of these recipients
constant. Estimating this cost requires a counterfactual thought experiment that answers
the question of how much government would have paid, had Medicaid covered the expen-
ditures of individuals who became eligible for Medicaid in 2014 prior to the reform. To
measure this counterfactual, I define ’would be’ Medicaid eligibility status at the individ-
ual level according to the rules of 2014-2016 for individuals observed in all years prior to
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201440 and calculate the average pre-reform total health care expenditure per individual,
which amounts to about $4,269 annually. Because Medicaid covered an average of 75%
of total expenditures for covered individuals prior to implementation of the ACA in 2014,
I estimate a mechanical cost equal to $3,207/per person annually. Furthermore, a minor
downward adjustment by $14.82 to account for the reduction in public funds spent on this
group for informal public insurance in the form of charity care yields a final mechanical
cost of $3,192.18 that is adjusted to 2017 dollars according to the CPI-med.
As the previous analysis demonstrated, increased health insurance coverage in-
creased total expenditures despite decreasing the fraction paid out of pocket. Part of
this increase stems from the moral hazard efficiency cost of providing insurance. Because
health care prices become relatively less expensive for those receiving heavily subsidized
insurance, people consume more of the good. While it is not possible to exactly dis-
tinguish how much of this increase should be deemed socially inefficient, it is possible
to approximate an upper bound on the moral hazard as the difference between actual
post-reform expenditures and the mechanical cost. Average post-reform expenditures for
individuals in the treatment group amount to $4,335.37. The (upper bound) of the moral
hazard cost is then $1,143.19 annually per person between 2014-2016. The lower bound,
if all additional expenditure is due to previously inefficent lack of access, is zero. How-
ever, given the results from sections 4.5.4 and 4.5.3, it is likely that the true amount is
non-zero. The calculation yields a total per person cost of $5,635.98 ($4, 335.37 × 1.3)
using the upper bound of moral hazard cost.
4.7.2 Social Benefits of Medicaid
Because the mechanical cost of the reform is nothing more than a transfer from taxpayers
to benefit recipients, the mechanical cost is equal to the mechanical gain. Additional ben-
efits may exist if Medicaid expansion prevents bankruptcy due to a catastrophic medical
event. Because I do not observe bankruptcy in the MEPS data, I leave this aspect of
the reform to future research. Omitting this potential benefit would lead to an underesti-
mation of the social benefits from Medicaid. Another additional benefit could stem from
improved health status or increased preventive health behavior that could decrease the
probability of developing a chronic condition and even lead to higher productivity. The
MEPS data is ideal to investigate possible improvements to preventive health behavior
and health status. However, Appendix Table 4.A7 documents that I fail to detect any
40This is the same measure used for the treatment definition of MCAIDACAhst in regression equation 4.3
with the exception that here, it is defined at the individual rather than household level for ease of
interpretation on a per person basis.
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short-run improvements in health status on account of Medicaid expansion.41 Given the
absence of any impact on mental or physical health found in this study, I do not include
any value for improved health in the benefit calculation.
The second part of the total benefit from Medicaid stems from its nature as an
insurance reform that affects the risk of high out of pocket expenditures, as analyzed
in section 4.5.2. At the mean willingness to pay to insure against the risk of any OOP
spending and at a moderate risk aversion parameter of 3, risk protection from Medicaid
is estimated to be valued at roughly $126 annually, as shown in Table 4.7 above.
Inserting the total costs and total benefits calculated above into Equation 4.11 yields
the net social cost of the ACA Medicaid expansion of $2,318/person annually. As discussed
above, this calculation should be interpreted as a rough summary measure of the costs
and benefits of ACA Medicaid expansion, in particular with respect to OOP medical
spending as it influences the household budget of Medicaid-eligible households and non-
eligible taxpayers. It does not include the value of potential improvements to financial
health - not investigated in this paper - or to physical and mental health, which may arise
as a medium-run benefit. Including either of these factors could possibly decrease the net
cost of the reform. Furthermore, the CBA cannot fully account for general equilibrium
effects, in which prices may respond to increasing demand for medical goods and services.
4.8 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper examined the short-run impact of the expansion of Medicaid public insur-
ance under the Affordable Care Act on the out-of-pocket medical spending of low-income
eligible households. I find that Medicaid expansion improved affordability of care for el-
igible households by reducing household out-of-pocket expenditures for medical services
and products by 8.8% (among households with positive expenditures) and for insurance
premia by 12.0%. Reductions in OOP premium costs are driven by households switching
from positive insurance payments to free or nearly free public insurance, indicating some
crowd-out of private from public coverage. Reductions at the mean of total OOP medical
spending (including insurance premia) can be attributed to smaller OOP in particular in
the upper five percent of the OOP distribution, suggesting the largest effect for high-cost
medical events.
In line with the impact of high OOP expenditures in the upper quantiles of the
distribution, Medicaid expansion also reduced the variance of medical payments, which is
41This finding is perhaps unsurprising, as health improvements may not emerge immediately in the short
run. Moreover, the present study finds no improvements in preventive behavior or access to care,
which would be a likely precursor to such improvements.
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assumed to carry additional value for risk-averse households. The risk protection analysis
documents a corresponding value of insuring against the uncertain variance of OOP med-
ical expenditures that is economically small at the mean, but moderately large, roughly
$310 annually, in the upper-most tail of the expected OOP distribution. The presence of
charity care may have dampened the impact of Medicaid on risk protection. Alternatively,
the lack in substantial improvements to access to care may have contributed to a muted
effect.
Whereas Medicaid-eligible households experienced a stark reduction in their own
OOP payments, the total expenditures paid by any source on their behalf increased.
For one standard deviation increase in the share of a household eligible for the ACA
expansion, the reduction in the share paid OOP and the share covered through private
insurance decreased by 7.2% and 4.6%, respectively, and was compensated by a 10.9%
increase in the share paid by the taxpayer through formal and informal public sources,
including charity care. As such, the burden of payment for medical goods and services
shifted from low-income Medicaid-eligible households toward non-eligible taxpayers in a
non-negligible magnitude.
The heterogeneity analysis reveals that households with at least one pre-existing
chronic condition are driving the average reductions in OOP payments among Medicaid-
eligible households, while reductions among those without any illness are statistically
insignificant. The most substantial difference between average effects and those among
chronic households can be seen with respect to insurance premium costs, which lead to
annual savings of $383 in the overall Medicaid-eligible population and $522 among those
with a chronic condition, for each additional standard deviation increase in eligibility.
Despite improvements in affordability for low-income families, the analysis does not
detect substantial improvements with respect to access to urgent care or utilization of
preventive care services and the improvement in access to a regular physician is econom-
ically negligible. I do not find any change in delays to necessary treatment due to the
financial burden of health care costs or changes in self-assessed mental or physical health.
These findings could help to explain why the reduction in spending proved stronger among
households with positive expenditures for medical services and goods, as households with
positive spending already had access to some form of care. However, these results do
not imply that persistent barriers to care are necessarily driving the lack of substantial
changes to access to care. In fact, given the low share of Medicaid-eligible households
reporting lack of access to a usual care provider both before and after the reform, it is
likely that many already in fact did have some form of informal insurance through charity
care. Coupled with the evidence regarding sources of payment, results are in line with the
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hypothesis that pre-reform access to charity care offered informal insurance in particular
against urgent and acute medical needs of low-income households.
The cost-benefit analysis summarizes short-run changes in the incidence of medical
expenditures for taxpayers and recipients induced by the Medicaid expansion component
of the ACA. It quantifies an annual, per person mechanical cost (and subsequent gain)
of $3,207 in transfers from the pool of taxpayers to recipients (some of whom are also
taxpayers), a $14.82 reduction in charity care expenses, a moral hazard cost of $1,143.19
(upper bound) from increased utilization and a moderate average gain of $125.85 in risk
protection, with the moderate latter result likely at least partially attributable to the role
of charity care in previously insuring high-cost expenditures. The net social cost of the
ACA Medicaid expansion in the order of $2,318/person annually serves as a benchmark
going forward, in which potential medium-run financial, physical or mental health benefits
can be monetized and compared. Because previous research has found cost reductions
from health improvements in the context of other reforms to show strongest effects in the
medium or even long run, the current paper leaves for future research the question of
whether these improvements amount to more than the social cost of the reform.
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Table 4.A1: Results for Total OOP Including Households with >400% FPL
Difference-in-Difference (DD) Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD)
OLS Simulated IV OLS Simulated IV
(IHS) (log) (IHS) (log) (IHS) (log) (IHS) (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Medicaid×post -0.209** -0.431*** -0.143 -0.364*** -0.217* -0.357*** -0.361*** -0.418***
(0.096) (0.071) (0.098) (0.075) (0.115) (0.083) (0.135) (0.098)
Subsidy×post 0.059*** 0.030*** 0.078*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.031** 0.088*** 0.070***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.026) (0.019)
Penalty×post 0.018* 0.031*** 0.025** 0.039** 0.045** 0.025 0.165*** 0.104***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.052) (0.036)
State×post controls X X X X
Income group×post controls X X X X
R¯2 0.269 0.269 0.269 0.269
AR-Statistic (H0=weak IVs) 22.67** 24.73*** 24.42*** 29.07***
Observations 104,962 83,134 104,962 83,134 104,962 83,134 104,962 83,134




























Table 4.A2: Results for Total OOP Including Households, Including Years 2007-2016
Difference-in-Difference (DD) Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD)
OLS Simulated IV OLS Simulated IV
(IHS) (log) (IHS) (log) (IHS) (log) (IHS) (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Medicaid×post -0.260*** -0.421*** -0.211** -0.374*** -0.076 -0.259*** -0.221* -0.342***
(0.087) (0.059) (0.091) (0.063) (0.119) (0.085) (0.126) (0.097)
Subsidy×post 0.052*** 0.034*** 0.070*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 0.027** 0.091*** 0.069***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.021) (0.017)
Penalty×post 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.036** 0.025* 0.139*** 0.100***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013) (0.040) (0.032)
State×post controls X X X X
Income group×post controls X X X X
R¯2 0.247 0.237 0.247 0.238
AR-Statistic (H0=weak IVs) 23.16** 28.42*** 23.52*** 28.12***
Observations 101,313 79,437 101,313 79,437 101,313 79,437 101,313 79,437
Source:MEPS 2007-2016. Post = years 2014-2016. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 4.A3: Access to Care: Conditional Means
According to the ACA Medicaid Rules from 2014-2016:
Medicaid Eligible Medicaid Eligible Not Eligible Not Eligible
2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2013 2014-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Due to cost, delayed/forwent:
- Medical care 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03
- Dental care 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.06
- Prescription drugs 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03
- Any care or drugs 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.09
Access to usual care provider:
- Must travel > 30 min. 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07
to USC provider
- Lacks access 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.06
Observations 6,778 3,941 36,096 25,882
Source: MEPS cross-sectional data 2010-2016. Weighted means at the household level using household sample weights.
Households with at least one member becoming eligible through the ACA Medicaid expansion in any year between
2014-2016 are categorized as eligible. Column (1) presents the average value for households that would have been eligible
according to the ACA rules, had the reform been implemented between 2010-2013. Column (2) presents the average value
for the treatment×post group that actually became eligible for Medicaid through the ACA expansion. Columns (3) and (4)
show weighted means for households that would not have met eligibility criteria for the ACA Medicaid expansion in any year.
Table 4.A4: Access to Care: Difference-in-Difference OLS Results
Delayed or forewent the following due to cost: Access to USC Provider:
medical dental prescription any Must travel lacks
care care drugs care >30 min. access
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid×post 0.001 -0.016 0.004 -0.020 -0.003 -0.017**
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008)
Subsidy×post 0.001** 0.001 0.001*** 0.002 -0.001 0.001*
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Penalty×post 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.0005 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
R¯2 0.030 0.042 0.029 0.059 0.016 0.045
Observations 72,697 72,697 72,697 72,697 72,697 72,697
Notes: See notes to Table 4.11.
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Table 4.A5: Preventive Care Service Utilization: Conditional Means
According to the ACA Medicaid Rules from 2014-2016:
Medicaid Eligible Medicaid Eligible Not Eligible Not Eligible
2010-2013 2014-2016 2010-2013 2014-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4)
- Any preventive checks 0.80 0.83 0.82 0.84
- Physical exam 0.47 0.51 0.44 0.46
- Dental checkup 0.44 0.47 0.55 0.58
- Checked blood pressure 0.64 0.68 0.58 0.60
- Checked cholesterol level 0.40 0.46 0.38 0.41
- Received flu shot 0.27 0.31 0.23 0.26
- Prostate exam 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
- Pap smear 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19
- Breast exam 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21
- Mamogram 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10
- Stool test 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
- Colonoscopy 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03
Observations 6,778 3,941 36,096 25,882
Source:MEPS 2010-2016. Weighted shares using household sample weights. The share is taken with
respect to the number of household members asked about each preventive measure in the MEPS,
according to the age and sex for which each is recommended. These target groups are as follows: any
preventive measure (all ages, both sexes); routine physical, dental check-up, blood pressure check,
cholesterol check, flu shot (age>17, both sexes); prostate exam (age >39, males); pap smear test, breast





























Table 4.A6: Difference-in-Difference OLS Results: Changes in Preventive Care
Share of household utilizing the following preventive services in the past 12 months:
Any blood Pap blood
preventive Routine Dental pressure cholesterol Flu Prostate smear Breast Mamo- stool colon-
measure physical check-up check check shot exam test exam gram test oscopy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Medicaid×post 0.018 -0.006 0.022 0.002 0.027 0.010 0.020 -0.005 -0.037 -0.021 0.012 0.016
(0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.012) (0.010)
Subsidy×post -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.004*** 0.004** 0.0005 -0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Penalty×post -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.001 -0.001 0.0001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
R¯2 0.030 0.065 0.106 0.050 0.117 0.039 0.096 0.042 0.027 0.122 0.036 0.025
Observations 72,697 72,697 72,697 72,697 72,697 72,697 20,854 49,300 49,300 37,685 37,802 37,802
Source:MEPS 2010-2016. Post = years 2014-2016. Weighted OLS DD results using household sample weights. All regressions contain controls for year and
state fixed effects, local county unemployment rate, household income group, household type (single, couple without children, family with children) and the
race/ethnic origin (non-exclusive dummies for black, white, Hispanic) and age of the head of household. The share is taken with respect to the number of
household members asked about each preventive measure in the MEPS, according to the age and sex for which each is recommended. These target groups are as
follows: any preventive measure (all ages, both sexes); routine physical, dental check-up, blood pressure check, cholesterol check, flu shot (age>17, both sexes);
prostate exam (age >39, males); pap smear test, breast exam (age>17, females); mammogram (age>29, females); blood stool test and colonoscopy (age >39,
both sexes). Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 4.A7: Self-Assessed Mental and Physical Health Status: Difference-in-Difference
OLS Results
Average Average poor poor
MCS PCS physical mental Share with
score score health health Depression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Medicaid×post -0.288 -0.685 -0.004 0.004 0.012
(0.479) (0.418) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011)
Subsidy×post -0.071 -0.043 0.0003** -0.0001 0.002***
(0.056) (0.036) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001)
Penalty×post -0.004 -0.044 0.001 0.00001 0.002*
(0.033) (0.028) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.001)
R¯2 0.064 0.182 0.027 0.007 0.065
Observations 66,399 66,363 72,697 72,697 72,697
Source:MEPS Self-Assessed Questionnaire (SAQ), cross-sectional data 2010-2016. Weighted OLS DD
results using household sample weights. Post = years 2014-2016; MCS score = mental component sum-
mary score; PCS = physical component summary score. MCS and PCS measures are generated MEPS
variables based on the trademark algorithm of Ware et al. (2002), which computes a weighted average
of 12 questions assessing current mental and physical well-being indicators from the self-assessed MEPS
questionnaire. Columns (3) and (4) show results for the share of the household reporting poor physical
and/or mental health on a 5 point ordinal scale (excellent, very good, good, fair, poor). Column (5)
reports the share of the household with depression, defined as having a Kessler Index score of at least 3/6
(see Kessler et al. (2002); Kroenke et al. (2003)). All regressions contain controls for year and state fixed
effects, local county unemployment rate, household income group, household type (single, couple with-
out children, family with children) and the race/ethnic origin (non-exclusive dummies for black, white,
Hispanic) and age of the head of household. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 4.A8: Medicaid Eligibility vs. Receipt
Difference-in-Difference Difference-in-Difference-
(DD) in-Difference (DDD)
OLS Simulated IV OLS Simulated IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicaid×post 0.157*** 0.163*** 0.110*** 0.145***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Subsidy×post -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Penalty×post -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
R¯2 0.309 0.308 0.308 0.307
Observations 72682 72682 72682 72682
Source: MEPS cross-sectional data 2010-2016.
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation setzt sich aus vier empirischen Forschungsartikeln zusammen. Das
erste Kapitel entstand in Zusammenarbeit mit David Neumark. In diesem Papier un-
tersuchen wir die Treibkra¨fte sinkender Jugenderwerbsta¨tigkeit in den USA, die sich seit
2000 fu¨r 16-17-Ja¨hrige am sta¨rksten abzeichnet. Insbesondere beru¨cksichtigen wir drei
mo¨gliche Erkla¨rungsfaktoren, die am ha¨ufigsten in der Literatur und in der o¨ffentlichen
Debatte ero¨rtert werden: erho¨hte Mindestlo¨hne, die die Bescha¨ftigungschancen junger
Menschen einschra¨nken ko¨nnten; steigende Bildungsertra¨ge, die Investitionen in den eige-
nen akademischen Erfolg rentabler machen und den Arbeitsmarktwettbewerb durch Mi-
granten, der, a¨hnlich wie Mindestlo¨hne, Jugendliche aus dem Markt auspreisen ko¨nnte.
Um dieser Frage nachzugehen, scha¨tzen wir ein multinominales Logit-Modell unter Ver-
wendung von CPS-Daten (Current Population Survey) und erga¨nzenden Quellen, um die
Auswirkung dieser Faktoren auf den Anteil der Jugendlichen in Arbeit, in einer Bildungs-
maßnahme oder einer Kombination von beiden zu bestimmen. Von den untersuchten
Erkla¨rungsfaktoren stellen sich Mindestlo¨hne als der sta¨rkste Faktor heraus, der die Er-
werbsta¨tigkeit junger Menschen senkt. Wettbewerb von Immigration spielt womo¨glich
eine minderwertige, aber signifikante Rolle wa¨hrend wir keine Evidenz fu¨r die Relevanz
von steigenden Bildungsertra¨gen finden.
Wa¨hrend Kapitel eins die zeitliche und ra¨umliche Variation von inkrementellen Min-
destlohnerho¨hungen in den US-Bundesstaaten fu¨r die Identifikation kausaler Effekte ver-
wendet, erfolgt die Identifikation im Kapitel zwei mittels eines Differenz-von-Differenzen-
Ansatzes infolge einer verha¨ltnisma¨ßig großen Reform. Dieses Kapitel untersucht die
Auswirkungen der Einfu¨hrung eines fla¨chendeckenden Mindestlohns 2015 in Deutschland
auf die Reservationslo¨hne der nichtarbeitenden Bevo¨lkerung. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass
die Mindestlohneinfu¨hrung zu einer Anhebung der Lohnerwartungen um 18 Prozent unter
nichterwerbsta¨tigen Arbeitssuchenden gefu¨hrt hat. Diesen Erkenntnissen zufolge fu¨hren
Mindestlo¨hne nicht zwangsla¨ufig zu einer erho¨hten Arbeitsmarktpartizipation, da Ar-
beitssuchende ihre Reservationslo¨hne entsprechend anpassen ko¨nnten.
Wie die ersten zwei Kapitel, widmet sich Kapitel drei der Erkla¨rung von Arbeit-
sangebotsentscheidungen auf der individuellen Ebene, allerdings mit besonderer Betrach-
tung des Haushaltskontextes. Dieses Kapitel analysiert inwieweit die jeweiligen Steuer-
Transfer-Systeme in 12 europa¨ischen La¨ndern zu unterschiedlichen Arbeitsanreizen und
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Erwerbsta¨tigenraten beitragen. Auf der Basis von EUROMOD-Daten und dem harmon-
isierten Mikrosimulationsmodell berechnen wir Partizipationssteuersa¨tze (PTRs) und un-
tersuchen ihre Auswirkung auf die Erwerbswahrscheinlichkeit. Die Ergebnisse weisen
heterogene Elastizita¨ten auf, die, unabha¨ngig vom Geschlecht, fu¨r Zweitverdiener am
gro¨ßten und bei Erstverdienern vernachla¨ssigbar sind. Daher weist diese Analyse auf die
Wichtigkeit hin, heterogene Elastizita¨ten des Arbeitsangebotes auf der Basis o¨konomis-
cher Konzepte wie Opportunita¨tskosten anstatt Geschlecht zu messen.
Kapitel vier untersucht schließlich die Auswirkungen einer wichtigen Sachleistung,
na¨mlich der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung, auf das medizinische Ausgabenverhalten
von Haushalten mit niedrigem Einkommen in den USA. Die Analyse setzt empirisch auf
dem Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS) und einem quasi-natu¨rlichen Experi-
ment durch die Ausweitung von Medicaid unter dem Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA) auf. Die Anspruchskriterien fu¨r Medicaid werden verwendet, um die
Programmteilnahme (Anspruchsberechtigung) auf individueller Ebene zu bestimmen und
die Teilnahmeintensita¨t auf der Haushaltebene als den Anteil der Anspruchsberechtigten
im Haushalt zu definieren.
Die Ergebnisse aus den Differenz-von-Differenzen(-von-Differenzen) (DD und DDD)
Ansa¨tzen mithilfe der Variation u¨ber Regionen, Zeit und Einkommensgruppen zeigen,
dass eine Standardabweichung nach oben im Anteil der berechtigten Haushaltsmitglieder
die eigenen Auslagen fu¨r medizinische Versorgung und Produkte um 8,8 Prozent und die
Auslagen fu¨r Krankenversicherung um 12,0 Prozent verringert. Des Weiteren reduziert
die Anspruchsberechtigung auf die gesetzliche Krankenversicherung das Risiko, besonders
hohen Auslagen ausgesetzt zu sein. Dennoch, obwohl Gesundheitsleistungen moneta¨r er-
schwinglicher fu¨r anspruchsberechtigte Haushalte werden, finde ich weder Effekte auf den
Zugang zu akut beno¨tigter Versorgung noch auf die Inanspruchnahme von pra¨ventiven
Maßnahmen, die von der gesetzlichen Versicherung abgedeckt werden. Die Ergebnisse
weisen auf eine Verdra¨ngung privater Versicherung um 4,6 Prozent, aber auch auf eine
Kostenreduzierung beim ineffizienten ’Charity Care’, oder informeller Sorgearbeit, zu-
gunsten formeller gesetzlicher Versicherung hin. Insgesamt erho¨ht die Anspruchsberechti-
gung auf Medicaid den Anteil der Kosten fu¨r Gesundheitsleistungen, die vom Steuerzahler
u¨bernommen werden, um 10,9 Prozent.
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